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Summary 
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by 
Arthur C. Williamson 
This study suggests that, from a situation where co-operation between the British 
Army and the RAF in south-east Asia hardly existed it grew to have a profound effect 
on the course of the war in Burma, particularly in air supply. The evidence shows that 
air supply became critical to the successful prosecution of the campaign. The study 
also challenges the view that air interdiction is always of major importance in land 
campmgns. 
The Malayan defence strategy was flawed as a result of pre-war misconceptions and 
prejudices, exacerbated by institutional bureaucracy and fiscal restrictions. Burma, a 
'Cinderella' defence area, was a case of too little, too late. In the first year of the war; 
given the problems of finance, labour for defence works and reinforcements, even 
extensive co-operation between the army and the air force might not have produced a 
different result, but it might have made defeat less ignominious. 
Underlying the Burma campaign, there were two fundamental factors outside climate 
and terrain affecting co-operation. Distances and the multiplicity of the Allied aims. 
Distance detrimentally affected surface transport and US support of China and 
establishing airfields to bomb Japan, caused the air supply 'Hump' route to be a 
constant drain on resources. A comparison with the Berlin Airlift indicates the scale 
of effort required by the air supply needs in Burma. This was at a level far greater 
than elsewhere throughout the Second World War and provides unwitting evidence 
for the unparalleled levels of inter-Service co-operation which these operations 
demonstrated. 
The particular approach to the study was partially determined by the scarcity of 
documentation, consequently the analysis has been fraught with difficulties. 
Admirable campaign histories exist, but these also have been shaped by the available 
documentation and secondary sources, all serving to accentuate the methodological 
problems. Despite these difficulties this research has proved the vital importance of 
inter-Service co-operation in the Burma campaign. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Co-operation between the army and air force is a vast subject for it covers most aspects 
of military operations from close air support and air supply to the purely physical 
aspects of keeping an army mobile 'in the field' of battle. Certain aspects of co-
operation such as close air support, have been amply covered in other campaigns but 
little has been done in the area covered by the acronym, SEAC. Whilst there is much 
on the ground and air war in the sense of 'blow by blow' accounts and memoirs, more 
specifically, little seems to have been done in the important field of co-operation 
between the two services. The British XIV Army and its sister services in Burma were 
known as the 'Forgotten Army' and in a way this was true. Without co-operation at the 
levels that were reached in Burma, the campaign, starved as it was of the essential 
mi'c;tht- 'n"-"e -\'-o..'-l.d ~ 
materiels of war and at the end of a very long supply line, it is possible that the 
" Japanese might have been able to invade India. Co-operation at Imphal changed the 
whole course of the campaign and was then instrumental in destroying the Japanese 
Southern Area command under General Count Tenauchi.l In this respect co-
operation was vital to the Allied forces and was a major instrument in the defeat of 
the Japanese. 
Discussion into the war in south-east Asia requires a background knowledge of the 
approach to war and a basic understanding of the need for co-operation. Co-operation, 
IX 
first established during World War 1, fell by the wayside in the inter-war years, and "\k.. -tln~t"'=>sho~ 
~c.l\ how it was that the military authorities failed to take appropriate measures for its 
recreation and resurgence. 
The Burma campaign was fought amidst the conflicting war aims of the three major 
powers involved and the movement for Indian independence. It is arguably the most 
complex campaign of the Second World War. Against this background the question 
posed is how important were the levels of co-operation between the British army and 
the air force, to their defeats in the land battles in Malaya, Singapore and Burma and 
later for their success in the re-conquest of Burma? Air support, is not a sine qua non 
for military success and the history of the Second World War is replete with examples 
to the contrary, such as the German defence of Monte Cassino and Caen and the later 
German offensive in the Ardennes during the winter of 1944. However, these 
particular episodes are arguably exceptions to 'the rule'.2 There are by way of contrast, 
1 Mark tvi.BoatJ1er IlL The Biographical Dictionary of World War I! .. Novato, Ca. Presido 1996. pp. 558-9. 
Richard Fuller.Shokan: Hirohito's Samurai, London, Arms and Armour 1992. pp. 2 15-7. 
2 The German forces were, Luf/waffe paratroops, the 12th Waffen-SS Hitle1jugend Division and SSPanzers, all 
were militaJ)' formations with exceptionally high levels ofespiril de c01ps. 
many examples where the use of air support has affected the land battle and staved off 
defeat or reduced the enemy to such levels of impotence that any potential offensive 
capability has ceased to exist. Underlying this telling use of air support are the levels 
of co-operation that exists at any one time between the army and the air force, for it is 
co-operation which determines its effectiveness. 
Successful co-operation during the Second World War between the army and the air 
force is generally understood, to apply to close air support and air interdiction. This 
view of successful co-operation is essentially true of the campaigns in the western 
Desert, Italy and north-west Europe where these concepts developed and it appears to 
have become the accepted wisdom on the subject. However, this is a relatively 
simplistic hypothesis when seen in the context of the war in south-east Asia where 
there was an exceptional terrain and climate and a determined enemy. Under these 
circumstances co-operation evolved in a manner that was both comprehensive and 
intricate and essentially different to that elsewhere. The accepted shibboleths of air 
power were not true of the war in Burma. Different scales of values and priorities 
determined the effective use of co-operation, values that were unlike those of other 
campaigns. Interdiction for example, had arguably less impact on the conduct of the 
land battle than was evident elsewhere. In Burma the enemy's reduced logistic 
requirements tended to emasculate the effects of interdiction. In some ways it was a 
precursor to future wars in the the twentieth century. In Vietnam, despite 
overwhelming air superiority air interdiction failed to close the Ho Chi Minh TraiP 
The terrain however, and a lack of communications and a major seaport dictated that 
air transport and air superiority became overriding factors in co-operation and the 
land operations. On it hung the balance between success or failure. 
Both the army and air force subordinated their service ethos to the common objective 
and became in effect, a joint service. Under these circumstances those other elements 
of co-operation, close air support and interdiction, whilst important, were a bonus for 
the land operations. This situation cotinued until the port of Rangoon was recaptured 
with its road and rail connections into the hinterland. Only then did the importance of 
of air transport gradually diminish. The exception to this was in north Burma where 
the capture of the airfield at Meiktila provided a major air base for the 'Hump' route to 
China and the objective of Stilwells' offensive. The remainder of the campaign 
remained a bitterly and hard fought 'mopping up' operation as the remnants of the 
Japanese army formations attempted to escape from encirclement by the 14th Army. 
Close air support co-operation then followed much the same pattern as in campaigns 
3 See Robert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Classic History of Guerrilla Wmjare from AncienT Persia to 
the Present. London, Little, Brown 1994. p. 1017. · · 
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elsewhere. The period up to the capture of Rangoon was unique in the annals of 
modem warfare where for the first time, an army relied almost totally on the air force 
for its logistic needs. 
The extremely poor land communications and the Monsoon meant that air transport 
was to play a key role not only for logistic support but also for morale. Without this 
level of co-operation, victory would possibly not have been achieved in Burma 
without using levels of resources and accepting rates of casualties that would not have 
been sustainable and would arguably not received the necessary support from the 
public at such a late period in the war. 
Co-operation between the RAF and the other Services is now an accepted routine in 
all military operations, whether it be warfare between nation states or in Peace '3u~pcc+ 
Operations. During World War I inter-service co-operation had steadily increased to a 
point where it was beginning to be seen as an essential part of modern wmfare and 
especially during the Allied advances in France in 1918. In the inter-war years the 
lessons that had been learned were largely ignored and co-operation was in limbo. 
Before World War Il co-operation between the RAF and the Army was the exception 
rather than the rule. It continued only in British administered overseas territories 
where the British and Indian army were frequently in conflict with local dissidents in 
places like Iraq, Palestine and India. The use of the RAF in these areas was often 
controversial and not without its critics4. Attempts were made by certain RAF officers 
in the inter-war years to produce serious studies of the need for army and air force co-
operation but they had little influence on the military thinking of the day. The RAF 
was also preoccupied with its survival as a single service and later with the prospect 
of an imminent European war. After a slow start, World War Il was to usher in a new 
era of co-operation between the Air Force and the Army and in this regard the Burma 
campaign in South-East Asia stands out. 
The stunning success of the German Luftwajfe in supporting the Wehrmacht in 
Poland, France and later on the island of Crete came as a great shock to the British in 
World War II and was to cause a radical reappraisal of co-operation between the Air 
Force and the Army. Slow to get started, it was in the Western Desert campaigns of 
early 1941 that the RAF again began to appreciate the importance of co-operation 
with the Army and the necessity for close air support. In many respects they were 
4 In this respect see Tow le, Phi lip, Pi lots and Rebels, The use of aircraft in unconventional warjf:tre 1918-1988, 
Brassey's UK, London 1989, Hoffman, Bruce, British Air Power in Peripheral CoJ!flict, 191 9-1976, RAND, 
Santa Monica 1989 and Omissi, Dav id E., Air Power and Colonial Control, Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 1990. 
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relearning the lessons their predecessors had learnt in World War I, but they were also 
able to go a step further, for modern aircraft gave rise to greater possibilities of 
exploiting air interdiction by destroying enemy lines of communication and supply 
points at considerable distances behind the battlefront and so influencing the outcome 
of the ground battle. 
In 1940, France fell and Italy entered the war on the side of Germany, and these 
events were to affect the military situation in South-East Asia. Prior to the 
commencement of hostilities in South-East Asia, all the Services had suffered from 
severe cut-backs in equipment, training and a drain of experienced personnel resulting 
from the demands of the other theatres of war. Throughout the early stages in the 
campaign in Malaya and Burma, when the British and allied forces were being forced 
to withdraw, each Service fought its own battle for survival and co-operation only 
occurred at low levels of command. Even then it was on a personal and ad hoc basis 
and when requested. The air force did its best to provide some air reconnaissance and 
close support whenever it was possible and the army tried to provide a measure of 
Anti-aircraft (AA) cover and ground defence for airfields. In Burma this situation was 
repeated. For the Allied land and air forces in South-East Asia, co-operation was a 
story of evolution, fuelled by a growing understanding of the needs of the other 
Service and the desperate circumstances of the time, by learning to cope with the 
geographical demands of the area, by the steady improvements in communications 
and increasingly reliable supply lines and by the increases in men and modern 
equipment, especially for the air forces. Burma was a watershed in co-operation, not 
only in terms of tactical and strategic support for the ground forces but also in terms 
of air transport, which gave the British Army a level of battlefield mobility hitherto 
unknown. As well as being of major importance in their own right the events in 
Burma were to profoundly influence the future development and uses of air power. 
There are few campaigns for which so much can be claimed. 
The key to success in the war in south-east Asia was undoubtedly in the uses of air 
power, partly brought about by the unique circumstances in the theatre; weather, 
terrain and distance.5 As the Japanese Army Air Force (JAA\) was gradually forced on 
to the defensive in 1944, it could no longer threaten either North-East India nor the 
shipping in the Bay of Bengal. The dominant position of air power had been 
established at the opening stages of the war in south-east Asia when the Japanese air 
forces destroyed allied air opposition and within days of the opening of hostilities, 
had sunk two capital ships. Following this and without air cover, denied air 
5 The geographical conditions in New Guinea were somewhat similar but on a smaller scale. 
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reconnaissance and air intelligence, the British were forced to fight the ensuing battles 
militarily blind. These experiences were to act as a powerful stimulant to the Allies in 
the development of an allied air strategy that would exploit the use of the air to 
overcome the vagaries of the climate, the difficult terrain and the huge distances 
involved. As the build-up of the allied air forces took place, dedicated air 
reconnaissance units were established and in late 1943, air superiority was gradually 
obtained over the battle front and later over the essential air transport corridors. Air 
superiority meant effective close air support and interdiction which reduced the 
logistic support to the Japanese Army and affected its ability to remain a potent 
fighting force. It also limited the Japanese tactical mobility and in turn denied the 
Japanese army aerial reconnaissance, an essential aspect of modem warfare. 
However, perhaps the most important lesson was that the Japanese had either failed to 
recognise or simply could not apply, the use of air transport as a 'weapon'. It meant 
large scale army mobility coupled with supply irrespective of either weather or terrain 
and the ability to evacuate casualties. 
Air Superiority 
A pre-requisite for successful air force co-operation with the Army or Navy is the 
attainment of air superiority, especially over the battlefield. However, in conventional 
warfare air superiority, by its very nature, is only a temporary phenomenon and must 
be continually contested unless the enemy air force has been destroyed or reduced to 
such a level that it is unable to successfully challenge for the necessary air space. This 
had been established during the First World War by the RFC at the Battle of the 
Somme and the RAF at the Second Battle of the Marne in 1918 when aircraft in close 
support of the army had been used extensively.6 
Air superiority can be attained in several ways; by the superior petformance of 
aircraft, by numerical superiority, by attrition or by effective counter-air actions. For 
example, the Italian Air Force, the Regia Aeronautica, during the Second World War, 
equipped as it was at the outbreak of war with obsolete aircraft which were never 
super.';)eded in sufficient numbers, generally failed to establish air superiority at any 
point during the war. Whereas, the Soviet Air Force, which also began the war with 
obsolete aircraft and almost immediately lost air superiority battle, was gradually able 
to replace these aircraft with more modem types in vastly superior numbers to the 
Luftwaffe and consequentally gradually gained air superiority over the Russian 
battlefield resulting in notable close air support to the Red Army. A converse 
situation occurred with the Japanese Air Forces. From a position of being equipped 
6 Jolm Terraine, The First World War 1914-18, London, Macmillan 1965, Papermac 1984, p.167. The RFC had 
been part of the army but became the independent ·RAF on the 1st April 1918. 
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with superior fighter aircraft, their development and production of more modern 
aircraft increasingly lagged behind the Allies as the war in the Far East progressed. 
The western powers were able to establish air superiority with the subsequent 
contribution to the war. on the ground. In modern warfare it is evident that, since the 
introduction of military aircraft into the surface battle, the tide of battle has been 
frequently governed by the fortunes of the air forces engaged on either side. 
Close Air Support 
Close air support is the tactical air support of the forces on the ground. This involves 
aircraft flying at relatively low altitudes to attack enemy troops, artillery and heavily 
fortified positions and consequently means the aircraft involved being exposed to a 
greater risk than normal to enemy AA fire and in mountainous geographical regions, 
to greater flying hazards. In Burma close air support was initially provided by fighter 
aircraft using their armament to strafe Japanese troops and later by the use of 
specialised dive-bombers, the only dive-bombers used by the RAF and the Indian Air 
Force (IAF) during the Second World War.7 They were superseded by fighter-
bombers and rocket firing aircraft when these became available. Close air support was 
virtually essential in North Bum1a where, largely clue to the terrain and jungle, 
accurate and sustained artillery support was almost impossible. An almost unknown 
and innovative aspect of air support in Burma was the use of fighter bombers carrying 
underwing smoke canisters filled with DDT, when it became available, to spray in 
front of the leading elements of the army to reduce the incidence of Malaria amongst 
Allied troops in the Kabaw Valley, an area notorious for the disease. 
Air Interdiction 
The aim of air interdiction is to destroy, dismpt or neutralise enemy forces before 
they can be brought into action. Air interdiction was of limited importance during the 
Burma campaign. Eduard Mark comments that, " ... [it] has been practicable only 
under specific conditions".8 He states that the success of air interdiction depends on 
certain factors such as, the methods of transport used by the opposing forces, its 
capacity, the distances involved and the daily demands of the battlefront. All of these 
elements were important in Burma. The classic example of successful air interdiction 
where terrain was an important factor, was 'Operation Strangle' during the Italian 
campaign in 1944. The capacity of the Italian railways under Axis control, was 
7 The Vengeance dive-bomber was also used by the RAAF in the south-west Pacific. The RNZAF used the US 
SBD-3 Dauntless. See Peter C. Smith, Jungle Dive-Bombers at War, London, John Murray 1987. pp. 54-71 and 
pp. 105-125. 
8 Mmk, Eduard, Aerial Interdiction in Three Wars, Air power in the Land Battles in Three American Wars, Center 
for Air Force History, Washington D.C. 1994, p. 404. 
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reduced by the use of air interdiction from 80,000 to 4,000 tons per day.9This was to 
have a major impact on the German sunender in May 1945.10 
Air Intelligence 
Air Intelligence is provided by the use of aerial photography and by physical 
observation of the ground. This form of tactical air intelligence is of particular 
importance to the artillery. During the Japanese invasion air intelligence was 
generally denied to the British defence by the JAAF but the position was completely 
reversed in 1944 in Burma when Spitfires were able to destroy the, up until then, 
invulnerable Japanese Mitsubishi Ki-46, Type 100 Twin-engined 'Dinah' 
reconnaissance aircraft. Such was the desperation of the Japanese field commanders 
for information that these aircraft were continually being sent over Allied lines in 
spite of the crippling losses which they were incurring. 
Air Transport 
The part played by the RAF and USAAF air transport squadrons was of critical 
importance in the war in Burma. From very limited beginnings air transport grew to 
unprecedented levels in Burma. The air forces provided logistic support in the form of 
materiel and troops by air, often in the form of air drops, by the use of a parachute or 
directly without a parachute. They also provided crucial casualty evacuation from 
airstrips close to the front line. Casualty evacuation by air meant that, the time 
normally spent in transporting the wounded and sick to a hospital was reduced from 
days to hours. The effect on the morale of the troops on the ground was of 
incalculable importance as well as increasing the percentage of those men who were 
capable of returning to their military Units and dramatically reducing the length of 
time that they were casualties. Air transport was also particularly important in 
carrying important but fragile medical supplies, such as blood plasma, where formerly 
there had been a high incidence of breakages. In contrast, the Japanese never 
developed the transport component of their air force and this caused detrimental 
consequences for the logistic support of their ground forces. Crucial to the success of 
the air transport operations was the attainment of air superiority, necessary if the 
vulnerable transport aircraft were to be able to accomplish their tasks. 
During the invasion of Malaya and later Burma, the JAAF proved to be masters of the 
art of air power tactics. They clearly understood the need for air superiority and their 
9 For a detailled discussion see Eduard Mark, Aerial Interdiction in Three Wars: Air Power and the Land Battle in 
Three American Wars, Wa~hington DC, Centre for Air froce History 1994. pp.l43-78. 
10 Eric Linklater,The Campaign in Italy, London. HMSO 1951, and Kesselring, Albrecht , The lvlemoirs of Field 
Marshal Kesselring, London, William Kimber 1953, repr. London, Greenhill Books 1988. 
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primary target was the destruction of allied air power following which they were then 
able to devote the majority of their air operations to supporting the Japanese Army. 
Such was the success of these operations that a Japanese 'mind-set' appeared to 
develop which induced, the Japanese to believe that fighters and bombers were the 
main instruments in the use of air power, and air transport a subsidiary activity. 
At the outbreak of hostilities in the Far East counter-air action was initially planned 
and taken at a tactical level. The air forces involved were operating at a considerable 
distances from their respective homelands and centres of production. As a 
consequence, they had limited resources and reserves. The answer to this for an 
attacking force was counter-air a tactic which was very successfully used by the 
Japanese. The destruction of over fifty percent of the Allied air force in Malaya 
within the first twenty four hours of the commencement of the first attack at Kota 
Bharu gave the Japanese army an undeniable advantage over their opponents. 
However, the case for counter-air action is not as clear cut as may be assumed and 
depends on two important factors; the distances involved and the geographical 
location of the air battle. This aspect of air warfare has been described as the 'force 
gradient' by Professor Philip Sabin who has pointed out it is an important factor in 
battles. 11 In Malaya, the RAF were attempting to operate from a disadvantageous 
position, using the island of Singapore as their main base, both for fighter and bomber 
operations. The Japanese operated from forward airfields much closer to the critical 
air space over northern and central Malaya and where the ability of the British to 
contest that air space was minimal. The 'force gradient' operated to the Japanese 
advantage, the allied airfields were usually within Japanese fighters range whereas 
the Japanese held airfields were usually out of the range of the British fighters and 
relatively invulnerable to ground attack. 
However, from late 1942 onwards the Allied air forces gradually started to change the 
tactical air situation in Burma and eventually completely reversed the situation and 
gained air superiority. Air superiority was matched with an effective use of close air 
support for the ground forces. The ability to insert and supply and support long range 
ground forces, often to destinations deep behind Japanese lines was vital to Stilwell's 
campaign in the north. Of particular importance in this respect was Colonel (Flip) 
Cochran USAAF and his special forces air force, the 'No. I Air Commando' . 
ll Professor Philip Sabin, KCL. See Dr. Philip Sahin's chapter, 'The Counter Air Contest', in Lambert, A.P. N., 
Group Capt. RAF and Williamson, A1thur C. (eds), Dynamics of Air Power, MOD, RAF Staff College, Bracknell , 
1996, for a full discussion of the subject. 
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Logistic air support for the army is now seen as commonplace, but in 1943 these were 
very new and untried operations developed in one of the most difficult geographical 
and meteorological air operations theatres of the Second World War I. With close air 
support they were a major contributing factor which led to the eventual surrender of 
the enemy. Air support had to be given time to evolve and, quoting from Dr. Richard 
Muller's study of the Luftwaffe experience in Russia, 
"Just as the entire methodology of close air support grew up at the tactical 
level, suggestions for the constant improvement of that capability also 
originated from the lower echelons" . 12 
This was also true of the Allies in Butma. 
For the Allied land and air forces in South-East Asia , inter-service co-operation is a 
story of evolution fuelled by a growing understanding of needs. Learning to cope with 
the geographical demands of the area and overcoming the lack of land 
communications was a vital part of that process which was also to l~ to an 
increasingly reliable logistic situation. It seems appropriate to quote Martin Caidin 
who wrote that one of the major reasons for the Japanese defeat was their 11 •• .failure to 
understand the true meaning of airpower. 11 l3 Surely this is true of air transport. 
One other factor originally affected the RAF, they were sadly misinformed as to the 
capabilities of their opponents and their aircraft, 'Prejudice and racial stereotypes 
frequently distorted both Japanese and Allied evaluations of the enemy's intentions 
and capabilities'.14 Allied pilots soon came to respect the prowess of the Japanese 
airmen and as a consequence quickly 'honed' their own skills. Racial attitudes 
certainly had a detrimental effect on the defence of Malaya; the Japanese were 
underestimated and the British failed to gain and mobilise the support of the non-
European races in south-east Asia. IS S ubseq uentally there grew up the opposite belief 
that the Japanese soldier was some sort of superman in the jungle which bedevilled 
the army in the first years of the war in south-east Asia. This in turn, was dispelled by 
General Wingate's Chindit expeditions behind Japanese lines. Prejudice and 
stereotyping of their enemies equally affected Japanese judgements and were factors 
that were not appreciated by their High Command until after the battle of lmphal in 
1944. Here General Mutaguchi's blithe assumptions of a victory were to have 
12 Muller, Richard, The German Air War in Russia, The Nautical & Av iation Publishing Company of America, 
Baltimore 1993 (2nd printing) , p. 86. 
13 Caidin, Martin. The Ragged, Rugged Warriors, NY, Elsev ier-Dutlon 1966, p. xv i. 14 Dower, John W. , War Wi!hout M.ercy: Race and power inlhe Pacific War, London, Faber and Faber 1986. 
p.11 . 
15 W. David Maclntyre, The Rise and Fall of/he Singapore Naval Base, 1919-1942. London, ~vfacrnillan 1979. 
pp. 222-28. Maclntyre has some interesting observations on this subject and records valuable comments by 
various 'infom1ed' orticials and others. . 
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disas'trous results and ultimately led to the defeat of the Japanese Army in Burma. 16 
For all concerned, Burma was a bmtal and very steep learning curve. 
Operational research . 
One of the standard sources of analysis of the effects of air actions, are the reports 
produced by the Operational Research Sections (ORS). This was particularly so for 
close air support, most notably in northern Europe and to a lesser extent in Italy. Ian 
Gooderson in his study of Close Air Support during the Second World War says that, 
it was the wealth and availability of ORS reports in the geographical areas of North-
West Europe and Italy that influenced his decision to elect to study close air support 
there rather than elsewhere, in particular, in south-east Asia where ORS records are 
limited.l7 The 'Germany first' policy led to a scarcity of trained personnel in this 
theatre and research into the war in south-east Asia has possibly been restrained by 
the lack of source material. Probably due to this there have been less published 
studies of this war, apart from Official Histories, biographies and reminiscences, than 
of other Theatres of the Second World War. 
Clearly an explaination is required of the difficuties of researching into this particular 
area of the war. There is a paucity of evidence in the form of written records for the 
war in Malaya and Burma. Perhaps this should not be surprising as military 
commands and administrations were increasingly undermanned as the defence forces 
expanded. It seems that the written record was either destroyed or simply fell by the 
wayside in the light of more pressing and urgent needs and for meetings, conferences 
and orders as well as requests, to go more and more unrecorded. At the lower levels 
of command the verbal seems to have become the order of the day. This appears to 
have been particlarly so in the area of co-operation. 
These points are made in much of the literature. Clearly this is not an ideal situation 
but, there is unwitting evidence which the writings frequently reveal and which may 
corroborate a variety of situations and events. 
This lack of original material in this period was also partly the result of a deliberate 
policies to destroy records, certainly during the retreats. For example, the Operational 
Records of No. 21 RAAF squadron cease after November 1941. Also, before 
16 Louis Alien, 'Mutaguchi Renya and the Invasion of India , 1944', pp. 215-39, in Brian Bond, ed., Fallen Stars, 
Eleven Studies ofTwentielh Mililwy Disasters , London, Brassey's 1991 , General Renya Mutaguchi was U1e 
Commander of the Japanese 15th Army and was in conunand of Operation 'U-GO', the failed attack on Imphal in 
lviarch 1944. He was personally ambitious and a\lempted to lmn this limited otlensive into an invasion of India, 
colloquially known as 'The March on Dehli'. 
17 Gooderson, Ian, Air Power all he Battlefi·om; Allied Close Air Support in Europe 1943-45. Frank Cass, London 
1998. See his Introduction, passim. · 
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sun-ender takes place those records that have not already been moved are normally 
destroyed. Photographs and newsreels of documents being incinerated in the 
compounds of military headquarters or embassies such as the US Embassy in Saigon 
are common enough. However, the destruction of documentation will also occur as 
part of a normal existing military culture. In this context it is worth noting the 
following written order, 
This Operational Instruction [No. 12/44 on the subject of fighter escorts for 
transport aircraft] cancels Operational Instruction No.8 dated 30th March, 
1944, which is to be destroyed by fire. 18 
It is impossible to estimate how much material was destroyed in this manner but, this 
kind of instruction is common in military circles, especially on active service and in 
fluid or climatically adverse situations and where the available transport is used to 
move the military important supplies. 
NOTE: The Japanese convention of putting the family name first has been used 
throughout to avoid confusion and where this has been found necessary to identify 
particular Japanese Officers. 
18 PRO AIR 23/2()15, Eastern Air Command, Operational Instructions, Nos. 12-18. 
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Chapter 1 
Army and air force; co-operation and defence 
It takes two to tango 
Co-operation between the army and the RAF in the early stages of World War Two, 
especially in South-East Asia was abysmal , what is surprising was the manner and 
success with which this situation was completely turned round to the distinct 
advantage, particularly in Burma, of the British forces. The pre-war military 
philosophy was a result of the cataclysmic experience of trench warfare and the 
horrendous loss of life that this entailed during the First World War. The dominating 
principle which emerged in the UK as an outcome of these experiences was that, 
never again would the British Army be involved on such a scale in a Continental war 
and this was the avowed intention of the vast majority of the nation. In future Britain 
would only ever have a limited liability on the Continent in terms of an army. 
Generally most politicians of the day thought that Britain's main interests lay outside 
Europe, primarily with the Empire. It was a view which was to have an effect on 
British Foreign and military policy until the 1930s when, it was eventually accepted 
that Britain could not isolate herself from the events that were taking place in Europe. 
Isolationism and the ability to produce a bomber during World War One which was 
able to reach Berlin from East Anglia carrying a 3,000lb bomb, contributed to the 
appeal of deterrence against any potential aggressor on the continent of Europe. 1 The 
influences of Douhet in Italy and Mitchell in the USA reinforced the RAF lobby 
which strongly advocated the deterrent effect of the strategic bomber. Douhet had 
published the Command ojthe Air in 1921, in which he promoted strategic bombing 
as a war winning weapon and the concept of an Independent Air Force .2 In 1921 
Mitchell gave a practical demonstration of the destructive power of bombers by 
sinking the 'unsinkable' German reparations Battleship Ostjriesland. Mitchell was a 
friend and disciple of Trenchard, but, it is debateable whether either Trenchard or 
Mitchell were influenced by Douhet. They had drawn their own conclusions from 
their experiences during First World War. There were other influences on 
Governments in the years between the World Wars which supported these views. The 
costs of the War had left the UK in a perilous financial situation with the urgent need 
to restore the peacetime economy and expand the industrial and trading base; the 
result was that severe financial restrictions were imposed on military expenditure. 
1 This was the Handley Page V/ 1500 four-engined bomber 255 had been ordered. It equipped 86 Wing. See Owen 
Thetford, Aircraft of The Royal Air Force since 1918, 8th rev . ed. London, Guild!988. pp 302-3. 
2 The RAF had already been establi shed as a seperate service in 1918. Guilio Douhel, Tile Command of The Air, 
2nd ed. 1927, trailS. by Dino Fenari, NY , Coward-McMcann !942, reprint \Vashington DC, Office of Air Force 
History 1983. 
1 
There were also in 1919 over 20,000 British troops and a number of RAF squadrons 
in Russia supporting the White Russian cause.3 Yet in 1920 the Cabinet reduced the 
RAF budget from £365 milion in 1918 to £75 million with corresponding cuts for the 
Army and the Navy.4 These cut-backs were to lead to rivalry between the services 
competing for the limited budget. 
It was therefore an attractive solution to defence problems for the Government to 
grasp the apparently satisfactory and cheaper options offered by the use of air power, 
to deter potential aggressors and to police the Empire. On this basis Trenchard 
maintained the independence of the RAF. It followed that the "Bomber lobby" gained 
considerable political support as did the air substitution policy for policing the 
Empire. In so far as co-operation with the Atmy was concerned, it was argued that 
with the adoption of a General Purpose aircraft for the policing role, the RAF had 
offered tacit recognition of the atmy's needs. Nevertheless, because of its economic 
attractiveness the air force put its main budgetary emphasis on the development of the 
dual role bomber/transports. Without the need to maintain a large continental type of 
army which was to be replaced by strategic bombers, there was no clear or obvious 
requirement for either co-operation with the army or close support aircraft of the type 
that was developed in the 1930s by the Luftwaffe. 
In 1926 there was concern about defence against air attack, Britain was no longer 
isolated by the sea from the Continent and this was illustrated by the fact that for the 
first time in 1926, there were CID Sub-Committees for AA research (an ad hoc 
committee) and on Air Raid Precautions. However, with the main RAF policy being 
to retaliate by bombing, the army's commitment to a continental war was to be 
limited.5 Under these circumstances, it is understandable why any tactical co-
operation with the Army was only seen by the RAF as a peripheral requirement 
overseas.6 This remained the view until the mid-1930s. A Royal Artillery Captain 
writing in the RUSI Journal at the time commented that, 'The Air Force regarded 
aerial operations with the Army as sidelines which only served to divert them from 
the main [strategic bombing] policy.'7 
The Japanese invasion of Manchuria, the growth of the German military and the 
Italian invasion of Abyssinia, caused a reversal of British defence policy and a growth 
3 Andrew Boyle, Trenchard, London, Collins 1962. p. 339-40. 
4 PRO CAB. 23/15 Minutes 15/8/1919. 
5 Ismay, General The Lor cl, The Memoirs of Lord Ismay, London , Heinemann 1960. p. 56. 
6 Palestine, Iraq and the North-West Frontier of India being the most obvious candidates. 
7 MacGregor, Capt. I.O'B., 'SecondLine Aircraft: their Utility in the Army', RUSI Journal, vol. LXXX. November 
1935, p.765. 
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in expenditure in the Defence White Papers of 1936 and 1937. However the 
Continental commitment of the army remained very limited . 
. Chamberlain had made it clear to the Army chiefs early in 1937 that, if only 
on the grounds of manpower shortage, there must be a radical change in the 
role and size of the Army, and the War Office had been obliged to accept his 
argument that Britain must renounce all idea of a continental army on the 
scale of 1914-1918 and continue to concentrate resources on building up the 
air force and the Navy.s 
Nevertheless, following a visit to Daladier (the French Prime Minister) at the Quai 
d'Orsay in November 1938, Chamberlain relinquished a 'limited liability' Continental 
commitment and agreed a British Expeditionary Force (BEF) with a small RAF air 
component being sent to France in the event of war. It was already too late for the 
RAF to develop either aircraft or tactics for the specialised close support role and 
reliance was placed on L'Armee de l'Air to provide the air cover. In Britain, most 
aircraft manufacture was devoted to producing fighters and bombers. In Germany by 
1938, part of the Luftwaffe's role was to both directly and indirectly support the army, 
resulting in the development of specialised support aircraft.9 Thus the raison d'etre of 
the RAF differed from the Luftwaffe and the philosophy of strategic bombing 
remained unique. tO In the 1930s, due to geography, the US developed an effective 
strategic bomber, the B-17 Flying Fortress but, it was evolved as an intercontinental 
bomber; although the outcome was substantially the same as the RAF, the doctrine 
was not. 
So deeply ingrained was the strategic bombing culture in the RAF that as late as 
1943, in spite of the experiences of Poland and France in 1940, Sir John Slessor was 
still insisting that the dive-bomber was not a viable battlefield weapon. Supporting his 
views he pointed to the losses sustained by the Luftwaffe's Ju 87 Stukas during the 
Battle of Britain. This completely ignored the prior requirement of air superiority, a 
lesson not overlooked by the Luftwaffe who, thereafter rarely flew the Stukas into 
action without a fighter escort. Slessor had not changed his views from 1934 when as 
a Wing Commander he had, 
... in a series of lectures .... reflected the official Air Ministry line ... his main 
thesis being that 'the aeroplane is not a battlefield weapon', and that special 
classes of Assault aircraft were 'uneconomical'.'' 
8 Montgomery Hyde, H. Neville Chamberlain, London, Weiderfield and Nicolson 1976. p.130. 
9 Expectin-g to fight~ Continental war, the army's need for tactical support produced the dive-bomber concept. 
lU This also goes some way to explain why the Luftwa.ffe did not have a strategic bomber force. However , the 
USAAC were developing the concept of an inter-continental bomber, the B-17. Both the L'Armee de l'Air and the 
Regia Aeronautica also attempted to develop, with .varying degrees of sucess, close support aircraft. 11 Peter C. Smith, Dive Bomber: An Illustrated History, Ashboume, Moorland 1982. p. 34. 
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Perhaps it is in the word uneconomical lies the real reasoning behind the Air Ministry 
reluctance to develop such an aircraft which might well have diverted money and 
time devoted to the development of the bomber force. Slessor had emphasised the 
vulnerability of support. aircraft but exactly the same argument could have been used 
against flying heavy bombers in daylight without fighter escort. Later in 1943, he also 
ignored the available evidence from RAF and IAF dive bomber squadrons operating 
in Burma. During 1942-44, No.168 Wing RAF were operating the Vengeance dive 
bomber in Burma, ' ... with zero losses.' 12 He also seems to have completely 
disregarded the accuracy obtained by dive-bombers. In 1940, the Skua dive-bombers 
of the FAA had successfully attacked and sunk the Kreigsmarine Cruiser the 
Konigsburg with what was stated to be only a mean error of' 50 yds'.13 In 1943 the 
RAF Vengeance dive-bombers of No. 110 squadron in Burma ' ... were attaining an 
average error of about 40 yds ... after an average flying time in the Vengeance aircraft 
of some 50 hours. 14 This was in stark contrast to the accuracy of the bombers of the 
8th USAAF where, ' ... the circular error was 3,550 feet in 1943.' 15 RAF strategic 
bombers were similarly inaccurate. Undoubtedly, in the RAF there was a significant 
lobby which considered close support aircraft such as dive bombers as unwelcome. 
An RAF officer had reportedly said, 
I know unofficially that Air Ministry think dive bombing is a thing of the past, 
whereas I am of the opinion that this policy is wrong and that those officials 
who think so are probably not aware of the capabilities or possibilities of dive 
b b. 16 om mg ... 
The pre-war RAF preferred General Purpose aircraft or the light day bomber to dive 
bombers as a suitable army support aircraft. Versions of the single-engined bi-plane 
light day bomber of the 1920s and 30s had been adapted at low cost as so called army 
co-operation aircraft, only effective where there was no air opposition. 
A Shaky Start: The Birth of Co-operation and the inter-war years 
Co-operation and close air support had started in World War 1 when it was realised 
how significantly aeroplanes could affect the course of events in the land battle. Apart 
from this, the airmen themselves, many of whom were army officers , had wanted to 
be able to offer some practical assistance to their comrades on the ground from as 
12 Smith, ibid, p.l85. No. 45 squadron RAF flew its first operational sorties against the Japanese on the 27th November 1942. 
13 Smith p.l25. 
14 Smith, p.185. 
15 Stephen L. McFarland, America's Pursuit of Precision Bombing, 1910-1945. Washington and London, Smithsonian Press 1995. p.168. . 16 Smith, ibid, p.35. Unfortunately he does not quote the source. 
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early as 1914.17 Between the two world wars and prior to 1926, there were some 
military men who clearly advocated the use of the aeroplane as a serious tactical 
weapon on the battlefield. IS In the 1920s Major General Fuller and Captain Liddell 
Hart were possibly the most outspoken and influential. Liddell Hart went so far as to 
suggest that there ' ... was a need for a land fighting (ground attack) aeroplane to 
provide additional firepower.•19 Indeed, the German Air Service had used just such an 
aeroplane, armoured for protection from ground fire, in the closing stages of the war 
in 1918.20 
In the middle ranks of command, there were, people like Lt. Col. Johnson and Wing 
Commander Chamier of the RAF who also advocated the use of the aeroplane as a 
battlefield tactical weapon. Wing Commander Leigh-Mallory, was still advocating 
co-operation in the1930s but there were strong opponents to these views.21 The CAS, 
Air Marshal Sir Hugh Trenchard and Philip Joubert de la Ferte felt strongly that air 
attack on the enemy homeland was a far more effective a way of using air power than 
giving battlefield support to the Army.22 Generally, the Army advocated the use of 
the aeroplane on the battlefield and the senior ranks of the Air Force advocated 
bombing the enemy homeland. Neither of these had been conclusively proven during 
the First World War and therefore the issue remained unresolved. However, the 
questions were not that simple for, underlying the whole of the debate on the correct 
application of air power lay the very survival of the RAF as an independent service. 
All of the training with the Army during the inter-war period consisted of using 
aeroplanes for reconnaissance and artillery spotting, much in the way that they had 
been used in the early days of World War One. In fact, the tactical use of the 
aeroplane as a battlefield weapon appears to have been cast aside, partly because the 
RAF were suspicious that the motives of the army were to gain control of part of the 
air force. Most of the responsibility for the lack of interest in co-operation seems to 
rest with the Air Force. For example, in response to a request from the General Staff 
for an exchange of instructors at their respective Staff Colleges, Trenchard had 
replied that a senior RAF officer could not be spared for an attachment to the Army 
17 When the BEF was escaping from von Kluck's encicling movement at Mons, RFC pilots and observers had 
dropped makesshift bombs on the Germans. See Ralph Barker, The Royal Flying Corps in France: From Mons to 
the Somme. London, Constable1994. p. 47. 
5 
18 Waldie, ~.J.P. ,Relations Between The Army and !he Royal Air Force 1918-1939, (unpublished doctorial thesis) KCL, 1980. p.to7 
19 United Services Magazine, April 1920, pp. 30-44. 
20 This was the Halberstadt CL II ground attack aircraft. See Richard Muller, op. cif., photo caption , p. l. 
21 Both Johnson andChamier wrote articles on cooperation. Chamier, Wg. Comdr. J.A., 'Aircraft in Cooperation 
with Infantry,' Army Quarterly, vol.. 1, October 1920,. p.112. Johnson, Lt. Col. P. 'The Use of Tanks in 
Undeveloped Country', RUSI Journal, vol. LXVI, 1930. p.191. Leigh-Mallory, Wg. Comdr. T.L. 'Air Cooperation 
with Mechanisied Forces', RUSI Journal, vol. LX.'\.V, 1930. p.565. 
22Joube11, p.67. Joube11 , Sir Philp de la Fmt e, The Third Service, London, Thames & Hudson 1955. 
Staff College at Camberley and there was not enough demand to justify having an 
Army instructor at the RAF Staff College at Andover although some lectures might 
be arranged. General Ironside, who was very keen to have a full time RAF instructor 
at Camberley, was disal?pointed at the response from the Air Force. 23 In 1923 Cavan, 
when he became the CIGS, started demanding that Army co-operation squadrons' ... 
be administered and operated by the army', increasing air force suspicions. 24 
Following World War One, there were elements in both the Army and the Navy, who 
wished to gain control of aeroplanes involved in the direct support of their respective 
services. The foundation of the RAF as a separate service in its own right in 1918, 
had been an unprecedented step at the time. The armies and navies of France, the 
United States and Japan, continued to retain their own respective air arms. 
Independence was the RAF priority, and every effort was expended towards this end, 
whether by lobbying politicians or by proving that the RAF could efficiently and at a 
lower costs carry out tasks for which the Army had been traditionally retained. 
Trenchard convinced Winston Churchill in the early 1920s, on a cost basis, that the 
RAF could effectively police areas of the Empire from the air. 25 This had already 
been demonstrated in British Somaliland where a rebellion had controversially been 
supressed by the use of air power. Such was the evidence, it had been sufficiently 
convincing to result in giving the overall responsibility for the internal security of the 
newly created Kingdom of Iraq to the RAf.26 
In any future Continental war, the Air Force saw its role as the defence of the United 
Kingdom and the offensive against a European enemy. It resulted in the air force 
being equipped mainly with fighters and bombers. For example, Air Commodore 
Brooke-Popham, when Commandant of the RAF Staff College at Andover thought 
that standard fighter aircraft could be used for supporting the army by, ' ... bombing 
and aerial gunfire, rather than by the use of specialised aircraft for army co-operation 
work'. 27 These views expressed in 1922, on close air support ignored how costly this 
was. In the last seven and a half months of 1918 one third of the total RFC and RAF 
casualties for the whole war occured, mostly due to close support missions.28 In 1916 
alone the air fighting had produced an overall casualty rate of 33 per cent in every 
23 Quoted by Waldie, op.cit. p.121 , from Air 5/280 9a, Minutes and conclusions of a conference between War 
Office and Air Minislly dated 13 February 1923. 
24 Andrew Boyle, Trenchard: Man of Vision, London, Collins 1%2, p.477. 
25 On this see both Omissi and Tow le, passim. 
2~he Kingdoms of Iraq with Syria, and the Trans Jordan were created at the time of the Paris Peace Conference from the breakup of the former Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War. The three Kings who headed 
their respective countries were all part of the family of Ibn Saud who became the King of Saudi Arabia. 27 Remarks of Brooke-Popham on the 8th January 1923, see PRO Air 9/5, No.16 Minute 2 Air Staff Paper. 28 Ralph Barker, The Royal Flying Corps in France: From Bloody Aprill917to Final Victory, London, Constable1995. p. 251. 
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squadron. 29 Such were the figures and, against the wishes of Trenchard, the 
Government decided that figures for RFC casualties would not be published 
seperately from the normal army lists. 3° Fighter aircraft designed to operate at low 
altitudes are inefficient for gaining air superiority at the high altitudes necessary to 
intercept enemy bombers which was one of the primary roles of the RAF.31 It was 
this line of thinking which down-played the Army's needs, suggesting that the costs of 
designing and producing a specialised aircraft were not justifiable. This was a genuine 
dilemma and was encountered in the Second World War. Additionally, was the fact 
that, opting for a close support aircraft would have undoubtedly raised the spectre of 
the loss of RAF independence. Here then we have the seeds of the lack of co-
operation between the two services, driven by the acute lack of finance in the post-
war years which had pressurised the RAF into fighting for its very survival and 
independence. 
This situation was exacerbated by an agreed RAF expansion programme to 52 
squadrons that had been slowed down by the Ten Year Rule. In all of this there was 
little, in so far as the RAF were concerned, to encourage the kind of specialisation 
necessary for the development of army and air force co-operation. In the 1930s such 
was the public level of anxiety about the state of the RAF that private aircraft 
developments were sponsored by Lord Rothermere. This produced the twin-engined 
Bristol Type142 monoplane named 'Britain First' which was faster than any fighter 
that the RAF possessed at that time. The result was that the Air Ministry issued 
Specification B.28/35 for the development of the Type 142 which became the 
Blenheim bomber, one of the first aircraft ordered under the expansion scheme.32 
'- .Conc~m was yXpressed over the German claim in 1934 of air parity with the RAF, 
llC.I"- nowl c<l_!j(-'l>!erct'bf- '.'lhlc.V\ · 
cackna•t. h: tigedt\by the British Government resulted in the priority in the manufacture 
of bombers to counter any possible threats. A British Army sent to the Continent 
29 Andrew Boyle, Trenchard: Man of Vision, London, Collins 1962. p. 251. 
30 
.b.d 2 l 1 .. p. 01. 
31 The original version of the North American Mustang fighter [which was later when equipped with a Merlin 
engine, to become one of the most sucessful fighters of the Second World War] was deemed inferior as an 
interceptor compared to RAF fighters. · 32 Thetford, op. cif. ,p.138-9. 
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would be fighting under the air umbrella of VArmee de l'Air. 33 Any leanings 
toward army-air force co-operation wet:e therefore stifled by this limited commitment 
of the army. As Donald Cameron Watt puts it, specialised army-air co-operation aircraft had 
... no place whatever in the doctrines of the Royal Air Force, obsessed as its 
High Command was from 1922 onwards with strategic bombing and the 
strategic deterrent.34 
This judgement seems a little harsh, for what alternative strategy was there to be 
without using the Army on the Continent? The Wehrmacht on the other hand, whose 
training was based on fighting a continental war, clearly had a need for close support 
aircraft and the German experiences in Spain resulted in the effective Stuka dive-
bomber. 
The RAFs answer to these problems was an aircraft that was to be 'all things to all 
men', a 'General Purpose' (GP) aircraft suitable for general tasks for example, as a 
light day bomber in the reconnaissance role or as a Torpedo bomber.35 The light day 
bomber was to be the RAF's method of supporting the army by using them to isolate 
the battlefield. This approach produced a line of GP aircraft, such as the Westland 
Wapiti which served for many years in Iraq and on the North-West frontier of India 
and its replacement the Hawker Hart. In its co-operation role the aircraft was fitted 
with a message hook, deemed to be a sufficient method of communication with the 
army.· These designs were driven by Treasury limitations but in this way it was 
believed, the needs of the Army could be met and they could be be used for other 
tasks including torpedo bombing. 
The policy of using General Purpose aircraft persisted beyond the outbreak of the 
Second World War as did the light day bomber concept. The Fairy Battle suffered 
catastrophic losses in France, but was not withdrawn from service until September 
1940. The contrast was the single-seat Fighters designed to meet Air Ministry 
specification F.36/34 of 1934, the Spitfire and the Hurricane, both originally private 
ventures.36 The Battle of Britain justified the faith in these eight-gun designs of 
Camm and Mitchell, in spite of opposition to their development in the 1930s from 
officials such as Brooke-Popham.37 Nevertheless, in Malaya a GP aircraft had to 
33 In fact the Cabinet agreement to send a British Expeditionary Force (BEF) to France was not until February 
1939. 
34 Watt, D. C., Too Serious a Business: European Armed Forces and the Approach to the Second World War, 
London, W.W.Nmton 1992. p. 67. 
3S It was by using this argwnent that Trenchard was able to obtain funding for the design and development of such 
an aircraft. The Air Ministry Specification 26/23 resulted in the Hawker Horsley, designed to carry the new and 
heavier, it had a Torpex explosive warhead, 18in. Torpedo. 
36 Edward Bishop, Hurricane, Shrewsbury, Airlife 1986. pp. 7-8. 
37 B' h 'b ·d 8 -IS op, 1 t • p. . Brooke-Popham, as C-in-C ADGB in the 1930s, thought eight guns unnecessary. 
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soldier on. This was a version of the the Vickers Vincent GP aircraft, the Vickers 
Vildebeest, which continued to be used as a torpedo-bomber. Obsolete by any 
standards in 1939, it had had originated as a basic design in 1928, these aircraft were 
sent into action against the Japanese in 1941 because of the failure of the fledgling 
Australian aircraft industry to produce its replacement, the twin-engined Bristol 
Beaufort , on time. 
In other countries developments varied. The Luftwaffe arguably developed one of the 
outstanding Army support aircraft of the early days of the Second World War, the 
Junkers Ju 87 Stuka Dive-bomber as a result of a philosophy to provide tactical 
support for the army. American Army aviation never went along this route but 
attempted to develop Army support aircraft along similar lines to the RAF light day 
bombers and no outstanding American aircraft had been developed by 1940.38 The 
Italian Regia Aeronautica's attempt to develop close support aircraft also failed but 
due to technical problems. In contrast both the American and Japanese navies 
developed outstanding dive-bombers as did the RN and it was the dive-bomber, 
which was arguably the pre-eminent close support aircraft of the war when operating 
with air superiority. 'True dive-bombers like the Ju 87, the Dauntless and the 
Vengeance were of course always superior in that role to fighters adapted for dive 
bombing as a secondary role'.39 The close air support dive-bomber role was 
ultimately was taken over by RAF fighter-bombers when suitable aircraft became 
available. 
It was not simply a matter of aircraft, there was also the problem of training and 
development in this field for army and air force officers and NCOs. As early as 1923 
it had been recognised in some military and air force quarters and for instance, by 
such people as the Editor of the influential aeronautical magazine,The Aeroplane 
that, for the airman, working with army was a job of such a specialised nature that 
specific training was required. He suggested that RAF officers should be attached to 
army formations to familiarise them with army organisation and needs. 
Finding troops on the ground, recognising what they were, and deciding what 
they were doing, required a highly specialised education. 40 
As Waldie also mentioned, it was also recognised at the RAF Staff College in 1925 
by Wing Commander C.H.B. Blount, RAF who referred to the, 
38 The US allowed some of tllis type, the Nortlu·op A-17, to be exported to China where they operated for a short 
time against the Japanese without much success. 
39 Peter Smith, Vengeance: The Vultee Vengeance Dive Bomber, Shrewsbury, Airlife 1986. p. 133. 
40 Waldie, op.cit. p.l21, quotingThe Aeroplane, Vol. XXV, lOth October 1923, p. 378. This happened during 
World War II. 
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'vast store of military knowledge' required by aircrew working with the 
army.41 
Some senior RAF officers had already recognised this. For example, A VM R.E.C. 
Peirse the AOC Palestine, who commanded British forces in Palestine, in June 1936 
initiated a combined staff organisation to deal with the increasing problems of 
internal security in that country. This was a new approach to coping with the 
problems involved in the combined operations then being undertaken locally and it 
was welcomed by both the War Office and the High Commissioner for Palestine. 
Mobile ground forces equipped with radio vehicles co-operated with an Air Strike 
force. The arrangement was a success for inter-service co-operation in a period which 
had been bereft of any attempts at any real capability in this area. The Aeroplane later 
reported on a speech by Air Commodore C.F.A. Portal (later to be CAS during the 
Second World War) to RUSI in February 1937 when he spoke on the 
' ... high state of perfection' of these particular operations.42 
The Palestine experience demonstrated the ability of the services to co-operate when 
the necessary but this was an exception. In 1936 Wing Commander J.C. Slessor had 
carried out tactical air exercises and published a book on the subject of his studies in 
close air support work, Air Power and Armies but it was not considered seriously. 43 
In it he identified one of the most important deficiences, as the lack of direct 
communication between the aircraft and the ground forces since as he put it, 
... the crux of the whole matter is effective comunication. 44 
In contrast to this insight on the communications issue, Slessor was one of the 
leading opponents to the aquisition of dive-bombers. The lack of dive-bombers 
became a very sore point with the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) in France in 
1940.45 The Fairy Battle light-bomber squadrons were an inapt alternative to dive-
bombers and any training was on bombing targets in Germany. Parkhouse comments 
that, aircrew training' .. never mentioned tactical support for the BEF in France.' 46 
British aircraft radios continued to use different radio Frequencies to those used by 
the army. This problem also extended to radio communication between transport 
aircraft and their RAF fighter escorts. 47 The radio sets used by the RAF were 
41 Waldie, ibid. p.121. 
42 Waldie, ibid, quoted from The Aeroplane, vol. Lll, 24 February 1937, p. 219 
43 Waldie, op.cit., p.292-4. 
44 Slessor Papers VD, Combined Reports on Air Co-operation Training, 17-25 November 1936, and quoted in 
Waldie, ibid, p.293. This was still a problem in Burma in 1945. 
45 In 1939 the British already had an extremely good Dive-bomber in the Blackburn Skua used by the Aeet Air 
Arm in 1940 to sink the German Cruiser Konigsberg in a Norwegian Fjiord. The Skua also had an impressive 
operational range. 
46 Rupert Parkhouse, Sqd. Ldr. RAF (rtd.), 'Taking the 'Battle' into Battle'. Journal No. 20, RAF Historical 
Society, 1999. p.19. It was envisaged that the Battle .would, if necessary, provide tactical support for the army . 
47 The RAF used VHF, C-47s used HF. 
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cumbersome and heavy and portability in jungle conditions was a major problem 
never seriously addressed. The importance of wireless communication in co-operation 
was emphasised very much later by Vincent Orange writing in reference to the 
Second World War, 
Effective aircraft operations in close support of ground forces required 
reliable systems of communications between airmen at or beyond the front 
line, soldiers below them and their respective commanders in the rear, who 
would take a long time to recognise the advantages of a joint headquarters. It 
also took a long time to design and produce in quantity such essential 
equipment as radios, radars and cameras, as well as to train men and women 
to use them correctly. 48 
Nevertheless, several years before the outbreak of war some members of the RAF 
were striving to co-operate with the army. The expansion of the Services caused by 
the threats from Germany removed fears concerning any cut-backs. In 1934 the Air 
Ministry issued Specification, A.39/34 for a specialised army co-operation aircraft, 
the Lysander. Designed specifically to meet the expected needs of the army such as 
artillery spotting, with a short take-off and landing to enable it to be operated close to 
the front line. Entering service with the RAF in 1938 it was a failiure as a front-line 
aircraft in France in 1940 being very vulnerable when facing serious air opposition. It 
found a niche in air/sea rescue and Special Operations Executive (SOE) operations in 
Europe and in Burma.49 When the country went to war, the air force · was woefully 
equipped to meet the needs of the army, especially close air support. This is not as 
inept as it might seem for with the limited continental commitment the RAF felt that 
the development of a specialised form of ground attack aircraft would be an 
' ... uneconomic use of their resources.'50 
Who controlled army co-operation aircraft was another area of dispute between the 
services. The RAF view was that in a given military situation the army and air force 
should co-operate but with separate commands, feeling that if the army 'got their 
hands on' the aeroplanes then that was where they would remain. In early 1939 
General Gort in particular, wanted to increase the number of bombers which would be 
allocated to a BEF Field Force (and under its control), a move which Newall , the 
CAS, strongly resisted.51 They were part of Bomber Command and needed to be 
48 Orange, Vincent, 'World War II; Air Support for Surface Forces' , p. lOl, in Stephen Allan, (ed.), The War in the 
Air, RAAF Air Power Studies Centre, Fairbairn 1994. 
49 Owen Thetford, Aircraft of the Royal Air Forces since 1918 , 8th revd. ed., Guild Publishing, London 1988. pp. 
580-2 
50 PRO AIR 9/6, Note dated 28th February 1935. 
51 PRO Cab 211521, Gort to Secretary CID, 17th April 1939. 
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available should the need arise and not locked into an army command. 52 When war 
broke out in 1939 the Advanced Air Striking Force (AASF) under AM Barrett moved 
o.f 
to France, but it remained under the controW3omber Command in the UK. Major 
General Ismay who was in France in December 1939 with the Prime Minister, Neville 
Chamberlain, comments that, 
It almost seemed as though the Air Staff would prefer to have their forces 
under Beelzebub rather than anyone connected with the Army. When one 
recalls the views which were then held by the General Staff on the 
employment of air power, one can scarcely blame them. 53 
Indicating that in Ismay's opinion as an Army man, the Air Staff were right. Co-
operation meant more than using men and weapons, it also meant having the same 
levels of understanding and comprehension of the problems and their possible 
solutions. Until the Spring of 1939, when the Cabinet made the final decision to 
accept that the Army had a continental role, the problems associated with co-
operation and sending an accompanying Air Striking Force had been a matter of 
conjecture. The needs of the army and co-operation, were not then seen to be a 
pressing urgency until the 'Blitzkreig' in Poland and France in 1940. 
Running throughout the whole of this period there was also another factor which 
which was important for, however indirectly, it also militated against the idea of 
supporting the army, that was the aspirations of the pilots themselves. Virtually all 
aspiring pilots on joining the RAF wanted to become fighter pilots for this was 
undoubtedly, for those who were growing up during and after World War One, the 
glamorous aspect of flying. Stories of the exploits of fighter pilots such as Captain 
Albert Ball, Captain 'Billy' Bishop, Major 'Mick' Mannock, Captain James McCudden 
and others were legends and most of the record breaking flyers of the inter-war years 
whose exploits were constantly in the public eye were ex-fighter pilots. Even Captain 
Arthur Harris of World War Two Bomber Command fame was a fighter pilot in 
World War One.54The German ace, von Richthofen, the 'Red Baron', was as well 
known by the youth of Britain as their own heroes and in the US it was Capt. 'Eddie' 
Rickenbacker of the 'Hat in the Ring' squadron and Charles Lindbergh, both former 
fighter pilots, who made the headlines. 55 
52 Precisely the point that Deichman makes in reference to the Russian front. See Dr. Alfred Price, ed., Spearhead for Blitzkreig: Luftwaf!e Operations in Support of the Army 1939-1945, by Paul Deichmann, London, Greenhill 
and Penn. Stackpole 19%. passim. 
53 The Memoirs of General The Lord lsmay KG PC GCB CH DSO, London, Heinemann 1960. p.104. 
54 Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Sir Arthur 'Bomber' Hanis, GCB, KCB, CB, OBE, AFC. 
55 Rickenbacker was a World War One 'Ace' and was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor (MH). 
Lindberghjoined the US Army Air service in 1924 and was a Pursuit (fighter) pilot and made the first solo flight 
across the Atlantic in 1927. 
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In the inter-war years and especially in the 1930s, the novels read by British youth 
were those of Percy F. Westerman and Captain W.E. Johns, an ex RFC fighter pilot, 
whose stories of the exploits of the fictitious Biggles were famous. In a television 
interview an ex-Spitfire pilot of 1940 said that he, ' ... had been an avid reader of the 
Biggles stories which directly led to my joining the RAF as a fighter pilot•.56 Johns 
partly wrote in the hope that some of the pilot experiences gained during the First 
World War would be passed on to future fighter pilots and said that fighter pilots in 
the Second World War wrote to him saying ' ... that they owed much to Biggles. In 
1944 one of our leading fighter pilots, asked by a reporter from a Sunday newspaper 
to what he owed his success, answered "Biggles" .•57 The authors of Johns biography 
comment that, 'The word Biggles has passed into the English language•.58 Such has 
been the effect of Biggles that 'he' is still a subject for discussion in RAF circles 
nearly seventy years after some of the stories were first written. 59 The inter-war years 
also saw the introduction of the RAF Hendon Air Displays, and the establishment of 
the University Air Squadrons, all part of the RAF's deliberate policy to make the 
British public air minded.60 Although all types of aircraft took part at Hendon, it was 
the fighter displays which were always the 'stars' of the show. 61 
The plain truth was that being a fighter pilot was glamorous and it was part of the 
youth culture. For example, at one time 'Biggles was the most popular juvenile 
fictional hero in the world'.62 Those who wanted to fly in the RAF, wanted most of all 
to be fighter pilots. A former Thunderbolt pilot in Burma stated he, ' ... joined the RAF 
to be a fighter pilot', and that he, ' ... had grown up with Biggles•.63 The fighter pilot 
culture is perhaps best illustrated by the Battle of Britain and the 'Few' and the 
legends surrounding this period still exist today. Even amongst other aircrew the pilot 
culture existed, for example amongst wartime navigators and bomb-aimers, who were 
almost invariably failed trainee pilots, most had joined the RAF to fly as fighter 
pilots. The RAF have never had a problem recruiting would-be pilots, even when the 
losses during World War Two were at their worst. Professor Bemard Brodie 
56 Interview on BBC 2 television programme, Finest Hour, 8.05pm on the 21st October 2000. 
57 W.E. Johns, Biggles of the Camel Squadron, London, Dean n.d. p.6. 
58 Perter Benesford Ellis and Piers Williams, By love, Biggles!: The Life of Captain W.E. Johns, London, Alien 1981. pp. 2-3. 
59 Air Comdre Peter Dye, 'Biggles-The last Ace of the First World War?' in RAF Historical Society Journal, No. 
23, RAF Historical Society, 2000, pp. 122-28. This article is written in the sense of 'double irony'. 
60 As with the Hendon Air Displays to make the public air minded, the University Air Squadrons were part of a 
deliberate policy by Trenchard to influence possible future politicians to be air minded. See Boyle, Trenchard, op, 
cit. p. 519. 
61 Capt. W.E. Johns, the author of the Biggles books, also designed some of the posters for these events as well as 
editing a magazines such as Modern Boy and witing articles for the Aeroplane. 
62 UNESCO Statisical Yearbook, 1964. It also records that Biggles books were 29th on the list of the world's most 
translated books. 
63 Interview with Mr. J. Rixon, 1 May 2000. 
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comments on this kind of enthusiasm as,' ... something quite special psychologically', 
and talks of, 'The attachment of the Air Force [US] 'rated pilot' to the vehicle that 
gives him that distinction'. He elaborates this theme even more by suggesting that 
there is amongst pilots an, ' .. . abhorrence of such techniques as close support of the 
ground forces, ... 64 
Thus, it should not be surprising that army-air force co-operation, or what was 
generally called in those days, Army co-operation, was not the most popular area in 
which to be involved. The best pilots went to fighter squadrons, those with slower 
reactions to bomber squadrons and the remainder, perhaps unfairly seen as third class 
pilots went to other units amongst which were of course Army co-operation 
squadrons. Small wonder then that the RAF was not enthusiastic in co-operating with 
the army. The result was for little to be done in this field and what was done tended to 
be ignored for example, the work done in Palestine in the 1930s and the lessons on 
the importance of communications. This kind of glamour culture can also be seen 
when viewing the FAA, where being a fighter pilot was not first choice. Naval fighter 
pilots in the inter-war years would, in a conflict, really see few chances of real action, 
the job was to deal with opposing gunnery spotters or reconnaissance aircraft, it was 
not in the tradition of 'dog fighting'. Consequently, the first choice was to be a dive-
bomber or torpedo bomber pilot as these were the actions of 'daring do'. This was 
particularly illustrated in the Pacific war during the battles of the south-west Pacific 
where the dive-bomber pilots of the USAAF did not perform as well as their counter-
parts in the USN in spite of using the same type of aircraft, the famed Douglas 
Dauntless. 
The SBD [the navy Dauntles and army A-24] in the hands of Army pilots was 
but a pale shadow of the aircraft that the Navy and Marine Corps pilots were 
to use so dramatically and effectively in the years [from 1941] ahead.65 
Such Hollywood films as 'Dive Bomber' with Errol Flynn encouraged the naval dive-
bomber ethic. Similar films were shown in both the UK and the US during the 1930s 
and 1940s, the great era of Cinema expansion.66 According to Berry Oldfield, 
The Air Force has always owed a lot to movies and movie people. Between 
the wars you couldn't find better recruitment posters than pictures like 
Wings, Hell's Angels, and Dawn Patrol ... The only person ranking with 
[James Stewart the film actor] Stewart as an important publicist for the Air 
64 Bemard Brodie, War and Politics, London, Cassell 1974. p. 413-4. 
65 Smith, op.cit., Vengeance. p.38. 
66 See John Walker ed. Halliwell's Film Guide, 9th ed. London, Harper Coli ins 1993. pp. 296 and 330. Dawn 
Patrol was first shown in 1930 with a remake in 1938. Dive Bomber was shown in 1941. 
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Force in the middle of the century was Milton Caniff, the artist for the comic 
strips like, Terry and the Pirates and Steve Canyon. 67 
None of this could have failed to have an effect on the choices of those young men 
who wanted to fly and also in the manner and lack of enthusiasm with which the RAF 
tackled the army and air force co-operation issue. 
In any case, any well meant views on co-operating with the Army did not have a 
noticeable impact on the consciousness of those in authority. Malcolm Smith clearly 
identified the problem when he said, 
It was in the large grey area between the two easily defineable extremes of 
tactical and strategic air power that the debate on the impact of aircraft on war 
was concentrated in the inter-war years, both in Britain and elsewhere.68 
It was precisely the strategic bombing line of thinking by senior RAF officers with 
limited budgets, which consistantly downplayed the Army needs. Slessor, who had 
written on co-operation in the 1930s acknowledged that the subject of air support and 
co-operation was generally ignored in the RAF before 1939, his own book on the 
subject only achieved ' ... polite but not very serious attention'.69 
Following the Blitzkreig lessons of 1940, from early 1941 the RAF Desert Air Force 
commanded by A.M. Tedder and A.V.M.Coningham, began to take co-operation 
very seriously. 70 Unfortunately, little of the experience gained in North Africa seems 
to have filtered through to the Far East where the air force had to start from scratch. 
Following the retreat in Burma, inter-service co-operation is a story of evolution and 
one that is fuelled by a growing understanding of each others needs. Learning to cope 
with the geographical demands of the area and overcoming the lack of land 
communications was a vital part of that process . 
67 Berry Oldfield quoted in, Donald Dewey, lames Stewart: A Biography, Atlanta Ga, Turner 1996. p. 251. Berry Oldfield was a Film industry (Warner) and air force publicist and later a speech writer for US President Reagan. 68 Smith, Malcolm, British Air Strategy Bef\Veen the Wars, Oxford, Clarendon1984. p.4. 69 Liddell Hart Papers, 1/644, Personal Reflections by Sir John Slessor, September 1964, p. 7. 70 See Vincent Orange, Coningham: A Biography of Air Marshal Sir Artlutr Coningham, Washington DC, Centre for Air Force History 1992, first pub. London, Methuen 1990. passim, and Richard P. Hallion, Strike from the 
Sky: The Histmy of Baffle.field Air Attack, 1911-1945,, Smithsonian History of Aviation Series, Shrewsbury, Airlife 1989.p.149-62. 
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Far East Defence Policy and the Singapore Naval Base 
When British defence policy for the Far East is examined it becomes clear that the 
pernicious historical baggage of the bomber doctrine swayed the defence of Malaya 
and Singapore and the thinking of the day. It influenced the area of co-operation 
between the army and the RAF because it affected their differing views on tactics and 
strategy, views which were to cause them to be 'poles apart' in the years leading up to 
the outbreak of war in 1939. Waldie put the problems in a nutshell, 
It [Singapore] was, in effect, but another compromise [to use both guns and 
aircraft] which, as far as the fighting services were concerned, depended in the 
last resort upon the will to cooperate - a commodity in short supply for much 
of the period under review [the 1920s and 30s].71 
The defence of Singapore affected the attitudes of politicians, servicemen and civil 
servants and equipment, training, government expenditure and virtually every other 
area of military and political action. Driven by budgets, the aftermath of the 'Geddes 
Axe' of 1922, the RAF had become 'locked- in' to the idea of an offensive war to 
avoid a land war72. This strategy was subsequently combined with an air defence 
system based on short-range fighters and the eventual development of radar to protect 
the UK heartland. Throughout this period, ' ... the strategic doctrine [bombers] of Trenchard 
and others dominating all else•.73 The RAF were to cary this doctrine with them 
overseas and attempted to apply it to the defence of Malaya and Singapore when it 
became their responsibility . 
Throughout the early stages of the campaign in south-east Asia when the British and 
allied forces were forced to withdraw, each Service fought its own battle for survival. 
Co-operation between the Services existed but at the lower levels and then only when 
it was requested. There had been little joint planning or training, and co-operation was 
born of necessity and a desire to help in extreme situations. A draining of 
experienced personnel , a result of the demands of the other theatres of war, had left 
the Services in a weakened state. France had fallen in 1940 and during the same year 
Italy had entered the war on the side of Germany, Britain was threatened with 
invasion and a spirited war was being fought out in both North Africa and Abyssinia. 
In the inter-war years both the military and civilian authorities in Malaya and 
Singapore and perhaps more importantly, successive United Kingdom governments, 
71 Waldie, op.cit . p.l31. 
72 In 1921 the Government had yielded to opposition and Press pressure on expenditure and appointed a 
Committee under the Chairmanship of Sir Eric Geddes to enquire into excessive spending in all areas of 
government. The financial cuts imposed certainly created a sense of trepidation an1ongst the services and the 
consequent reduction in the size of the armed forces was to stifled military development for some years. 
73 Smith Peter C. Dive Bomber: An Illustrated Histmy, Ashbourne, Moorland 1982. p. 109. At the end of the First 
World War Trenchard had carefully selected those officers that he wanted to retain in the RAF. These he felt 
understood the need for independence and would support RAF Doctrine. 
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had been 'dogged' by a mind-set that gave pre-eminence to naval defence of the 
Colony. The RAF, on whose shoulders the responsibility for the defence of the base 
and Peninsular had finally settled in August 1940, for which it was neither funded nor 
suitably equipped, was also 'dogged' by a mind set that gave pre-eminance to the 
doctrine of strategic bombing. This ignored the value of co-operation but, it was not 
responsible for the 'chain of disaster'. That was the result of a tangled web of historic 
presumptions and preduces of the British and colonial governments who had 'down-
played' the Japanese threat. The British view of strategic thinking and perceptions that 
were current in the nineteenth century continued into the twentieth and were driven 
mainly by the need to protect existing British trade routes using the Royal Navy to 
protect those routes. 
The capture of Singapore was undoubtedly seen by the Japanese as the 'key' in their 
military and economic thinking relating to South East Asia and its place in the 
establishment of the Japanese Greater Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, the Military's 
'Southern Strategy'. The other element of the Japanese plan was the destruction of the 
United States Pacific Fleet in Hawaii, the key to the naval domination of the Pacific 
Ocean 74. Both these strategies had been engendered by the need to remove any 
possible naval threats posed by enemy fleets at large upon the high seas. Allied Fleets 
would have been able to threaten and seriously disrupt communications to the Japan 
and the flow of vital industrial imports, particularly of oil from Burma and the Dutch 
East Indies. These -had been denied to Japan before Pearl Harbor, mainly at the 
instigation of the United States. The shortage of oil, became the casus belli in both 
political and economic terms in South East Asia and the Pacific, responsible for the 
outbreak of the war between Japan and the West.75 
The naval base at Singapore was to provide the deterrent in the Far East and it was 
finally completed and officially opened in July 1938. To reinforce the base four 
and 
airfields were constructed on Singapore Island" the fixed main defences of the various 
calbre coastal guns was completed by late 1939.76 
The failure of the Geneva Disarmament Conference, the revelation that the German 
armed forces were rapidly expanding and the claim that the Luftwaffe were at parity 
with the RAF brought the realisation that the armed forces were not in a condition to 
74 Hawai'i was the forward base of the US Pacific Fleet, the main base being San Francisco. 
75 The flow of imports was almost brought to a halt at the end of the Pacific war by the actions of US submarines. 
The result was catastrophic for the Japanese war economy which illustrates the logic of the Japanese decision, in 
their view in 1941, to go to war in response to US trade sanctions. 
76 These were five 15", six 9.2" and fourteen 6" guns in 'fixed' concrete em placements, all were facing in a south 
west- south east arc. Kirby, op.cit., p.21. 
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counter the threat from Germany. But, more far reaching than this was that the threat 
to the UK had on the defence plans for the Far East . Kirby suggests that, 
It was a combination of Fisher [Sir Warren] and Vansittart which forced the 
Defence Requirements Committee (DRC) to look beyond the menace of Japan 
to Germany and pronounce her the ultimate potential enemy against whom 
long-range defence policy must be planned. 77 
This view clearly had the effect of putting the defence of overseas possessions on a 
lower level of priority and affected Army and RAF contingents overseas. Until 
sufficient forces were available, and only after the United Kingdom Home defence 
forces had been brought up to an acceptable level, would they be substantially 
reinforced. This was not to say that the Japanese threat had not been recognised, it 
was simply one of priorities given the existing state of the UK finances. 
In fact the chief restraint on defence in the early 1930s and after 1935 when 
rearmament began was imposed by Neville Chamberlain as Chancellor of the 
Exchequer: and his central arguments were the economic ones of the 
Treasury .... Under Chamberlain's influence the Cabinet opted for building up 
the RAF as a deterrent force, thereby restricting the proposed expenditure 
increases to £59 million rather than £97 million as originally suggested.78 
The economic conditions had been brought about as a result of the Depression and the 
US government policy of concentrating on its own domestic trade and insisting until 
1931 on the British government servicing interest payments on the British War 
debt. 79 
The trade concerns of the British, Australian and New Zealand governments, 
influenced by the needs of strategy and diplomacy, had determined the geographical 
location of the base on Singapore. Delays in the construction were of concern to the 
Dominion governments and Professor W. David Mclntyre makes the point that, a 
battleship took about five years to build whereas the construction of, what was to be a 
major naval base, took a great deal longer. Dominion concerns were not over the 
existence of a Far Eastern fleet but over the existence of the naval base. These 
concerns were real enough for without a naval base fleets cannot operate, therefore 
without the base the prospect of there being a Far Eastern Fleet remained remote. So 
concerned were they that the New Zealand government voted a considerable sum of 
money to the construction costs. Australia had taken a similar action but due to the 
77 Kirby, ibid. p.98. At this time, 1934, Neville Chamberlain was the Chancellor of the Exchequer. 
78 Martin Pugh, The Making of Modern British Politics 1867-1939, Oxford, Blackwell1986, p. 288. 
79 On this see Watt op. cif. pp. 112-5. 
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delays in implementing the project had decided to use the money to increase the size 
of the Australian navy rather than rely on the British government. 80 
The British goverment proposed that in an emergency, a Fleet would arrive in the Far 
East within seventy days. This was later revised to ninety. By 1939 the question was 
whether a war would break-out simultaneously with Germany, Italy and Japan. It 
exercised the minds of the governments and the military of Britain and the 
Dominions. The promises of the Fleet were indecisive and dependant on factors 
which could not be pre-determined such as the role of the French Navy in the 
Mediterranean and the number of capital ships available. In addition, the period of 
relief was extended from three to six months. The war with Germany and the 
deterioration in the situation when Italy sided with Germany caused a revision of the 
defence policy for the Far East. Japan occupied the island of Hainan in the Gulf of 
Tanking in September 1939, thereby offering a threat to French Indo-China and 
Thailand and the possibility of an attack on Singapore. 
The use of a Naval Fleet still dominated British defence thinking in respect of 
Singapore but in August 1940 with the RN stretched, the responsibility for the 
defence of Malaya and the Singapore naval base shifted from the Royal Navy to the 
RAF. Left 'holding the baby' the RAF were without either sufficient intelligence on 
Japanese air capability or adequate air strength to mount an effective defence. Airfield 
defence and early warning had now become a factor for protection in the theatre. At 
no time was army and air force co-operation an issue, the RAF tasks were air defence, 
reconnaissance, bombing enemy bases and attacking an invasion fleet. Given the 
weakness of the air force, this was a formidable list. 
This was a complete reversal of policy. For example in February 1938 there had been 
a combined military defence exercise that assumed that Singapore was under attack 
from a foreign power some 1200 miles to the East. It was construed as a naval attack 
and the RN aircraft carrier HMS Eagle was at the core of the 'enemy' Fleet . By 
launching its aircraft the attack on Singapore was a complete success for the FAA and 
this led to efforts being made to improve the AA defences of the area. Thus as late as 
1938 it was still being assumed that any attack on Singapore would be based on the 
use of a naval fleet, the counter to which was to be the RN and the fixed defences. 
The role of the RAF was limited to reconnaissance and torpedo attack on an enemy 
fleet.81 Later in 1938, General Dobbie the GOC, questioned the existing defence 
80 W. David Mclntyre, The Rise and Fall of the Singapore Naval Base, 1919-1942, London, Macmillan 1979. pp. 
1-18 and 56. The New Zealand government contributed £100, 000. 
81 See Mclntyre, op. cit., pp. 136-8. 
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proposals in a memorandum written by Col. Percival and presented to the War Office. 
This suggested that the defence of the naval base required the defence of the whole of 
Malaya and that the air force needed to be strengthened. Dobbie had also 
demonstrated that areas regarded as impassable in southern Malaya could be crossed 
by ground forces. The COS in London agreed that this was a likely scenario, but with 
the increasing demands being made given the European situation only a limited 
amount of finance was available for the Far East. Thus in 1938 the responsibility for 
defence rested on the navy and the fixed defences. 
It was a natural outcome of an air power doctrine of fighter defence and strategic 
bombing, which had so permeated throughout RAF thinking, that it should be carried 
over in the formulation of their defence policy in south-east Asia. Bomber raids 
mounted from airfields in Indo-China or air attacks by carrier aircraft were thought to 
be the danger to the naval base and were the focus of the defence. Of these 
possibilities, a carrier-borne air attack seemed to offer the greatest danger and three 
out of the four fighter squadrons available were stationed in Singapore. It was 
wrongly believed that twin-engined Japanese bombers could not reach Singapore 
from Indo-China. 
Shortly before the Munich crisis in 1938, Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt, the CAS, in 
correspondence with the Air Ministry pointed out that fighter escorts for a bomber 
force were possibly becoming a necessity. 
Experience in China and Spain seems clearly to indicate that with the aircraft 
in use in these two theatres of war at present, f ·ighter escorts are considered 
absolutely essential for the protection of bomber aircraft. So far as I am aware 
this policy runs counter to the views long held by the Air Staff ... 
and Hyde's comment is, 
'Little or no official attention was paid to these representations'. 82 
Clearly some of the RAF were looking at intelligence reports from the Far East whilst 
the Air Ministry seems to have beeen discounting them. Some intelligence therefore 
was available on the capabilities of Japanese aircraft. Far Eastern intelligence was not 
a priority in the face of the urgent needs of home defence. Some Japanese aircraft 
operating in China at this time were the equivalent of some European first-line 
aeroplanes. 
In 1937 General W.G.S. Dobbie, the then GOC Malaya, had suggested in a report to 
the War Office that an invasion of Malaya would probably be initiated by landings at 
82 cited by Hyde, op cit., p.486. 
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Sungai and Patani in Thailand and at Kota Bahru in northern Malaya.83 In a report in 
1939 he warned that the jungle in Johore [in the south of the peninsular] was not 
impenetrable to military forces and it was this last report which prompted the War 
Office to allocate £60,000 for the construction of defence works on Singapore Island 
and in Johore. When the new GOC General Bond, wished to build additional defences 
using direct local labour, his proposal was resisted by the Governor Sir Shenton 
Thomas, insisting on a policy of priority for local commerce and industry to support 
the 'war effort' in the United Kingdom. The RAF suffered similar constraints in their 
airfield building programme affecting and limiting airfield locations. 84 In October 
1939 the Australian Chief of General Staff had already commented on the, 
' ... possibility of a hostile Japan', thus there were those who saw the potential need for 
a realistic defence policy in the Far East and those such as the Governor who did 
not.85 
Correspondence on the situation in the Far East from a senior members of the 
Government in 1939 suggests that the dangers in the area were sometimes recognised. 
For example, in a letter to the Admiralty in February 1939, Lord Halifax asked, 
What measures were there to defend vital Imperial needs against the threat of 
Japanese plans for a 'New Order in Asia'? Possible to absorb into that area 
[Allied defence area] territories producing at least two of the raw materials of 
really vital importance to her [Japan]. Oil in the Netherlands East Indies and 
high grade iron ore in Malaya. Japan would become a fu damental threat to 
British interest throughout the Eastern Hemisphere. What was the[ expected] 
possible action by the US Fleet in existence of war between this country and 
Japan.86 
An enclosure in this letter refers to a proposal to station a naval Squadron 
permanently at Singapore. There were two schools of thought on this critical subject, 
the orthodox which felt that, the Fleet should be kept in Europe and the Far East 
which believed that Japan was a major threat and a Fleet would deter any thoughts of 
aggression. Clearly government opinion was divided on how to proceed but decided 
that the European threat must be treated as the priority. Soon after the outbreak of war 
with Germany, naval units were gradually being withdrawn from China. 
83 Col. Percival was later to be in 1941 Lt.Gen. GOC Malaya was on Dobbie's Staff. 
84 The local problems of the recruitment and transportation of labour, construction equipment and materials 
should not be ignored and must have been some of the factors affecting the overall problem of locations. as must 
have been lines of communication for logistic support of the squadrons using the airfields. 
8S Gillison, Douglas, Royal Australian Air Force 1939-1942, Australian War Memorial , Canberra 1%2, p. 61. 
86 See Appendix 1, 3rd Series Documents on British Foreign Policy. 
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In 1939 the position of the RAF in South-East Asia had not significantly changed 
from the early 1930s. There was no RAF presence in Burma and no fighter or bomber 
squadrons in either Malaya or Singapore. The air defence of Singapore was limited to 
an obsolete flight of RAF Flying-boats and two RAF squadrons equipped with 
'Vildebeest torpedo bombers and a few ancillary aircraft. None of these were 
concerned with co-operation apart from one flight operating target towing Queen Bee 
(pilotless Tiger Moths) aircraft for anti-aircraft practice. There was also the Malayan 
Volunteer Air Force (MV AF) which had been formed in 1940 from the SSVAF. 87 
Equipped mostly with ex-civilian aircraft its task was to train pilots for the RAF as 
part of Malaya and Singapore's contribution to the Empire Air Training Scheme and 
provide internal air communications. 
In spite of the Japanese threat, 'the differences between the Army and the Air Force on 
how to defend the Naval Base remained. Airfields were sited and built without 
reference to the army and airfield defence. The army persisted in its main task of the 
ground defence of the Naval base against seaborne attack. Kirby diplomatically 
makes the point that, 'there was insufficient consultation between the Services in 
Singapore.'88 This inflexibility caused some friction between Babington the AOC and 
General Bond, even though both realised that any reinforcements received would be 
inadequate. Neither could agree how to best make use of their respective military 
assets. 
The differences resolved around two basic issues. Bond saw the need to defend the 
whole of Malaya, primarily to keep the airfields open for the reception of 
reinforcements by air. Nevertheless, he was only prepared to spare one regular Army 
battalion to defend Alor Star which, with the airfield at Kota Bahru was especially at 
risk from Japanese ground attacks from Thailand. For the the remainder of the 
airfields and internal security throughout Malaya, he suggested that volunteer army 
(local) forces be available. He was clearly still sticking to his original mandate, 
defending the Singapore Naval base. Here he intended using the regular Army to 
defend the beaches in Johore and Singapore Island and provide AA cover for the 
Singapore airfields and Naval Base. Babington on the other hand, saw the situation 
somewhat differently. He was convinced the length of time that Malaya and 
Singapore could hold out against the Japanese would be determined by the air actions. 
In his view it would be vital to hold and defend the northern airfields which were also 
necessary for the detection and destruction of an approaching enemy invasion fleet 
and air action against the Japanese Indo-China air bases. 
87 Straits settlement Volunteer Air Force. Formed in 1936 
88 Kirby, vol. 1, op.cit. p.31 
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They could not resolve their difference and it was referred back to the COS in 
London. It was on this basic and vital issue of the method of defence that, at the 
highest military levels within the Colony, the key to the lack of inter-service co-
operation mostly seems t6 hinge. If the respective Commanders could not agree, it 
gave little inducement to subordinate ranks to co-operate. How for example, were the 
myriad training costs in co-operative exercises to be resolved if there was no overall 
consensus between the two services? 89 
In 1940 events took a turn for the worse and British naval strategy was immediately 
forced to change. Containing the Italian Fleet to the Mediterranean now became a 
priority. It was no longer possible to send a relieving Fleet to the Far East should this 
be needed. Without this planned-for reinforcement, the responsibility for the defence 
of the Singapore Naval Base now fell to the Army and the RAF. Strategically the 
Japanese were clear that they must control Singapore if they were to expand their 
Empire southwards to gain access to strategic raw materials. 90 
The British reaction to this latest crisis situation was to withdraw the remaining 
military garrisons from China, accepting that the loss of Hong Kong would be 
inevitable if there was a war with Japan.91 Also, that it would be impossible to defend 
Borneo with the military forces currently available. As the defence of the naval base 
now rested on the RAF, London accepted that the air force needed to be reinforced. 
The war situation in Europe and the Middle East made this impossible, British forces 
were stretched to capacity. The British government therefore decided in 1940 to ask 
the Australians for assistance in defending Singapore. In April1940 they responded 
by sending one Wirraway fighter-bomber Squadron and two reconnaissance 
squadrons to reinforce the RAF establishment.92 Wirraways were unsuitable aircraft, 
described by Sir Edward Ellington (CAS RAF until August 1937) who had examined 
the aircraft in Australia on his visit to that country in 1937 as, ' ... a temporary 
expedient...it can only be regarded as an advanced training aircraft.' These provided 
89 They also needed to be resolved with the Governor. 
90 Akira lriye, The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific, London, Longmans 1987, 5th 
imp.1989. pp.126-7 and p.l49. Following the Japanese refusal to a US request to withdraw its military forces from 
China the US government placed an embargo on the export of scrap iron . In addition, the US brought pressure to 
bear on the Dutch government to refuse the export oil to Japan. The failure in 1941 to obtain oil for its rapidly 
growing industrial complex would have been an economic disaster for the Japanese economy and left its Navy in 
the untenable position where it woud have been unable to fight a war. Japanese assest were frozen by the USA on 
the 25th July 1941. 
91 The British army garrison normally stationed in Shanghai and Tietsin was one infantry battalion. It was 
withdrawn to avoid any incidents with the Japanese army occupying those cities. The Royal Navy river Gunboat 
patrols had also experienced a series of incidents with the Japanese from 1937. See Martin H. Brice, The Royal 
Navy and the Sino-Japanese lncident1937-41 . London, lan Allan 1973, passim. 
92 Wirraways were Australian built adaptions of the Noth American Harvard, the standard trainer in the USAAC 
I 
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the only fighter cover for the Singapore area.93 They were replaced in late 1941 with 
the equally unsuitable US Brewster Buffalo. The reconnaissance squadrons were 
re·equippi~ with Lockheed Hudsons, also re-equiping some RAF Coastal Command 
squadrons in Europe. Supplies of American aircraft were hampered in 1940 by the US 
Neutrality Act.94 
Three issues had a strong bearing on the defence arrangements in British south-east 
Asia: the belief in a naval action and that an invasion Fleet would be 'knocked out' 
before it could land in sufficient force, the lack of co-operation and consultation 
between the Services and the colonial government and the problems of the allocation 
of government funds for military training and defence works. 
Dobbie's report to the COS in 1937 had already warned that defence planning based on the 
assumption of a direct seaborne attack on Singapore was unsound and he examined the feasibility of 
Japanese landings on the coast of Thailand and east coast of Malaya. He considered 
the most favourable time for an invading force was during the Monsoon (October-
March), as the visibility at this time would seriously inhibit the opportunities for 
aerial reconnaissance. He went on to point out that it would take a relieving British 
Naval force some seventy days to reach Singapore95. Under tQ.ese circumstances, 
Dobbie assumed that an invading force would establish advanced air bases in 
Thailand and that it would be necessary to defend the whole of the peninsular if the 
Naval base was to !Je sufficiently protected.% 
In April1940 General Bond had relieved General Dobbie as GOC. Updating Dobbie's 
report he pointed out that there were new factors arising since 1939: (a) in September 
1939 the COS had increased the period before relief could reach Singapore from 90 
days to 180 days and that this would mean an increase in reserves of military 
personnel to make up for casualties to be expected in the prolonged fighting period, 
(b) there was no defensive position which could be held indefinitely and (c) that due 
to the Japanese Army's war experience in China seaborne landings, opposed or 
otherwise, would not present them with any difficulties . Finally he suggested that , 
the Japanese Army would assemble in Hainan, establish advanced bases for their air 
force in Indo China and penetrate Thailand to prepare the way for an occupation. 
93 Gillison, Douglas)?oyal Australian Air Force 1939-1942, Australian War lvlemmorial, Canberral 962. p.49. 
94 This restricted military sales to nations engaged in the European war. 
95 Th.is period was later to be extended to one hundred and eighty days by the COS. in September 1939 . 
% As it turned out, this was an amazingly accurate forecast of the actual invasion. Dobbie and his team had 
clearly put a lot of serious thought into tllis analysis. 
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His conclusion was, that to thwart any attempted invasion the whole of Malaya would 
need to be held, therefore it was necessary to reinforce the army. As this was unlikely, 
he suggested the only feasible solution was to rely upon the RAF to take on the role 
as the main line of defence, primarily the destruction of an enemy invasion fleet and 
then to make it impossible for the Japanese to establish or to operate a base or any 
lines of communication within striking distance of RAF airfields in Malaya. He 
estimated the RAF would require a front line strength of some 22 squadrons, 336 
aircraft, but at that time there were only eight squadrons available with 88 first line 
aircraft mostly of obsolescent types.97 He recommended that by the end of 1940 RAF 
strength should be increased by two fighter and two reconnaissance squadrons. The 
existing squadrons to be re-equipped with modem aircraft. As the airfields in southern 
Burma were indefensible, he suggested they be prepared for demolition. In respon:5J1! 
the COS stressed that no reinforcements were available in the foreseeable future and 
that it would be necessary to conscript volunteer forces to counter any threat.98 
In the interim aware of the possible threat posed by the Japanese, a series of meetings 
had been held in Singapore in February 1941 between the British, Dutch and 
Australian military authorities to discuss defence and areas of responsibilities should 
the threat become a reality. This was a step in the right direction but lacked the teeth 
to be effective.99 This was the situation when A VM Pulford, the new AOC arrived in 
Singapore in April 1941. The RAF were now committed to the defence of the Base 
which, in the light of Bond's appraisal and Babbington's views, now meant the whole 
of Malaya. lOO In view of the obvious military threat, Pulford realised that the 
command desperately needed to be expanded and especially with modem aircraft. He 
asked the Air Ministry and the COS for more modern fighters and strike aircraft. The 
result was that it was decided by the Air Ministry to allocate the equivalent of a Wing 
of Hurricanes (three squadrons) to Singapore and to earmark the Beauforts now being 
built in Australia to be formed as RAAF squadrons to replace the obsolete 
Vildebeests:. Events outside the control of both the Air Ministry and the CAS caused 
these well intentioned plans to fail. The Hurricane Wing was sent instead to Russia in 
September 1941. In the middle of the year there were a 'flurry' of telegrams betweem 
the GOC Malaya, the C-in-C Far East and the War Office in London. Most were 
concerned with the state of the defence and belatedly recognised the need for co-
operation with the army.lOl Allocated to this task was No. 21 squadron RAAF, it was 
re-equipped with Buffaloes in August 1941. Training was to consist of lectures and 
97 Kirby, vol. 1, op.cil. p.35 
98conscription for the Voluteer Forces was introduceded by Legislation on the 26th June 1940. 
99 PRO AIR 23/ 19 17. Anglo-Dutch-A ustralian Conversations: Report . 
lOO A Vlvi Ph.ilip Babbington the AOC was, by rotation, relieved by A Vlvl Pulford. 
101 PRO WO 106/2516. Telegram elated 21 June 1941 says that one squadron allocated to part time training. 
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excercises on army methods, the flying time for this was to be fifty hours a month. 
This apparently was for the whole squadron however and very little seem to have 
been acomplished.102 
Previously in March 1939, the British Air Minister, who had been sent to Australia by 
the British government, had also recommended that Bristol Beaufort Bombers be 
built in Australia for both the RAF and the RAAF in an effort to help meet the 
increasingly heavy demands being made upon British industry to cope with the 
military expansion then taking place at an accelerating rate. Some of the aircraft thus 
to be produced were destined for Malaya where it was proposed by the British 
government to replace the Vildebeests . The first six aircraft built by the factory in 
Australia were unsatisfactory and their crews were not up to acceptable operational 
standards when they reached Malaya in 1941.103 Arguably the delivery problems and 
delays were exacerbated by the American embargo placed on war materials and 
imposed on the British government in May 1940. Surprisingly this included aircraft 
engines such as the American Pratt and Whitneys which necessitated substitution of 
British engines for the Beauforts.l04 The consequent delays to aircraft production in 
Australia and the failure to fulfil this commitment to produce the Beaufort was to 
result in the Vildebeests being retained for front line duty in Malaya as Torpedo 
bombers and subsequently being decimated when sent into battle in that role. 
Two hundred and forty-three Brewster Buffalo fighters originally ordered for the 
RAF were allocated to Australia to meet the need for a fighter aicraft in that 
region. !OS In November 1941 No. 67 Sqdn. RAF (Buffaloes) arrived in Singapore but 
this squadron less its aircraft were immediately transferred to Burma, its Buffaloes 
being allocated to No.21 sqn. RAAF who were to convert from the Wirraways to 
Buffaloes.l06 Six of the Wirraways were retained for further training of those pilots 
arriving directly from the flying schools in Australia and New Zealand to bring them 
up to operational levels. Later, in December 1941 , in a belated recognition of the 
desperate need for close suport for the army, these Wirraways would hurriedly be 
converted into make-shift dive-bombers in an attempt to give some dedicated close 
air support to the hard pressed forces on the ground. 
l02 PRO AIR23/277. Operational Record Book (Form540) No. 21 sgn .. Last entry 23rd November 1941. 
103 PRO AIR 23/2 123. tdaltby Repoti and Gillison, ibid p. 269 footnote 4. 
104 Gillison, ibid p.l35. 
105 Douglas Gillison, Royal Aus!ralian Air Force 1939-1942, Canberra ,Australian War Memorial 1%2, p. l38-9. 
106 on arrival in Burma No.67 Squadron was equipped with newly delivered Buffaloes and tasked with defending 
Rangoon against air attack. Most of the pilots in this Squadron had only a limited number of flying hours. 
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In November 1941, the RAF Order of Battle stood at thirteen squadrons; of which four were 
fighter squadrons. None of these aircraft were designated for co-operating with the 
army. Of the medium bomber squadrons squadrons only one a Blenheim IV -squadron 
was capable of reaching French Indo-China. The Japanese Navy bombers using the 
airfields in southern Indo-China had a far greater range than their opposite numbers 
in Malaya. The range of the Japanese aircraft was in fact, sufficient to reach 
Singapore, some four hundred and fifty miles further south than the RAF's 
northernmost airfields. Japanese aircraft had been arriving at Indo-China airfields 
developed by the Japanese since September 1940, 
A base rights agreement in exchange for Japanese recognition of French 
sovereignty was concluded on 22 September 1940, after Japanese troops had 
already violated the frontier [Japanese troops had occupied Tonkin]. 107 
General Catroux, a Gaullist had been powerless to resist these demands. The Japanese 
intention was to stop the flow of supplies reaching Southern China through Saigon 
and they were also determined to close the Burma Road. Succumbing to Japanese 
diplomatic pressure the British closed this route in August 1940, but re-opened it two 
months later after US representations. Under General Catroux,' L 'Armee de l'Air 
had attempted to resist Japanese air incursions on at least two occasions108. In August 
1940 .Vice-Admiral Decoux a Petainist relieved General Catroux, f:l.'l\ ~ was less inclined 
resist increases in the Japanese military presence.l09 
The reconnaissance aircraft were now vital for the maritime reconaissance and with 
limited range it was necessary for them to be based on the northern-most airfields. Of 
the five northern-most airfields, only Alor Star had a single hard surfaced all-weather 
runway, all the others had grass runways which gave problems during the 
Monsoon.l 10 
Few [airfields in Malaya] were camouflaged and several were already out of 
date, with airfield buildings congested and too close to the runways .... All 
were supposed to be defended by eight heavy and eight light anti aircraft (AA) 
guns in each case, but by the end of 1941 only 17% of this rutillery had been 
delivered. 111 
107 Robert O.,Paxton, Vichy France; Old Guard and New Order 1940-1944, Barrie & Jenkins, London 1972.p.83. 
108 See Shores, Christopher, et al, Bloody Shambles, vol. I, London, Grub Street 1992. pp. 24. In 1942 General 
Catroux was to lead the Free French Forces into Vichy held Damascus. Mark M. Boatner III, The Biographical 
Dictionary of World War 11, Novato Ca., Presido 1996, p. 81-2. 
109 Meirion and Susie Harries, Soldiers of the Sun: The Rise and Fall of the Imperial Japanese Army 1868-1945, 
London, Heinemann 1991. p. 238. 
110 Alor Star had been a Imperial Airways aerodome on the overland route to Singapore and for this purpose had 
been developed with a single all-weather runway. 
111 Shores, vol. I. op.cil. p.32. 
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On the 7th December, the day before the Japanese attack, the RAF dispositions were: 
five squadrons based on three of the northern airfields. These were the two Blenheim 
medium bomber squadrons, the sole Blenheim night fighter squadron, one Buffalo 
fighter squadron and a Hudson squadron all without an early warning systems. From 
these dispositions it is clear that the RAF were only expecting to launch attacks on 
Indo-China or to have to counter unescorted Japanese bomber attacks on the Malaya 
Peninsula. It was still believed that it was impossible for the Japanese to attack 
Singapore from Southern Indo-China with land based bombers. It was assumed, that 
the air threat to Singapore would be from carrier based aircraft and detected by radar 
as they came into range of Singapore. Undoubtedly, the emphasis was still on the 
defence of the Naval base. On the 8th December the Japanese attack started and by 
daybreak they were landing single seat fighters in Thailand. The speed at which the 
Japanese fighters were operational caught the RAF completely off-guard. 
The lack of army and air force co-operation in south-east Asia, was exemplified 
during the expansion in airfield construction in the Malay Peninsula , almost all were 
sited without reference to the army. The building and location of the airfields 
completely ignored their defence in the event of a ground attack. Army views were 
neither sought nor considered and, inference suggests, not welcomed. The RAF chose 
these locations because of the availability of local labour, access to materials and the 
constraints caused by the limited ranges of their aircraft. This clearly demonstrates the 
extent to which of the lack of co-operation between the services had reached. The 
whole RAF defence focus appears to have been on either reconnaissance over the 
Gulf of Tonkin or in counter-air action by launching bomber attacks on Japanese 
airfields in Southern Indo-China. Clearly in RAF terms, the likely-hood of a ground 
war was not an issue and therefore co-operation with the army was unnecessary. 
Arguably this can be ascribed to the pre-war fixation on strategic bombing as a 
counter-air strategy, a failure of RAF intelligence and the current belief that the 
Japanese would be facile opponents and any threats would be easily dealt with. The 
senior RAF officers in south-east Asia were all disciples of Trenchard who had 
'grown up' during the strategic bombing debate of the twenties and early thirties.112 
Otherwise, how else can one account for the failure to consider the necessity of 
establishing at least, given the shortage of Radar sets, an observer early warning 
system when the airfields were being built or the failure to send the two mobile 
Radars that were available to cover the northern-most airfields? This last point is 
112 When the size of the RAF was dramatically reduced after 1918, Trencharddeliberately chose for his future 
leaders, officers who supported his line of thinking. This was essential, as he saw it, if the RAF was to retain its 
independence. See H.R. Alien, Wing Commander, DFC, RAF, The Legacy of Lord Trenchard, London, Cassell 
1972. p.58 and passim. 
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strengthened by the RAF experiences of the value of Radar in the Battle of Britain in 
1940. They also failed to disperse aircraft, a standard procedure in other Theatres or 
use the airfields in the north for forward staging only. The only possible explanations 
are that complacency at high levels in the local military and civilian officialdom in 
the situation, was at unacceptable levels. When the Japanese attack came, it was not 
either expected or prepared for. The shortage of anti-aircraft artillery in 1941 was 
typical of the consequences of pre-war restrictions in defence budgets and the result 
of demands elsewhere.ll3 In January 1938 for example, the British army had, " ... only 
180 anti-aircraft guns larger than 50mm."ll4 The shortage of light anti-aircraft guns, 
especially the 40mm Bofors gun for defence against low flying enemy aircraft 
'strafing' in Malaya and Burma, meant that the airfields were continuously open to air 
attack. 
In 1941 the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, had offered two RAF Hurricane 
squadrons to the Soviet government to train Soviet pilots and a further two hundred 
Hurricane IlB aircraft to follow, with an additional two hundred Curtiss Tomahawk 
fighters to prop up existing Soviet aircraft production. The Hurricanes had originally 
been intended as reinforcements for the Far East and the Tomahawks for the Middle 
East. In the event the Tomahawks were not diverted to Russia but the Hurricanes 
were, which suggests a much lower level of priority for the Far East in spite of Bond's 
last 'Appreciation'. These Hurricanes were new aircraft straight from the production 
lines and were therefore the much improved Mk IIA and B models with the Rolls 
Royce Merlin XX engine equipped with a two-stage supercharger which gave a much 
enhanced performance (20mph faster than the Mark I) at altitude. 115 The two 
Hurricane squadrons as 151 Wing RAF, had been immediately dispatched to Russia 
on a north-bound Convoy which arrived in Russia on the 25th August 1941.116Jt was 
to prove a costly decision for Far East Command. 
In September 1941 AM Brooke-Popham, the C in C Far East, was advised by London 
that the planned expansion of the RAF could not be met. Logically, this must have 
been as a result of the Hurricanes that were being sent to the Soviet Union and which 
113 Heavy AA guns were the 3.7 inch and light were the 40mm Bofors guns, both of which were the standard 
British AA guns of that time, of this type of artillery most of the allocation had been to Home Defence and the 
Middle East. There were in the command, a few of the older type 3 in. AA guns already regarded as obsolete . 
114 Kenneth P. Wemell, Archie, Flak, AAA, and Sam; A Short Operational Histmy of Ground-Based Air Defense, Air University Press, Maxwell Alabama 1988, p. 5. · -- - · ·· · 
115 Owen Thetford, Aircraft of the Royal Air Force since 1918. London, Putnam 1957. revd. 8th ed. 1988. p. 363. 
116 This was No. 151 Wing which comprised No. 81 and 134 sqns. RAF. When within range of Murmansk some 
twenty four Hurricanes were flown off the Carrier Argus , the remainder of the Wing travelling in ships with 
crated Hurricanes contiued on to Archangel . When the Wing left Russia in late November 1941 these Hurricanes 
were handed over to the Russians. See Edward Bishop, Hurricane, Airlife, London 1986. pp.76- 79 and p.140. 
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earlier had been allocated and destined for Singapore. The Russia decision was to 
prove in hindsight, a dramatic error in so far as Singapore was concerned. The Prime 
Minister, Winston Churchill, was aware at the time that he was taking a risk but 
believed that Japan would not attack at the earliest until some time in 1942 and 'Eden 
like Churchill, believed an attack on Malaya unlikely',l17Jt was also an opinion 
which was held by the American government. Given the limited operational range of 
the Hurricane and the distances encountered in Russia it is difficult to see how this 
decision, so critical to the defence situation in the Far East, could have been justified 
other than on morale boosting grounds. It had the effect, however, of denying to the 
RAF any possibility of establishing even local air superiority against the JAAF which, 
would have at the very least, provided some opportunities for co-operation in the 
form of some realistic air support for the forces on the ground. It was a decision 
which negated any real opportunity for army-air co-operation in Malaya. 
In 1941 the defences remained woefully inadequate, the fiscal restrictions on defence 
works and training still applied and this was to remain the state of affairs almost until 
the Japanese attacked in December, but by then it was too late to correct the 
shortcomings of the past months and years. These were all contributing factors which 
added to the failure to provide any incentive for military co-operation. Military 
communications were also a serious problem in Malaya and Singapore which would 
not have helped the cause of co-operation. 118. This was due to the inherent 
atmospheric interference caused by the climate and the terrain and the general 
shortage of suitable radio transmitters. Virtually all communications were by means 
of the overland civilian telephone system, a system which the military were forced to 
share with the normal civilian users. During the Japanese invasion this was to cause a 
conflict of priorities for the civilian operators whose judgement was the sole 
arbitrator. The problem was the same for the RAF and the visual early warning 
system had to use the telephone. 
Surprisingly, some radar sets had been delivered to south-east Asia by the end of 
1941 and, for security reasons, they were known as Air Ministry Experimental 
Stations (AMES). Of the operational stations available to the defence in 1941; two 
were on Singapore Island.Two in eastern Malaya and one in Johore. two of these were 
mobile stations and less effective than those on fixed sites. These were to give early 
warning of the approach of enemy aircraft but were to be bedevilled by the monsoon 
weather and the spine of mountainous terrain running north south through central 
117 Roger Parkinson, Blood, Toil, Tears, and Sweat: The War History ftmn Dunkirk to Alemein, based on the War 
Cabinet Papers of 1940 to 1942, London, Hart-Davis MacGibbon 1973. p. 309. 
118 Pcrcival, Lt. Gen. A.E., The War in Malaya, Eyre & Spottiswoode, London 1949. passim. 
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Malaya which blanked out whole areas of the country to radar coverage. This 
combined with the extremely humid climate and its consequent effects on electrical 
equipment of all kinds was to cause problems and the use of the radar stations to be 
limited. However, the two mobile units were connected by radio to the Filter Room in 
Singapore, a far more efficient means of communication than the telephone or 
telegraph generally used by the military. 
Burma 
In 1939 it was believed by the GOC Burma that an attack by Japanese was unlikely 
and the COS in London had agreed. However, by August 1940 the Japanese had 
occupied part of Indo-China and were known to be covertly operating in Thailand. 
There was now a need for some additional military forces in Burma. Due to the 
demands of the current war situation in the West and the lack of any immediate threat 
from the Japanese the COS proposed that any reinforcement be on a long term 
basis.119 There was also the strongly held belief that the main object of any Japanese 
aggression would be Malaya and Singapore rather than Burma.120 As a direct 
response to this, a defence conference held in Singapore in October saw the Japanese 
threat as being slightly more serious and that there was a risk of air attacks on the 
Rangoon docks, Burma oil refineries, and the Burma airfields on the air reinforcement 
route to Singapore. 121 The Air Ministry obviously thought this a possibility and 
suggested that two bomber squadrons, one fighter squadron, one general 
reconnaissance and one army co-operation squadron would be sufficient to counter 
this possible threat.122 The Singapore defence conference also believed that an attack 
in southern Burma might be a possiblity and asked the COS to increase the strength of 
the army in Burma. They considered that Singapore had over-estimated the size of the 
threat and only one bomber (Blenheim) squadron was sent to Burma in early 1941 to 
be followed by one fighter (Buffalo) squadron in October 1941. The dangers of the 
Burma situation seems not to have been fully understood by the COS and notably 
there was no recommendation for the RAF to have the capability to support the Army 
except by the use of Light Bombers. The official RAAF history states that the official 
view was that, 
... Burma's defence must depend very largely on holding Malaya, the defence 
of which therefore must have priority. As Brooke-Popham saw it, the 
119 The fall of France and the entry of Italy on the side of the Axis into the war . 
120 This was because of the Rubber and Tin production in Malaya and oil in the N.E.I. 
121 At this stage a Japanese occupation of Burma seems not to have been part of the defence considerations. 
122 Army co-operation did not mean Close Support. Army co-operation squadrons role was artillery spotting and 
reconnaissance. The aeroplane used for these tasks was the Lysander. 
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Japanese were unlikely to attack Burma solely to cut the Burma Road with 
China.I23 
One A VG were also in Bmma at the time of the Japanese attack and made available 
by the Chinese government for defence of Rangoon and the Burma Road, this was a 
coincidence rather than any part of a planned defence strategy. 
During 1941 the defence of Burma had undergone various changes and by July 1941 
two Burma Brigades with the addition of an Indian Infantry Brigade had been formed 
into the 1st Burma Division. Short of most things but especially artillery, medics , 
engineers, signals and transport it was in reality a Division in name only. Mostly 
these were only partially trained and inexperienced soldiers and the Division was 
lacking in Intelligence staff. The instructions to the GOC Burma were that his priority 
was to protect the airfields on the Imperial reinforcement route and the Burma Road, 
the sole remaining supply route to China which started from Rangoon. General 
Mcleod, the GOC Burma, had estimated that the Japanese, if they launched an attack, 
would use two army divisions with eight bomber and four fighter squadrons in 
support and this proved to be the case. There can be little doubt that the defence 
problems were appreciated by the senior officers in Burma, what was lacking was the 
physical means to accomplish it. For example, due to the relatively short operational 
ranges of the Buffalo, unless the fighter squadron could have been based much further 
forward it was of little use in any role which could support the Army. The few 
Blenheim light bombers available had a greater range but could not operate without 
fighter escort, thus the fighter situation was not only critical but it was fundamental to 
the whole air situation. 
The local air commander in Burma from mid-1941 until January 1942 was Group 
Captain E.R Manning until Air Commodore Stevenson arrived to take over. With the 
help of the army there was a programme of airfield construction but there were few 
fully prepared airfields.I24 Nevertheless, by December 1941 there were a total of 
some fifteen airfields in Burma either completed or at least in a sufficient state of 
preparedness so that all were capable of being used as landing strips. 125 A VM Sir 
Paul Maltby, who compiled the official dispatch on air operations in Burma during 
this period wrote, 
123 Gillison, op.cir. p. 146. 
124 At this time there was still no signs of an Observer Corps being formed and no indication of any Radar sets 
(AMES) being allocated to Burma. 
125 The airfields are listed by S. Woodbum Kirby, The War Againsl Japan, vol. 11, HMSO, London 1958, p.IO. 
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... all bases were complete by the end of 1941... There was a measure of AA 
protection in the Rangoon area but none elsewhere.126 
Most of the airfields were east of the Sittang River and geographically located where 
it was difficult to provide sufficient early warning. As in Malaya, the factors 
governing the siting of airfields were geology and accessibility t6 building materials. 
Again like Malaya, the limited operational range of RAF aircraft also influenced the 
location of the airfields and made them vulnerable to Japanese air attacks. 127 A 
further complication was the forest ground cover which seriously hampered effective 
air reconnaissance for the army. Airfield ground defence was allocated to the BFF and 
an example of an understanding of the mutual need for co-operation between the 
services 128 All the intentions were correct, what failed was having sufficient means. 
Army and Air Force co-operation although limited, was willingly undertaken. As the 
official history of the RAAF states, 
Inter-Service relations in Burma were excellent and the army did everything 
possible to assist the RAF in its preparations. The raising and training of 
aerodrome defence troops [presumably the BFF] were conducted in parallel 
with the construction of the airfields themselves. 129 
From this it is clear that there was certainly real spirit of co-operation and each 
service did its best to help the other when it could in the common interest. However, 
the priority of the air force was to defend to defend Rangoon from air attack as this 
was the destination of the reinforcement convoys and protecting their own airfields. 
Providing some level of air support to the army on the ground was an impossible task 
for an air force generally consisting of some thirty plus fighters. The only aircraft 
available for supporting the army in Burma were the Blenheims.130 
Apart from the one RAF fighter squadron, the remaining available fighter aircraft 
available for the defence of Burma were those of the American Volunteer Group 
(A VG). Shortly before the Japanese invaded Burma, Chiang Kai-Shek, very much in 
his interest, agreed to one squadron of the A VG remaining in Burma to assist the 
126 Woodbum-Kirby, voi.II, op.cit., p.147. The AA guns referred to by Malt by presumably refer to those 
arriving in Burma after the Japanese attack for as Kirby says, that although there was officially an AA battery of 
the BAF it did not have any AA guns. The first AA guns arrived with a Royal Artiilery unit at the end of December. See Kirby vol. II, p.9. 
127 Slim, Defeat into Victmy. The operational range of the Hurricane fighter for example, was 135 miles and the 
Buffalo was little better. See also Peirse Papers, Folder 23. 
128 The BFF were formerly the Burma Military Police and were now part of the army. 
129 Douglas Gillison, op.cit. p.l46.-7 
130 Consisting of three fighter squadrons it was part of the Chinese Air Force. Popularly known as the 'Flying 
Tigers' the air and ground personnel of the A VG were entirely volunteers who, with the tacit agreement of the US had been recruited from the US military in early 1941 by Col. Claire Chennault. Its purpose was to provide air 
cover against Japanese attacks on the road convoys using the Burma Road. 
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RAF in defending Rangoon. As in Malaya army support and therefore co-operation 
was at minimal levels. 
Burma was an important factor in Japanese strategy in the Far East and it was a 
source of wolfram and oil, both vital war materials.l31 Strategically it was necessary 
to protect their right flank from any threat from India or China. How far the capture of 
Burma offered a serious threat to India is arguable, but there is evidence to support 
the view that the invasion of India via lmphal, Operation U-Go, had never originally 
been a serious option for the Japanese High Command. When the lmphal operation 
took place, the India option was initiated solely by General Mutaguchi who saw 
himself as a grand strategist.l32 Undoubtedly, the Japanese did offer a very real threat 
of air attack on the industrial north-east of India, to Calcutta and to the extensive 
shipping routes in the Bay of Bengal. 
In south-east Asia in 1941 there were in place all the pre-requisites for defeat. In 
Malaya and Burma the defence strategy was flawed, and consequently the air tactics. 
There was also a failure by the authorities in the UK to supply the key elements of air 
defence, sufficient modem aircraft and adequate early warning Radar sets. Both of 
these were critical for the establishment of air superiority without which effective air 
support was not possible. This had already been demonstrated in Europe and it 
contributed to the defeat of the ground forces. The long history of defence policy 
making had gradually led the military commanders to makes assumptions, which 
partly based upon poor intelligence, had led to an imperfect defence strategy. The 
defence of Singapore had been discussed and exercised over most of the inter-war 
years against a backdrop of international turmoil which had resulted at a late date in a 
fundamental revision of the strategy which failed to be backed by the means. This 
was a situation was compounded by the Prime Minister when, in taking what he knew 
to be a risk, he decided to re-allocate to Russia the much needed modern aircraft 
required by the new defence policy. In this whole 'mish-mash' there was little space 
to consider the subject of army and air force co-operation and in both the services, 
little concern. In the RAF both senior commanders and pilots, were elements of 
differing cultures without sympathy for army support operations. The defence 
strategy of the army and the RAF relied upon having a sufficiency of suitable aircraft 
which were non-existent. They were then left with little choice but to strive to meet 
the commitments which had fallen on their respective shoulders. It is clear that little 
131 Kirby, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 5. Burma supplied ten per cent of the World's Wolfram and thiry-five per cent of the 
Commonwealth's 
132 For an appreciation of this see Meirion and Susie Harries, Soldiers of the Sun, London, Heinemann 199l.and 
Stewart Adrian, The Underrated Enemy, London, William Kimber 1987. pp.344-121. 
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regard was paid to army and air force co-operation before the Japanese attack, for the 
reasons already discussed. Defence policy had made rapid adjustments to meet 
wartime situations but with the wrong assumptions, 'the pigeons were about to come 
home to roost' . The scene was set for disaster and the stage had been set for war. 
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Introduction 
Chapter2 
HARSH LESSONS 1941-42 
... more can be learned from defeat than from Victory1 
Churchill called the loss of Malaya and Singapore, 'the worst disaster and largest 
capitulation in British history'.2 Misguided assumptions concerning Japanese military 
ability led to the military disaster in Malaya, and a defeat in Burma of which 
Stillwell's frequently quoted remark was, ' ... we got a hell of a beating .. .'.3 The result 
was a Japanese threat to north-east India. British defence suppositions had resulted in 
flawed policies that were not sufficiently flexible with an air force not equipped to 
combat the Japanese attack. In Malaya the policy had not anticipated either the speed 
or the success of the Japanese and had been based on the wrong set of premises: that 
the initial thrust would be against Singapore. It assumed that an invasion force could 
be successfully attacked from the air whilst still on the high seas, that strategic air 
attacks could be launched on Japanese air bases in southern Indo-China to destroy any 
supporting Japanese air force and that any direct attack on the naval base could only 
come from a Carrier fleet. When these assumptions proved to be wrong the defence 
lost any coherence and the conduct of the battle was dictated by the Japanese. 
In Burma, the defences prior to 1940, had been limited mainly to internal security 
and retaining sovereignty in the border areas, both being carried out by locally raised 
ground forces stiffened with two reduced British infantry battalions. There was no air 
force. Faced with a possible threat from Japan the locally raised units were transferred 
to the army and an RAF light bomber squadron of Blenheims was dispatched to 
Burma and later reinforced in 1941 by one fighter squadron. The size of these forces 
was based on the assumption that the main thrust of a Japanese attack would be 
towards Singapore and therefore any Japanese incursion into Burma would be of a 
very limited nature. In addition there were few or no reserves to draw on. The 
assumptions proved to be wrong when the attack came and the defence was woefully 
inadequate, due to the weakness of the army and air force and piecemeal 
reinforcements . When General Slim arrived on the scene and took command of the 
Burma Division and later Burma Corps, he decided that after the loss of Rangoon and 
1 Quoted by Bond, Brian, ed. ,Fallen stars: Eleven Studies ofTwentieth Cenluly Military Disasters, London, 
Brassey's (UK) 1991. p.l2. This is in contrast to the Japanese proverb, Haigun no shO wa hei wo katarazu, 'a 
defeated general does not talk of war', see Louis Alien in Bondibid, p.229. Japanese Generals rarely learned from 
their mistakes. In contrast, General Slim frequently analysied his past defeats and mistakes and learnt from them. 
See Ronald Lewin, Slim: The Standard Bearer, London, Leo Cooper 1976. passim. 
2 Winston Churchill, The Second World War, vol. IV, London, Casselll951. p.81. 
3 Barbara W. Tuch.man, Sand Against the Wind: Stillwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-45, 
London, Macmillan 1971, Futura ed. 1981. p. 385. 
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the withdrawal of the air force to India, conserving an effective fighting force was the 
only course of action open to him. He conducted a fighting withdrawal to the Indian 
frontier. 4 
Background 
In south-east Asia there was an insidious detrimental influence in the underlying 
perception that the Japanese were an inferior race, that the quality of their military 
and their aeroplanes were inferior and that they were poorly equipped and short 
sighted. As late as 1941 RAF and Commonwealth aircrew were still being told that 
Japanese airmen and aircraft were inferior to those of the allied air forces.s On the 
very eve of war there was, as Vice Admiral Sir Richard Smeeton recalls it, 
' ... Saloon Bar speculation' -rather than official doctrine- .. that because of 
their slit eyes- epicanthic fold of skin( ... ) the Japanese fighter pilots could not 
shoot straight, ... 6 
and as late as theIst May 1941, the Joint Intelligence Committee estimated the 
operational efficiency of the Japanese Fleet Air Arm [JNAF] as, 'not more, but 
possibly slightly less than that of the Italians'. 7 This was in spite of reports from 
China on the performance and armament of the Zero fighter. There was a laissez-Jaire 
approach in the Far East and a failure to disseminate information. For example, in 
1941, ' ... it was recognised by the middle of the year that the heavy bombers, 
operating from southern lndo-China, did have the range to cover the 750 miles to 
Singapore.•8 
The Far East Combined Bureau (FECB) the military intelligence centre in Singapore, 
which had absorbed the former RAF Air HQ Intelligence Section, does not appear to 
have been stricken with either a sense of urgency or to have an adequate grasp of the 
situation. A report written in 1942 suggested it had been ' ... morally bankrupt'.9 This 
assertion may have been a distortion of the facts, Brook Popham's liaison officer with 
FECB may have misrepresented the true position. In a letter to General Ismay Brook 
Popham mentions that' ... Group Captain Darvall is responsible for Intelligence, not 
4 The loss of Rangoon meant that reinforcements could no longer be sent. The air force had been withdrawn after 
devastating air attacks on Magwe and Akyab. 
5 See John W. Dower, War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War, London, Faber and Faber 1986. 
passim for an interesting discussion on this aspect of the war against the Japanese. 
6 Marder, op.cit. p.345. 
7 Marder,ibid. quoted from JlC(4l)l75, Future Strategy of Japan, Annex to COS(4l) !59th Mtg., 3rd May 1941. 
CAB 79/ll. 
8 Probert, op.cit., p. 27. 
9 Cox Report, Ludlow-Hewitt Papers, Folderl4, and quoted by Probert op. cif., p. 25. Cox was an extremely 
experienced officer. 
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for collecting it but for seeing that all requirements are properly met.'lO This suggests 
that the quality of intelligence information was being queried by London. 
The attitudes towards the Japanese between the wars, were to have fatal consequences 
in the defence planning and in the opening stages of the war. These views were not 
limited solely to the British, the Americans also had similar perceptions. Conversely 
the early successes of the Japanese also had a profound and detrimental effect on the 
Emperor's troops and led them to have fatal belief in their own military superiority .11 
For example, Louis Alien suggests that the capture of British supply depots in 
Malaya, called by the Japanese 'Churchill supplies' when Mutaguchi was commander 
of the 18th Division, directly influenced his decision to launch the attack at Imphal. 12 
Prior to the outbreak of war stringent financial economies were imposed on the 
British defence forces. For example, the fighter pilots were inexperienced when 
compared to the Japanese, but the training budget was limited due in part to the 
parsimonious attitude of Sir Shenton Thomas, the Governor, and the Singapore 
government. Duff Cooper who had been sent to Singapore as Churchill's personal 
representative only mentioned the Governor in passing, but commented favourably on 
Sir George Sansom of the Ministry of Economic Warfare (MEW) and a Japanese 
expert, who was convinced that a war with Japan was inevitable.l3 Air to air firing 
practice in the air force was so limited that some of the Buffalo fighter pilots used 
their aircraft's guns for the first time when they flew into action against the 
Japanese. 14 There was also a general low degree of preparedness and lassitude on the 
allied side not helped by the dearth of necessary equipment. Pro~ert quotes an 
airman of 62 squadron RAF at Alor Star who stated that it was, 
CoJ 
... definitely peacetime air force- they [the squadron] were given no training 
" at all under wartime conditions.15 
This condition seems to have prevailed throughout the command. It says much for the 
courage and determination of the aircrews that, they not only survived the first 
Japanese assault as fighting units but continued to inflict damage on the JAAF 
throughout the retreats through Malaya and Burma.16 
10 PRO CAB 106/40. Letter dated 5th December 1940. Ismay was a member of the War Office Intelligence 
Directorate. See The i\1enwirs of Lord lsmay, London, Heinemann 1%0. p. 238. 
11 See Thorne, Christopher, The Far Eastern War: States and Societies 1941-45, London, Unwin1986. p.l9 .. 
12 Louis Allen, 'Mutaguchi Renya and the Invasion of India', in Brian Bond, ed. Fallen Stars: op. cil., 
-· - London, Brassey's 1991. pp. 215-39. Mutaguchi confidently expected to replenish his 
army's needs from British supply dumps at Imphal. 
13 Duff Cooper, Old Men Forget, London, Rupert Hart-Davis 1953, pp. 292-3. The SOE operated under the 
auspices of the MEW. See Aldrich op. cif., p. 94. 
14 See Shores, Boody Shambles, vol. I. p. 37. 
15 Probert, op. cit., p.24 
16 Probert ibid, p. 24. 
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The number of hours flown by a pilot is an officially accepted international standard 
measure of competence and is used by both military and civil aviation. In the RAF 
pilots normally needed to attain a particular level of flying expertise before being 
posted to an operational training squadron where they would gain those particular 
skills necessary before being posted to an operational combat-ready unit. This system 
was adopted as being the best possible and was a result of the experience of the First 
World War. The number of hours flown, apart from local variations, was used by all 
the combatant nations during the Second World War as a recognisable standard of 
competence. 
The levels of experience of, RAF aircrew posted to the South East Asian operational 
Theatre prior to the Japanese invasion is unknown. However, most of the Australian 
and New Zealand aircrew had by the then current standards, little actual flying 
experience or operational training. In fact, the majority arrived in Malaya Command 
either with their squadrons or later as reinforcements straight from the flying training 
schools in their own countries. Shores and Gillison both comment on this particular 
fact.17 In addition those aircrew who attained reasonable levels of operational 
competence in Malaya Command were then often posted back to their home countries 
as flying instructors to increase the output of aircrew at the flying schools, depleting 
the numbers of competent aircrew available in Malaya. Flying training was restricted, 
in 1939 Bomber crews were limited to seven hours a month and in 1941 this was only 
increased to eleven hours a month. 18 
In contrast, in the Japanese military and naval flying schools, the flying training was 
long and intensive. In addition to this, a high proportion of the aircrew in operational 
squadrons had already gained combat skills. This was particularly so in the Japanese 
Army Air Force which had been operating over China and Manchuria since 1937. 
Many aircrew had already experienced combat against Soviet 'volunteers' apart from 
that acquired from combat against the Chinese pilots. As the table below shows, 
virtually all Japanese pilots had 300 hours flying time before they joined their 
operational combat units from the training squadrons and the average Japanese army 
pilot, who were the main aircrew element of the Japanese air effort during the 
invasion, had accumulated 600 hours before December 1941. 
JAAF 300 hrs (average first-line pilot in 1941 600 hrs) 
17 Shores, vol.1, op. cit. , p. 42, and Gillison, quoting from Maltby, pp.l98-9. 
18 Probert, op. cit., p.34. 
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JNAF 300 hrs ( 11 11 11 11 11 11 800 11 )19 
Fifty per cent of the army pilots had been in combat, either in China or against the 
had 
Soviet air force as"ten per cent of the land based Navy pilots.20 It is remarkable that 
British military intelligence seems to have been unaware of this fact or, more likely, 
it passed unnoticed by the relevant authorities. Col. Claire Chennault of the A VG had 
been in China since 1939 and in Burma continually warned his opposite numbers in 
the RAF of the skill and experience of Japanese aircrew and of the effectiveness of 
their aircraft and equipment, which was far from as obsolete as the authorities 
believed. He was also in contact with A VM Brooke-Popham and the other senior 
RAF officers. However, it is difficult to see what could have been done to improve 
the situation other than increase the budget allocated for flying training within the 
Command and this would have gone some way to improve the situation. The bizarre 
twist is that the clearance for the necessary operational training was refused. This was 
an unforgivable omission on the part of those in authority be it civilian or military, 
notwithstanding the shortage of Government funds. 
For army and air force co-operation it is clear that at different times there were 
varying factors influencing the levels at which co-operation could be initiated. These 
factors were: 
(a) the individual Commanders and their perceptions of the needs at the time. 
Undoubtedly this largely depended upon their previous experiences, training and open 
mindness, or willingness to co-operate for mutual benefit. 
(b) perceptions of the need from the higher command and 
(c) the funds necessary to support the training programmes, supply the necessary 
equipment and to allow men to be allocated for this specific task. 
These were not all the responsibility of the services but, unless the relevant authorities 
were informed of the need by the professionals how were they to originate any 
action? In any case all the available aircraft were allocated to air defence or attack, 
none were available for air support even if it had been requested, and in 1941 it was 
unlikely that the additional aircraft needed could be supplied from elsewhere. 
Imperial Japan did not _have an independent Air Force during the Second World War. 
There was an Air Force component of both the Japanese Army and Navy and the 
personnel were respectively either soldiers or sailors. The roles of the two Japanese 
Air Forces had been defined from their foundation, consequently throughout the war 
19 Craven,W.F. and Cate,J.L.,The Army Air Forces in World War ll, vol. I, University of Chicago Press, 1949 
p.80. and quoted in Gillison, op. cit., p. 152. The information contained in Japanese Air Faces of World War !I 
op.cit. elaborates on this point in slightly more detail and indicates that over a flying training period of some 16 to 
30 months Japanese Fighter pilots attained 400 hours before being posted to an operational front-line squadron. 
20 Crave and Cate, ibid. and quoted in Gillison, ibid, p.152 . . 
40 
they each operated in support of their surface arm. The army was clearly told, 'The 
function of the Japanese Army Air Force is to give support to the Japanese Army ... •21 
But, there was always a degree of flexibility and on many occasions during the 
Second World War the Japanese Air Forces operated in unrestricted support of the 
other Service when necessary. This was very similar to the way in which the US and 
the French operated their air forces.22 The bombing of Singapore for example, was 
carried out by bombers of the JNAF of the 22nd Air Flotilla flying from airfields in 
southern Indo-China and it was aircraft from the same Flotilla which sank both the 
Prince of Wales and the Repulse. JNAF aircraft invariably had a greater range than 
those of the Army because of the distances they were expected to fly over the Pacific. 
The policy of support was, nevertheless, to result in the Japanese concentrating on the 
design, development and production of fighter and bomber aircraft for the army and 
navy.This was ultimately to prove counter-productive for, as with the Luftwaffe, it did 
not encourage the concept or the need for either the development or production of a 
strategic bomber or of transport aircraft of the kind used so effectively by the allied 
air forces in Burma. 
The operational air actions of the Japanese Air Forces were based on the doctrine that 
they were the air arm of their parent Service. In Malaya and Burma this was to result 
in a counter-air strategy by the Japanese Army Air Force to destroy the RAF and gain 
air superiority, this would enable them to give unrestricted air support to the ground 
forces. The success of this policy allowed the Japanese to frequently and successfully 
use relatively obsolete aircraft in the ground support role. An example was the 
Mitsibishi Ki-51 Sonia single-engined close support aircraft.23 This freedom was 
denied to the RAF for, without air superiority they could not effectively use obsolete 
aircraft without heavy casualties, hence the failure of the Vilderbeests to attack the 
Japanese Navy at Kuantan off the Malaysian coast and of the Lysander for close air 
support in Burma. Without adequate fighter cover the aircraft losses were 
insupportable. At the same time the British were taken completely by surprise when, 
the JNAF, using their long-range land-based bombers, were able to strategically bomb 
Singapore from their air bases in southern lndo-China. This was completely counter 
to all the defence assumptions, that only a carrier based air attack on Singapore was 
21rhe Japanese Air Forces in World War ll: The Organization of the Japanese Army and Naval Air Forces, 
1945. London, Arms and Armour Press 1979 and New York, Hippocrene Books 1979. Published by permission 
of the Controller HMSO. p. 2. 
22 In the US there were three air forces, the Army, Navy and Marine Corps. 
23 Rene J. Francillon, Japanese Aircraft of the Pacific War, London, Putnam 1979. pp. 178-8 1, calls the Sonia a 
successful aircraft liked by its crews however, it was an easy prey for Allied fighters. Eiichiro Sekigawa, Pictorial 
History of Japanese Militmy Aviation, Shepperton, Ian Alien 1974, in a photograph caption, also descrbes it as a 
successful and valuable aircraft. Over 1.459 aircraft of this type were produced between 1940-44. 
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possible because the distances were too great for land based aircraft operating from 
southern Indo-China airfields. 
In China, the Japanese military had already gained considerable experience of modem 
air warfare especially in launching attacks over long distances. This was something 
for which the Allies were completely unprepared. All the pre-war Allied planning had 
relied on air attacks being launched from bases which were within the normal aircraft 
operational ranges; that is generally half still air range, with an allowance for 
headwinds, and a loiter time of approximately 15 minutes . For fighters for example, 
the Hurricane lis had a still air range 460 miles though in reality this was an actual 
operational range of some 135 miles.24 The more modern Japanese army types of 
fighters, such as the Nakajima Ki 43 Oscar, had a still air range of 775 or 1200 miles 
with maximum fuel, and thus operational ranges were consistently of the order some 
four hundred plus miles which was frequently extended by the use of additional long 
range fuel tanks. 25 This in itself was a crucial factor in the air battle; Japanese fighters 
could reach RAF airfields but the RAF fighters could not reach the Japanese airfields 
which were therefore mostly free from the danger of air attack. 
In May 1939 the Nomonhan border incident occurred between the Soviet Union and 
Japan.26Jt was fought at the level of an undeclared war with considerable forces 
being engaged on either side. The result was that, ' ... the Imperial Japanese Army were 
strongly influenced by their encounter with the Soviet air force•.27 The Japanese had 
quickly recognised the necessity of supplying their Bomber formations with fighter 
escorts over the long distances involved, thus pre-empting the Allied air forces by 
some years. The concept of long-range fighter escorts was to effect the development 
of Japanese army fighter aircraft by increasing their operational ranges. These kinds 
of experiences were to prove invaluable to the Japanese in their air attacks on Malaya, 
Singapore, Hawaii and the Philippines during 1941 and 1942. Japanese Navy aircraft 
on the other hand, were designed to meet the long ranges necessary for Pacific 
operations. Thus, during the planning of operations for the attack on the west in 
December 1941 the Army were allocated to the land areas of south-east Asia and the 
Philippines with naval air force support when required. The job of the navy, due to 
the vast area of the Pacific, was to provide very long range and thus unexpected air 
attacks, for example the attacks on the Philippines and Singapore. 
24rhetford, op. cit. pp. 367. 
25Gillison, op.cil., Appd. 4, pp.717-50. 
26 Japan recognised Manchuria as the traditional invasion route into Korea, already occupied by Japan, and 
described by the Japanese as 'a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan'. See Documents on British Foreign Policy, 
Second Series 1919-1939, vol. XX?, for a more detailed explanation of the incident in 1939. 
27 Francillon, Rene J., Japanese Aircraft of the Pacific War, Putnam (new ed), London 1979, p.33. 
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Malaya 
The Malayan campaign was fought under difficult conditions. Geographically Malaya 
is a peninsula with a high central mountainous spine mostly covered in tropical rain 
forest and rising to some 7,000ft. above the coastal plains. It is over two hundred 
miles wide at its widest point with the island of Singapore four hundred and fifty 
miles south of the border with Thailand. The climate is tropical and has a Monsoon 
season running from December to April. It is also extremely debilitating, with a high 
annual rainfall and being hot and humid the whole year round with temperatures 
remaining in the nineties Fahrenheit . The lines of communication run north to south 
mostly through the coastal plains with the concentration being on the western side of 
the peninsula. Malaria is endemic. 
Defence of the naval base having originally been a navy-led policy, this focus on 
Singapore caused continuous confusion and it remained so throughout the campaign. 
For example, two of the six working Radar stations were in Singapore, of the 
remaining four; one was in Johore (in the south), two in the south east and one further 
station in the south west of the peninsular, none were in central or the north of 
Malaya. This situation would have been remedied as more radar sets became 
available, but the priority for the locations of the available sets indicates that the 
overall concern was for the protection of the naval base. The disadvantage of holding 
back the bulk of the air force and army in the south of the peninsula,· and in Singapore 
to defend the naval base, does not seem to have been generally accepted until some 
days after the invasion had begun. The priority was then switched to protecting the 
arrival of reinforcement convoys. 
In contrast to the focus on Singapore if Japanese forces managed to land on the coast 
of Thailand, the plan for the defence of Malaya, included two critical pre-emptive 
ground operations inside Thailand to forestall their advance, Operation Matador on 
the East coast and KrohcoL in the west. Both were planned to bar the two major 
road access points into Malaya. It was assumed that this would give an air strike force 
time to attack any Japanese reinforcement fleet off the coast of Thailand and so 
completely disrupt the Japanese logistic support system and that this would constrain 
their opportunity to advance. To provide advance warning of Japanese invasion fleet 
movements, four airfields had been placed as far north in Malaya as possible. All 
were within one hundred and twenty miles of Patani, which was to be the main 
Japanese landing point in Thailand. Apart from strategically basing the bombers at 
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Alor Star, the airfields were sited to enable the RAAF Hudson reconnaissance aircraft 
to carry out patrols over the Bay of Camrahn and off the east coast of Thailand, 
additionally Catalinas were based in Singapore. When the decision was taken to 
locate these particular airfields it would seem that it had been assumed that the 
Japanese would not be abl'e to attack them other than by using Carrier aircraft. The 
whole emphasis of the defence assumed the possibility of a landing in Thailand being 
dealt with by air attacks on any Japanese reinforcements coming by sea. 
There were crucial influences on the local decision-making process before and during 
the days following the Japanese invasion. These affected the outcome of the battle 
and consequently made the loss of Malaya and Singapore, the Dutch East Indies and 
Burma arguably inevitable. The most striking are; 
(i) The irrecoverable delay in authorising the launching Matador and 
Krohcol, both designed to forestall a rapid southern advance by the invaders. 
This had been caused in the first instance by (a), a telegram from the COS in 
London to Brooke-Popham on the 5th December insisting that he delay the 
invasion of Thailand until he was sure that the Japanese were about to land in 
Thailand and (b), the telegram from the British Minister in Bangkok on the 
7th to Brooke-Popham begging him not to launch any invasion of Thai 
territory until after the Japanese had landed, otherwise the British Minister 
believed, the Thais would side with the Japanese. 
(ii) The crucial mistake of basing strike aircraft so far forward on airfields 
without either fighter or AA protection and without an early warning 
capability. In addition, the whole situation was compounded by poor 
communications, only civilian land lines being available. 
(iii) The contradiction between defence of the naval base and the forward 
defence strategy. This was to be the 'bete noire' of the defence policy, it was 
to 'dog' the whole campaign. Initially it had the detrimental effect, during the 
whole sequence of the pre-war defence planning saga, of being the root cause 
of the differences between the army and the air force in their perceptions for 
an effective defence. 
(iv) The failure of aerial reconnaissance. This had started on the 4th and 5th 
of December when the Monsoon weather conditions at Kota Bharu had 
stopped all flying and it was not resumed until the morning of the 6th 
December when three Hudsons o( No. 1 RAAF squadron took off on 
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reconnaissance flights. The Japanese convoys were seen from the air on 
several occasions but there was considerable confusion in Singapore as to 
their destination, further compounded by the instructions from London all of 
which only served to detrimentally influence the high command decision 
making process. 28 
(v) The serious lack of factual intelligence. The fighting ability of the 
Japanese had been completely underrated. For example, in May 1941 a 
Japanese navy Mitsubishi Zero-Sen fighter (Zeke) had been shot down in 
China. Details of its armament and fuel tankage were sent to Singapore Air 
HQ Far East and to the Air Ministry in London. In September the British Air 
Attache in Chungking also forwarded estimates of the performance of the 
Zero-Sen to the Combined Intelligence Bureau (CBI) in Singapore.29 None of 
this crucial information seems to have reached the appropriate recipients, i.e. 
the air force chain of command and thus ultimately the aircrews . 
(vi) The level of training or fighter pilots, in both number of flying hours and 
the use of live ammunition for air gunnery practice was either restricted or 
simply not allowed on cost grounds. 3D 
The battle for air supremacy developed from the very first day of war and was fought 
by the RAF in the face of increasing odds. The Japanese air forces, mainly army but 
with a navy element when it was deemed necessary, continued to increase their hold 
on the tactical 'high ground'. Predictably, as in General Bond's Defence Appreciation 
to the War Office in 1940, the allied air forces suffered a rate of attrition which was 
not sustainable. Within less than twenty four hours of the original assault the RAF 
losses were almost fifty percent of operational strength forcing the RAF withdrawal 
south. 
Officially there had been little warning of the approach of a Japanese Fleet to 
Thailand.31 However, two facts were known, that there were Japanese bombers on 
airfields in southern lndo-China and that a Japanese Fleet, with transports was at large 
in the South China seas. It seems extraordinary that neither Operation Matador or 
Kroh Force were activated until it was too late. Partly this was due to the weather 
28 The failure of air reconnaissance was especially important on the 16th when the Japanese reinforcement convoy 
carrying the heavy equipment for the 25th Army arrived off Singora and Patani. However, by tllis time the RAF 
did not have sufficient air strength to mount an attack on tllis array of ships. 
29 See Shores, vol.l. op. cif. p.40. 
30 Shores, ibid. p.37. 
31 The Catalina was in fact shot down by Japanese fighters before it could get a radio message off to Singapore. 
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conditions which provided the Japanese fleet with cloud cover hindering air 
ob~ervation. In any case Brooke-Popham had been placed in the unenviable position 
of being responsible, should he launch the operations into Thailand, for starting the 
war. Consequently, he felt that he had to be absolutely certain that the Japanese were 
going to make a landing. However, lack of precise information resulted in indecision 
and delay in the launching of both Matador and Kroh Force. 32. 
The failure to provide adequate air reconnaissance in the days leading up to the 
invasion was probably the first clear illustration of a lack of urgency in Malaya. It is 
difficult to understand why there was seemingly a hesitancy on the part of Brooke-
Popham's HQ to instruct the RAF to send out sufficient aircraft to locate the Japanese 
fleet which was known to be at sea, unless there was a failure to appreciate the 
urgency of the situation. The requests for reconnaissance had to come from Brooke-
Popham's HQ and it is as well to note, without comment, that the 6th and 7th of 
December 1941 were Saturday and Sunday in Singapore. The disappearance of a 
Catalina flying boat sent out on a mission to locate the Japanese fleet on the 7th 
without making any radio contact, was an unprecedented event. Under the prevailing 
circumstances it ought to have been assumed on military grounds, that this might be 
due to some kind of hostile action. If not, then surely at the very least and in the 
normal course of events, a search and rescue mission should have immediately been 
put into operation. It was not. 
After the Japanese landing at Kota Bahru on the 8th December (Monday) a 
photographic sortie to Singora was undertaken to confirm the presence of the 
Japanese by the sole Beaufort in the Command. It was to be its only operational 
flight.33 Air reconnaissance shows that there were levels of army and air force co-
operation but, what was lacking was a sufficiency of photo reconnaissance aircraft. 
For example, in August of 1941 Air HQ in Singapore had requested some long range 
Hurricanes from the UK fitted with cameras for reconnaissance, work.34 These were 
not forthcoming and as a consequence, two Buffaloes within the command were 
adapted for this work in an attempt to remedy this glaring deficiency. But it was said 
32 The planned pre-emptive army advances into Thailand which were intended to seriously delay the Japanese 
advance southward. Matador was never launched apart from a limited foray into Thailand by Special Forces which 
only slightly delayed the Japanese advance and Kroh Force was too late to reach its destination. 
33 This had been specifically retained for reconnaissance duties from the original batch delivered to Singapore 
from Australia. 
34 This sounds very like an excuse for failure. The Buffaloes operational range was greater than that of the 
Hurricane. It can only refer to those Hurricanes equipped with non~droppable external fuel tanks which put it at a 
considerable speed disadvantage. See Thetford, op. cit., pp. 130 and p. 367. 
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they were limited in their usefulness as neither had the long-range ability of the 
Hurricanes. 35 
The only aircraft in the Command with the range to attack Japanese airfields in Indo-
China were the Blenheims at Alor Star and the three Catalinas of the RAF.36 
Theoretically the RAAF Hudsons could reach Indo-China by flying to the limits of 
their range, but only if they took-off from Kota Bahru, an airfield which became 
untenable within the first few hours of the Japanese attack. The Blenheim squadron 
suffered badly when Alor Star was attacked by Japanese aircraft on the first day and 
strategic counter-air attacks on the air bases in Indo-China were no longer a 
possibility. It was these from these bases that Japanese navy high level and torpedo 
bombers attacked and destroyed Force Z. Having missed the opportunity to attack the 
invasion fleet and with the effectiveness of the Blenheim squadron badly reduced, the 
two major legs of the RAF defence policy had collapsed. The only remaining counter-
air effort possible after the landings, was to attack Japanese occupied airfields in 
Thailand. Following a Buffalo reconnaissance flight over the airfield at Singora, 
where the pilot reported at least fifty Japanese aircraft on the ground, this was 
attempted. Only one Blenheim reached the target being shot down in the process and 
the raid failed to reduce the weight of the Japanese air attack on the RAF airfields.37 
By this time the air initiative had already passed to the Japanese. Without adequate 
early warning, within hours the air force had lost the battle for air superiority. Only 
one fighter squadron, superficially designated for army co-operation, was in northern 
Malaya at Sungei Patani and one Blenheim squadron was on the exposed northern-
most airfield of Alor Star. Without adequate AA batteries it was virtually undefended 
and sufficient early Warning to get aircraft into the air was never going to be 
obtainable. 38 
In so far as co-operation was concerned, the air support needed by the army, either 
before the war started or during withdrawal through Malaya and Burma, was never a 
priority of the air force. For co-operation to have been effective, specialised training 
and air superiority would have been needed. Percival commenting on the situation on 
the 11th December wrote; 
It had become clear that we could not hope to regain [air] superiority without 
powerful reinforcements. The safe arrival of these reinforcements therefore 
35 Shores, op. cit., vol. I. p.46, refers to a request for 'long range' photo reconnaissance Hurricanes. 
36 See Andrew Hendrie, Flying Cats, Airlife, Shrewsbury 1988, p.70. 
37 The pilot of this aircraft was awarded a postuhrnous VC. 
38 Clearly the lessons learned during the Battle of Britain had not really been taken on board. The intention was to 
establish a Radar station near Kotas Bharu but the landings occured. before this happened, Singapore had taken 
priority. 
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became the first essential in our air strategy. In consequence it was laid down 
by the Commander-in -Chief [Brooke-Popham] that the primary task of our 
fighters was to protect the approach [in the Malacca Straits and Keppel 
Harbour] of the convoys. 39 
Percival however does not seem to have appreciated the fact that, the possibility of 
RAF air superiority had never existed. 
In Malaya the Japanese Army initially had a logistic problem. Partly this was due to 
the limited amount of motor transport available and partly due to the fact that this was 
a seaborne invasion, the initial landing points being at Singora and Patani in Thailand 
and Kota Bharu in Malaya . The kinds of merchant ships available to the invasion 
force were only suitable for unloading vehicles either into Lighters or in an 
established port on a quayside for no large vehicle landing craft were operated by the 
Japanese. 40 In addition the Japanese also had their own intelligence failure, for when 
their first flights of aircraft landed at Singora airfield on the morning of the 8th 
December they found that its grass runways were waterlogged and it was not until 
Midday that the Japanese air attacks on the British airfields in Malaya could be 
launched. This was not surprising bearing in mind that the invasion took place during 
the Monsoon specifically to take advantage of the cloud cover and rain squalls 
necessary to cloak the approach of the invasion convoys. 
Logistics problems dogged the Japanese for some days following their original 
landings. For example, Tsuji notes that, after capturing the airfield at Kuantan on the 
East coast of central Malaya and some one hundred and fifty miles south of Kota 
Bharu, it was realised that it would be impossible to supply the air group based there 
with sufficient fuel, ammunition and food solely by using road transport as there was 
only one road and insufficient motor transport. The subsequent successful effort in 
supplying the air group was the result of innovation by the Japanese. Several hundred 
small boats, according to Tsuji, were loaded up with ammunition and fuel in Thai 
ports and sent down the coast to Kuantan. This was apparently sufficient to keep the 
air group in operation, although he does not say for how long this was maintained or 
indeed how viable an operation this would have been had additional supplies not 
reached the air group by road. As with so much during the battle for Malaya, it was a 
classic example of how important the loss of air superiority and a denial of air 
reconnaissance was to the Allies. The allied forces had no knowledge that this 
operation was underway due to the failure of air reconnaissance. The Beaufort 
39 Percival, op. cit., p/3l.This comment refers to the promised reinforcements convoys. 
40 Japanese Naval Vessels of World War Two; as seen by US Navallntellignce. Introduction by A .D. Baker III, 
Poole, Arms and Armour, 1987. section ONI 225-J. 
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originally retained for long-range PR had already been destroyed on the ground at 
Kota Bahru airfield on the 8th December. 41 
In so far as the RAF were concerned, the war was lost in the first twenty-four hours 
following the Japanese attack. It was during this period that the offensive capability 
of the RAF was virtually destroyed. Remarkably, decisions at this time still had to be 
referred to Singapore before any counter-air actions could be initiated. For example, 
even after Japanese troops had already landed on the beaches at Kota Bharu the RAF 
station commander telephoned Singapore for permission to launch air attacks against 
the Japanese off-shore. 
Surprisingly, Tsuji suggests that Japanese aircraft were inferior to the Buffaloes, 
Hudsons and Blenhiems being used by the RAF, but that the ratio of aircraft was in 
the Japanese favour by, 'one enemy machine to two of ours'. 42 This suggestion of 
inferiority can only have been obtained from the de-briefing of Japanese pilots or, that 
Tsuji was completely mis-informed. As he does not specify which Japanese aircraft 
he is referring to, this may well be a reference to the Nakajima Ki-27 Army Type 97 
Nate, a fighter which went into production in 1937 but still being used in front line 
service in 1941 and 1942 in south-east Asia. It does therefore raise a question as to 
the veracity of comparisons by the pilots of either side in the conflict. 43 Certainly the 
allied pilots were taken by surprise by the apparent superiority of the Japanese Ki-43 
Oscar fighters of the Japanese, however this might possibly have been due to the 
relative inexperience of the Allied pilots at that time. 
The Japanese landing at Kota Bharu was a remarkable achievement which also 
demonstrated a great deal of intensive training, for it took place during the hours of 
darkness when there was a considerable surf running, with intermittent squalls of rain 
showers and was opposed by the beach defences. In the event the Japanese casualties 
were surprisingly light. Obviously the landing achieved the element of surprise that it 
had been designed to produce. It benefited from the darkness of the night which was 
completely clouded over, limiting the effectiveness of the fire from the pillboxes of 
the beach defences. Even more surprising was the ability of the Japanese to keep up 
41 see Shores op.cit. vol.1, p.89. He cites the one instance, a reconnaissance flight to Singora on the 8th when this 
aircraft photographed the retiring Japanese invasion fleet. The one occasion when this aircraft was used in the very 
role for which it had been retained in Malaya, yet in less than twenty four hours this valuable asset to the defence 
had been destroyed. The question is, if one of the Australian Beauforts had been retained for this important role 
why not all of them? 
42 Tsuji, Singapore: The Japanese Version, Constable and Co., Ltd., London 1962, p. 197-8. In fact all the allied 
reports show that Tsuji's appreciation of the operational capabilities of the aircraft used by the RAF [except in one 
instance, the Netherlands East Indies Air Force who seem to have had a high regard for the Buffalo] to be wildly 
overestimated. However, it far from clear whether his opinion was shared by Japanese pilots. 
43 RAF pilots were still wrongly identifying the Japanese Oscars fighters as Zeros in Burma in late 1942. 
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their forward momentum without visible means of resupply and, once daylight had 
occurred, without gun support from the Japanese warships and undamaged transports 
which had by then withdrawn to the north. The RAF airfield at Kota Bahru, from 
which No.l squadron RAAF (Hudson lis) were operating, was less than one mile 
inland from the invasion beach and came under enemy ground fire by mid-day. 
Japanese air attacks on the airfield started during the morning and it was during these 
attacks that the sole reconnaissance Beaufort was destroyed. Percival commenting on 
the situation at Kota Bahru said; 
The anti-aircraft detachment of the Hong Kong and Singapore Royal Artillery 
defending the aerodrome [Kota Bahru] was in action almost continuously 
throughout the day [8th December] but the defence was too weak to beat off 
the [air] attack. 44 
Within a few hours it had ceased to be an operational airfield and it was evacuated by 
the air force during the afternoon of the 8th December and was later that day overrun 
by the Japanese army. Again Percival comments on this important loss; 
At about 4pm the Air Officer Commanding ordered the evacuation of the 
aerodrome. This began the long series of evacuations of aerodromes which 
had been laboriously prepared and for which the protection of which our 
troops had been specially dispersed. 45 
The airfield at Kuantan was attacked from the air on the 8 December on at least six 
separate occasions. Seven aircraft were destroyed on the ground in the. first air attack 
of that day at almost midday. 46 By dusk the RAF and RAAF had suffered 
catastrophic blows. The RAAF Hudson squadrons stationed at Kota Bharu and 
Kuantan and the remaining Blenheims from Alor Star had attempted to co-operate 
with the army by attacking the Japanese ships off the coast and to support the 
defenders on the beaches. They had continued to do so until it was no longer possible 
to use their airfields. Although some limited success was achieved by the aircraft, 
they were clearly not designed to undertake these kinds of operations and, perhaps 
more importantly, neither were the crews trained to attack ships or provide ground 
support. Two Buffaloes on detachment from 243 squadron, based at Kota Bharu to 
intercept high flying Japanese reconnaissance aircraft, strafed troop carrying barges 
attempting the passage upriver to the township. 47 Thus in the actions on the 8th 
December, the main effort air force effort had been to co-operate with the army and 
44 Percival, op.cit., p.ll8. 
45 Percival, ibid. p.ll8. In fact most were deemed by the army as being indefensible. 
46 It was from these very airfields, Kota Bharu and Kuantan, that the Fleet Defence fighter squadron [Buffaloes] 
based in Singapore were supposed to operate to provide air cover for Force Z should it have been requested. Air 
cover was not requested by the Navy. 
47 Shores, vol. I. p.84. 
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their forward momentum without visible means of resupply and, once daylight had 
occurred, without gun support from the Japanese warships and undamaged transports 
which had by then withdrawn to the north. The RAF airfield at Kota Bahru, from 
which No.l squadron RAAF (Hudson lls) were operating, was less than one mile 
inland from the invasion beach and came under enemy ground fire by mid-day. 
Japanese air attacks on the airfield started during the morning and it was during these 
attacks that the sole reconnaissance Beaufort was destroyed. Percival commenting on 
the situation at Kota Bahru said; 
The anti-aircraft detachment of the Hong Kong and Singapore Royal Artillery 
defending the aerodrome [Kota Bahru] was in action almost continuously 
throughout the day [8th December] but the defence was too weak to beat off 
the [air] attack. 44 
Within a few hours it had ceased to be an operational airfield and it was evacuated by 
the air force during the afternoon of the 8th December and was later that day overrun 
by the Japanese army. Again Percival comments on this important loss; 
At about 4pm the Air Officer Commanding ordered the evacuation of the 
aerodrome. This began the long series of evacuations of aerodromes which 
had been laboriously prepared and for which the protection of which our 
troops had been specially dispersed. 45 
The airfield at Kuantan was attacked from the air on the 8 December on at least six 
separate occasions. Seven aircraft were destroyed on the ground in the first air attack 
of that day at almost midday.46 By dusk the RAF and RAAF had suffered 
catastrophic blows. The RAAF Hudson squadrons stationed at Kota Bharu and 
Kuantan and the remaining Blenheims from Alor Star had attempted to co-operate 
with the army by attacking the Japanese ships off the coast and to support the 
defenders on the beaches. They had continued to do so until it was no longer possible 
to use their airfields. Although some limited success was achieved by the aircraft, 
they were clearly not designed to undertake these kinds of operations and, perhaps 
more importantly, neither were the crews trained to attack ships or provide ground 
support. Two Buffaloes on detachment from 243 squadron, based at Kota Bharu to 
intercept high flying Japanese reconnaissance aircraft, strafed troop carrying barges 
attempting the passage upriver to the township. 47 Thus in the actions on the 8th 
December, the main effort air force effort had been to co-operate with the army and 
44 Percival, op.cil., p.Il8. 
45 Percival, ibid. p.ll8. In fact most were deemed by the army as being indefensible. 
46 It was from these very airfields, Kota Bharu and Kuantan, that the Fleet Defence fighter squadron [Buffaloes] 
based in Singapore were supposed to operate to provide air cover for Force Z should it have been requested. Air 
cover was not requested by the Navy. · 
47 Shores, vol. I. p.84. 
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provide air support. By mid-afternoon it was decided by the RAF station commander 
to abandon Kota Bharu airfield. 
Whilst the battle at Kota Bharu was going on, the Japanese 5th Division of three 
regiments, was crossing the Kra Isthmus aiming for Alor Star and its airfield on the 
west coast. Kroh Force had crossed the border in an attempt to forestall and delay the 
Japanese advance by occupying the road north of Kroh. In the event insufficient 
numbers of troops reached the predetermined position where defences had to be 
prepared, it was a hopeless task given the speed of the Japanese advance. At this point 
Kroh Force did not receive any air support at all, either in the form of air 
reconnaissance or close support, there had been no pre-planning in this important 
aspect, especially air reconnaissance. Whilst Kroh Force was advancing the RAF 
Blenheim squadron at Alor Star was undertaking bombing missions mainly at Kota 
Bahru rather than supporting Kroh Force and slowing down the Japanese advance. In 
retrospect the failure to allow for some air support seems to have been a sad omission 
by the relevant military authorities. Kroh Force was soon forced to withdraw, thus 
leaving the road to Alor Star virtually open as it was an indefensible position for the 
army. The picture that emerges from these critical few hours, is one of a fixed mind 
set, a failure of direction and a lack of flexibility at a high level in the RAF which led 
to chaos in the attempt by local air commanders to do something, what they therefore 
finished up doing was therefore piecemeal and ineffective. 
Under continuous air attack Alor Star airfield became untenable and was abandoned 
by the RAF on the 9th December, leaving the 11th Indian Division, part of whose job 
it was to defend the airfields in the north west, without air support in a weak tactical 
position, and demoralised. On the same day the airfield at Sungei Patani ,the AA 
defence was four Bofors guns, was under air attack and by midday on the 9th 
December this airfield also was abandoned.48 Thus within thirty six ho~rs of the 
Japanese attack the air force had lost the use of its' northern airfields. 
Nor could the RAF now do much to help the Army's two divisions battling it 
out in the north, for not only had it suffered heavy losses but its own front-line 
bases were about to be overrun. 49 
As far as the 11th Indian division were concerned, 'During this initial battle little 
aerial participation [on either side] occurred•.so However, in spite of facing very 
heavy odds the fighter pilots of 21 squadron were continually attempting to give 
48 The 40mm Bofors lAO had an effective ceiling of 5,000ft. See Ian Brown et at, Bemard Lowry ed., 20th 
Century Defences in Britain: An Introductory Guide, Council for British Archaeology 1995, 2nd. ed. , 1996. p.59. 
49 Probert, op. cit., p.48. 
50 Shores, vol.l,op. cif ., p. l29. This is not surprising as clearly at this time the JAAF were concerned with their 
counter-air action in accordance with their preconceived strategy. 
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support to the army when it was requested. The Japanese air force were concentrating 
on destroying the air opposition and continuously making counter-air attacks on the 
airfields. 
On the lOth of December the Japanese naval aircraft operating from southern Indo-
China sank both HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse. Before Force Z as the 
naval force was designated set sail, the RAF did endeavour to arrange air cover. From 
Singapore to the Kra Isthmus landings is 500 miles. Marder states to, 
... the Fleet Defence officer and the squadron CO had arranged for Rff 
communication between the Prince of Wales, and the squadron was 
prepared, given the use of Kluang, Kuantan and Kota Bharu airfields, to keep 
a small patrol over the Fleet within 80 miles of the coast to a point 80 miles 
North of Kota Bharu. The range of the squadron was considerably reduced 
when Kota Bharu airfield, having become untenable, was abandoned in the 
late afternoon of 8th December. 51 
In fact the intention to co-operate was such that a direct R/T link was established to 
operate between the ships and the Buffalo fighters. 52 
Nevertheless, all this was of no avail when Admiral'Tom' Phillips, Force Z 
Commander imposed radio silence. 53 Having no idea where the Fleet was, the 
squadron remained in Singapore. When the Bridge of the Prince of Wales was 
destroyed by a bomb, Captain Tennant of the Repulse assuming that Admiral Phillips 
had been killed, broke radio silence. The squadron took off from Singapore but by the 
time that they arrived on the scene and at the limit of their two hundred mile 
operational range, both capital ships were sinking. There can be no doubt that, ' ... the 
desirability on general grounds of keeping shore headquarters apprised of attacks on 
the fleet is unquestionable'.54 With the loss of Force Z, the only opportunity for 
severing the main Japanese line of communication with Indo-China and slowing the 
Japanese advance was lost. 
By the 12th December the position of the 11th Division was such that Brooke-
Popham ordered a flight of Buffaloes from 243 squadron to Ipoh to support the army 
and on the next day all of 453 sqns Buffaloes were also allocated to this duty, 
Throughout the day the Australians at Ipoh kept the two serviceable Buffaloes 
51 Marder, vo!.l,op. cit ., p.426n., and 437. 
52 Marder, op. cif., p. 504. 
53 Alien, Singapore 1941 -1942, op.cit., p. 141-2, raises the issue that Maltby uniquely made the point that Phillips 
may have taken Pulford's signal to Force Z to mean that fighter cover was not available at all, whereas Pulford had 
only meant over Singora on the lOth. The omission being the word"Singora. 
54 Grenfell, Russell , Main Fleet to Singapore, 2nd. il)lp. OUP 1987. p.128. 
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at readiness [in case of an air attack], while ground crews worked ceaselessly 
to prepare others for offensive missions in support of the hard pressed troops 
falling back towards Penang. 55 
On 18th December there was a recognition of the need for more effort in the area of 
close air support for the army. The six Wirraways were converted into 'dive bombers' 
to become the army co-operation flight. 56 By the 19th December Ipoh was no longer 
viable as an operational airfield. The remaining fly-able aircraft were ordered south to 
Kuala Lumpur and Taiping airfield was abandoned. On the 22nd Kuala Lumpur came 
under attack and on the 23rd the RAF withdrew from the mainland except for 'Y' 
I 
Flight at Kluang in the southern-most Province of Johore with six Wirraways and the 
MVAF Detached flight. The MV AF were equipped with ex-civilian aircraft such as 
DeHaviland Moths for army reconnaissance to support the 8th Australian Division. 
Thus from the 23rd December and within a period of fifteen days the allied air force 
had been driven from the mainland. Given the limited operational ranges of the allied 
fighters, the army were now without any effective air cover or support south of Kuala 
Lumpur other than that which could be provided by the Wirraways. 
In a belated attempt to redress the situation, fifty-one crated Hurricanes reached 
Singapore in January 1941, these were, 
... Eight gun Hurricanes, mostly old Mk. 1s [from the western desert] which 
did not arrive until early January .... The Hurricane's absence hitherto owed 
more to priority for Fighter Command, the Soviet Union, the Middle East and 
• 
the Fleet Air Arm than to Brooke-Popham's previous confidence in the 
Buffalo. 57 
When they were uncrated, it was discovered that these first Hurricanes to arrive were 
fitted with Yokes air filters for desert operations. The filters imposed a 30mph drag 
penalty on the maximum speed of the Hurricanes and the ground crews found them 
almost impossible to remove in the time available. 58 By the end of January only 21 
Hurricanes remained operationai.59 On the 29th January thirteen Hurricanes flew in 
to Singapore from Java, a further forty-eight Hurricanes following 60 Thes~ were new 
Hurricanes IIAs and Bs (the Bs were armed with 12 machine guns) with Rolls Royce 
Merlin XX engines which improved the maximum speed by some 20mph over the 
55 Shores, vol. 1, p. 136. 
56 Shores, vol.l. p.152. 
5? Bishop, Edward, Hurricane, Airlife, Shrewsbury 1986. p. 102. This remark refers to a comment made by 
Brooke-Popham before the Japanese attack, that the Buffalo was adequate to deal with Japanese fighters. 
58 ibid. 
59 ibid, p.102- 3. 
60 The remainder of the sqn and their 32 Hurricanes remained in Sumatra, see Bishop, ibid, p.l03. 
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Mk ls61. However, there were no spares or glycol coolant, an essential for these 
aircraft, and it was not until the 31st that the squadron was operational. 62 Used in 
'penny packets' as they were made operational, both the Hurricane squadrons were 
reduced to seven aircraft by the lOth February and were then ordered to withdraw to 
Sumatra. Four 'patched up' aircraft, three Hurricanes and one Buffalo managed to 
leave Singapore on February 11th. 63 Thus ended the air defence of Malaya and 
Singapore, according to the official figures issued by the Japanese Supreme 
Headquarters in Tokyo, British losses were " ... about 390 aircraft and the Japanese 92 
aircraft in the battle of Malaya. "64 
The arrival of the Hurricanes in Singapore in January 1942, did challenge Japanese air 
superiority. Tsuji states that, they enabled the British reinforcing convoy to use the 
Malacca Strait and deliver reinforcements in late December 1941.65 The Hurricanes 
squadrons certainly provided some ground support for he acknowledges that they did 
cause some disruption to the movement of supplies by road which the Japanese had 
been using in broad daylight with little let or hindrance . 
... the Hurricanes flying low over the rubber forest were a serious challenge. 
Their intrepid pilots continually machine gunned our roads, shooting up our 
motor transport and blocking traffic, defects which could not be remedied by 
orders( ... ) While Hurricanes were flying even single cars moved off the road 
into the cover of the jungle, and all convoys had to move off the road and get 
out of sight at the first alarm. 66 
It is interesting that he should make this point which suggests that the Japanese were 
having logistics problems exacerbated by the Hurricanes strafing the road convoys. 67 
Clearly, there was little that the RAF and RAAF squadrons could do in the way of 
support for the army, constantly outnumbered in the air and without air superiority 
and with many demands they were fully stretched. The RAF were reinforced by 
Hurricanes but far too late in the day to redress the situation. There was also some 
support from the Netherlands East lndies Air Force operating from Singapore but, 
61 Also they were new Hurricanes is confirmed see Arthur Gerald Donahue, Last Flight from Singapore, London, 
Macmillan 1944. pp. 24-5. Thetford, Owen, Aircraft of the Royal Air Force since 1918, 8th rev. ed. Guild 
Publishing, London 1988. p. 363. 
62 Also the guns were still thickly covered with protective grease and it was essential that this was removed 
before they could be fired. See Terrance Kelly, The Battle for Pelembang, Robert Hale, London 19 85, p. 25. 
63 Donalme, op.cit., pp. 91-9. 
64 Sekigawa, Eiichiro, Pictorial Hist01y of Japanese Militmy Aviation, Ian Alien, Shepperton 1974. p.117. 
65 Tsuji, op. cit. see p.198. 
66Tsuji, op. cif. see p.198. 
67 Tsuji's book is one of very few Japanese military histories of the Second World War in South East Asia that has 
been translated into English. As the Director of Military Operations, 25th Army he was in a unique position to 
observe the battle and possibily the only Japanese officer whose memoirs of the Malayan campaign have been 
translated into English. 
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again this was provided far too late in the day. The RAF and RAAF were 
outnumbered from the start and were tactically badly disposed on the airfields, with 
the major part of the fighter force based in Singapore. The arrival of the Hurricanes 
had a limited effect on the Japanese and provided the essential air cover for the 
reinforcement convoys arriving in Singapore. For the air force it was a losing battle 
for survival but when and wherever possible the squadrons did their very best to 
provide support. 
The lessons to be learnt were that, air superiority and air intelligence were critical and 
early warning radar was essential if aircraft were not to be needlessly exposed on the 
ground to enemy air attack. In addition, that co-operation was essential for the land 
battle and required good communications between the air and the ground and trained 
army and air force personnel. The failure to gain air superiority and lack of training 
me(\llt that meaningful air support and co-operation in Malaya were never going to be 
a possibility 'The air in fact, held the key to the whole situation•.68 Some co-operation 
did occur but, it was sporadic, un-coordinated and clearly without higher direction 
and therefore relatively ineffective. 
Concurrent with the Japanese invasion of Malaya and following the loss of Singapore, 
Burma became the focus of the war in south east Asia. ·Its value, apart from being a 
producer of useful raw materials, was protecting the northern flank of Japanese 
expansion in south-east Asia. The occupation of Burma posed a real threat of air 
attack on the industrialised area of north-east India where, to complicate matters for 
the British, there already existed a considerable amount of unrest engendered by the 
Indian Independence movement. 
Burma 
The geography of Burma created two difficult military problems·, communications 
and disease. The one affecting manoeuvrability and the other, operational strength. 
Physically in the north are the mountain ranges covered in thick tropical forest and 
two of the three main rivers of Burma, the Irrawaddy and its tributary the Chindwin 
orientate from north to south. Further south is the Salween. Consequently, all the 
main lines of communication, roads, railways and water therefore run in the same 
general directions. The central flat plain area is covered with scrub vegetation which 
in parts is semi-desert. Burma lies within the tropics and in the north and north-west 
has a monsoon season from mid-May to mid-October, with an annual rainfall of two 
hundred inches in the Arakan. A further serious complication was that Malaria is 
68 Arthur Swinson, Def eat in Malaya: The Fall of Singapore, London, Macdonald 1970. p. l 54. 
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endemic. 69 The axis of communications between India and Bunna is east-west and 
thus contrary to the general lie of the country which caused the obstructions to 
establishing land routes. Therefore, prior to the outbreak of the war, there were no 
road or railway connections from Burma to India. All traffic entering Burma entered 
through the main port ofRangoon or the few small coastal ports of which Akyab was 
possibly the most important. Rangoon was also, the main military and administration 
base, and in 1941, the main base for the onward transmission of supplies to China via 
the Bunna Road. When Rangoon fell to the Japanese it had two very important 
consequences for the defence. First, supplies to China were cut off and second, the 
supplies to the defence were also cut and the British anny was isolated, with only a 
tenuous air link to Assam and India. As a consequence the whole axis of land 
communications had to be reoriented east-west from India through Assam to the 
Burma frontier requiring new roads, railways and supply dumps to be built. A further 
consideration for the defence was the threat to the industrial resources of north-east 
India 
The invasion was allocated to the Japanese 15th Army with two divisions, the 33rd 
and the 56th, commanded Lt. General lida and the 5th Hikoshidan of the JAAF which 
was later reinforced with elements from the 3rd Hikoshidan after the occupation of 
the N.E.I. was completed.70 The leading elements of the Japanese Anny crossed the 
Bunnese frontier on the Kra Isthmus on the 9th December 1941 with the objective of 
occupying Victoria Point airfield in southern Burma. Japanese air activity was limited 
to reconnaissance sorties in support of the Japanese Army, this was soon to change. 
To oppose this force there were two British Brigades made up from two depleted 
British Army Battalions, two partly trained Indian Anny Battalions and the locally 
raised Bunna Rifles battalions made up from the Burma Frontier Force and the local 
military police. In the air it was a similar picture with one RAF Fighter squadron 
No.60, equipped with sixteen Buffalo fighters . There was a depleted RAF Blenheim 
bomber squadron with eight aircraft and there were a dozen impressed civilian aircraft 
of the BVAF for communications and coastal observation. In addition the RAF had 
the benefit of one A VG fighter squadron of the Chinese Air Force, equipped with P-
40s that was originally intended for the air defence of the Bunna Road but was on 
loan to aid in the defence of Rangoon.71 Under these circumstances there was never 
going to be a question of either retaining or gaining air superiority, it already 
69 The propholactic anti-malaria drug Mepacrine was still being developed and was not available at this time. 
Preventive control in the military was by use of protective clothing after dusk and Mosquito nets, methods 
difficult exercise under field conditions. Quinine only being used as a medical treatment for the condition. 
70 A Hikoshidan was roughly the equivalent of three RAF Groups being therefore comparable to an RAF 
Command,. 
71 Popularly known as the Aying Tigers. 
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belonged to the Japanese. However, and for a limited period, Japanese air superiority 
was successfully contested over Rangoon when the Allies had sufficient early 
warrung. 
The RAF fighter squadron, apart from the squadron and flight commanders, was 
mostly made up of newly arrived pilots straight from flying training schools in 
Australia and New Zealand. The squadron commander and flight leaders were, almost 
without exception, experienced fighter pilots from other theatres of war, thus the 
pilots who were to train the squadron were experienced in air fighting and not in army 
support, as they saw it, air fighting was their job. Only the A VG squadron could lay 
claim to all its pilots being proficient. The main task of the fighter force was to 
protect the city and dock areas of Rangoon, the only entree port into Burma. Facing 
them was a formidable, highly trained and experienced number of Japanese Army Air 
Force Sentais. 72 Under these circumstances it would have been extremely optimistic 
to have expected much in the way of co-operation between the army and the air force, 
what occurred was, as in Malaya, mostly ad hoc and at the request of local army 
commanders when and if it was possible, although this position did improve 
somewhat with the arrival of two Lysander squadrons and reinforcements in the shape 
of Hurricanes and Blenheims.73 
The problem for RAF squadrons attempting to co-operate with the Army was the 
shortage of aircraft in Burma and therefore the primary task of the air force had to be 
to defend the Dock areas of Rangoon. As the only possible reinforcement port there 
was no other choice. When any form of ground attack was needed the allied air force 
obviously did what they could notwithstanding the extreme demands from elsewhere 
but, when close air support was necessary there were very real problems in 
communicating with the ground forces and little knowledge or experience of army 
formations or structure or what support the ground forces really needed. An additional 
problem was that the army and air force HQs were not located in the same place 
causing communications difficulties. Under these circumstances, given the lack of 
available Allied Air Power, ignorance and inexperience became recognisable 
paramount factors. 
On the 11th December three days after Japanese troops had invaded Malaya, the first 
Japanese troops crossed the southern Burma frontier on the Kra Isthmus, by the 16th 
of December they had captured the airfield at Victoria Point. On the 22nd of 
72 Roughly equivalent to RAF Wings. 
73 Probert, op.cit. p. 'iS?. The Lysanders were modified to carry two 250lb bombs. The Hurricanes and Blenheims 
were from the Middole East. 
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December 1941 the main force of the two Divisions of the Japanese 15th Army 
invaded Burma . A key element of the Japanese plan was to destroy any effective 
Allied air opposition following which the Japanese army air force would then be able 
give close air support to their ground forces. By bombing Rangoon, their main target, 
the Japanese were undoubtedly aware that this was the indispensable base area not 
only for the British in Burma but, also the port through which vital military supplies 
reached China via the Burma Road from Rangoon to Lashio. The air attack was 
deliberately intended to achieve two important tactical objects, firstly force the two 
allied fighter squadrons into battle at a time and place of Japanese choosing and 
secondly, coerce the allied air commander to keep his fighter aircraft in an area close 
to the target (Rangoon) and thus denying him the opportunity offer any substantial air 
support to the army. The full thrust of the Japanese invasion of Burma did not start 
until the Japanese were confident that the air opposition in Malaya had been 
effectively crushed. 
The first air co-operation between Army and air force took place on the morning of 
the lOth December when an escorted Blenheim of 60 sqn took off on an aerial 
reconnaissance over southern Siam. On the 16th the remaining Blenheims of 60 sqn 
attacked Japanese forces crossing the Kra Isthmus [into southern Burma]. The RAF 
again carried out reconnaissance missions over southern Siam on the 16th December 
when troop trains where observed heading south towards Malaya. The problem was 
that to escort the Blenheim missions the Buffaloes had to refuel on the way as they 
did not have the range to reach southern Burma from Rangoon. Following these 
flights, attacks were carried out by the RAF and the A VG fighters against airfields in 
Siam. However, by the 23rd of December the Japanese had mounted their first air raid 
on Rangoon and the two fighter squadrons were fully engaged in defending Rangoon. 
Clearly because the allied air force was continually on the defensive, only limited 
support for the ground forces was possible. 
On the 1st January Air Comdr. D.F. Stevenson arrived to take over as AOC Burma. 
Shortly after his arrival he was to send a memorandum to General Alexander [C-in-C 
ground forces], pointing out the parlous state of the air force following the disasters in 
Malaya and the Dutch East Indies. He alluded to the fact that the air force in Burma 
was the only one between Australia and the Middle East and that Rangoon was the 
only port through which supplies could come. This port was under heavy air attack 
and it followed that; "It was therefore the primary task of the air force to prevent air 
attack on Rangoon". 74 
74 PRO Air 23/2076. This memorandum is undated but it is clear that it was written by Stevenson before the 
heavy Japanese air attacks on Rangoon in February 1942. 
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By the 7th January 1942 in an attempt to redress the increasingly desperate situation 
on the ground a Blenheim squadron had arrived at Rangoon from Egypt to join No. 
60 sqn. also equipped with Blenheims. This was to be almost immediately followed 
by a second Blenheim squadron from the Middle East Theatre. The squadrons 
immediately started operations. They attacked the dock area at Bangkok on the 8th 
and Japanese targets in and along the border including airfields and communications, 
but then saw no other activity until the 19th January. Hurricane squadrons were also 
on their way from the Middle East. By the 24th January 1942 the Japanese had 
already captured the three airfields in the South of the country (Victoria Point had 
been lost on the 16th December 1941 and Mergui and Tavoy on the 19th January 
1942) and the air situation was becoming desperate. The Japanese immediately started 
to operate their fighter aircraft from the captured airfields, providing fighter escorts 
for their bombers attacking Rangoon. Between the 23rd and 29th of January there was 
a major series of air battles over Rangoon and heavy losses were incurred by the 
JAAF bombers when they had proved to be vulnerable to the allied fighters and this 
caused the Japanese to overestimate the strength of the air opposition 75. Thereafter 
they switched to far less effective night bombing which in turn released their fighters 
to support the army in the field. The Japanese raids on Rangoon had been effective, as 
following the raid on the 23rd December there was a continuous exodus of Indian 
workers, especially dock labourers heading north towards India. Consequently, the 
unloading of supply ships carrying vital military equipment became an increasingly 
difficult problem for the port authorities and the burden of unloading ships carrying 
war supplies fell on the military. In total there were now three fighter squadrons, 
three bomber squadrons and two army cooperation squadrons operating on Burma. 
During January and February ' .. . the RAF did all it could to support the Army,'76. 
During February the two Lysander squadrons joined the Blenheims in attacking the 
Japanese lines of communication and according to Probert, " ... 202 Blenheim and 63 
Lysander sorties were flown ... " .77 On the 20th February there was an unfortunate 
friendly fire incident when the RAF were attempting to cover the withdrawal of the 
army and attacked these forces by mistake. This illustrated the difficulties of 
identification faced by the army and the RAF without proper training and radio 
communication. 78 Despite the dangers from Japanese aircraft, the sole air transport 
squadron of the RAF continued to fly supply missions not only for the army but also 
75 The Japanese bombers proved vulnerable to allied figters due to a lack of armour protection and self sealing fuel tanks. However, their speed which approximated at certain altitudes to that of the allied fighters was a problem for allied fighter pilots 
76 Prober!, op. cit ., p.87. 
77 Probert, ibid, p. 87 quoting AHB Narrative 2 pp. 190-1. . 
78 Probert, ibid, p.l49, quoting Kirby, op.cit. p.67. Radio communication would presumbly have prevented this. 
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for the thousands of unofficial refugees fleeing north from the advancing Japanese.79 
As far as General Slim was concerned, effective RAF close support for the ground 
forces ceased at this time80. 
By now the AVG were fighting in concert with the RAF squadrons, a fierce rearguard 
action over Burma as the British forces withdrew northwards towards the Assam and 
Indian border. By the end of April the AVG had only one effective squadron 
remaining in the air and Chennault sent a message to the Chinese Foreign Minister to 
the effect that " ... that the usefulness of the A VG and of himself would finish by the 
15th April unless immediate action was taken." 81 During this month Chennault was 
recalled to active service in the USAAF and promoted to the rank of Brigadier 
General, although remaining as commander of the AVG. A telling comment on 
Chennault was that, 'Much of Chennault's success lay in his knowledge of Japanese 
traditional psychology.•82 
The American General Stillwell had been sent by Washington to Command the 
Chinese forces in Burma in March 1942 and at the same time act as a deputy to 
Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek. In Burma Stillwell's Chinese Division were 
defeated at Toungoo and forced to withdraw in disarray83 The aftermath of this 
episode demonstrates that the RAF were making every effort they could to support 
the ground forces. An unusual act of RAF inter-service co-operation in the form of air 
recognition and air supply came in May 1942 when General Stillwell was falling back 
to India from Shewebo with the remnants (approximately a party of 100) of his 
Headquarters staff after an unsuccessful attempt to reach Myitkyina. It was 
impossible to use the railway and consequentially Stillwell decided to go across 
country. 84 Part of the route meant travelling on rafts down the Uyu River, a tributary 
of the Chindwin. Desperate for food and medical supplies the party were found by an 
RAF 'bomber' which air-dropped supplies to Stillwell's column ~nabling them to 
continue.85 
79 Kirby, vol. 2, p. 212, refers to No. 31 as a 'Bomber-Transport' squadron. 
80 This ignores the fact that the·remaining transport aircraft continued to fly in urgent supplies and evacuate 
selected personnel and refugees. 
81 Gillison, op.cit. p . .SOl. 
82 Gillison, ibid. p . .SOl. 
83 It is worth noting that a Chinese Division was about one third the size of a British Division , and one third of its 
strength was made up of porters and water carriers. 
84 In fact the party were eventually met and subsequently guided by a British District Officer to the town of 
Imphal on border with India. 
85 Barbara Tuchman, Sand Against the Wind; The American Experience of China 1911-45, Macdonald Futura, 
London 1981 , pp.380-l. 
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In March Wavell, the C-in-C India and Major General'Bill' Slim flew to Burma from 
India to review the situation . On his return to India a few days later Slim was given 
command of what was to be 1st Burma Corps formed from the 17th Indian Division 
and the 1st Burma Division. When Slim took command of Burma Corps he was 
alarmed, 
... when he discovered that he lacked the one tangible asset which might make 
victory remotely possible - air support.. ......... Slim would be the first to admit 
that his shattering victories over the Japanese in later years would not have 
been possible without the Royal Air Force. But he was to embark on this 
campaign without any form of air support whatsoever.86 
However, it seems that Slim was aware of the problems facing the air force in Burma 
and the effort that it had made, 
... the absurdly small Anglo-American air force had destroyed 233 Japanese 
machines in the air and 58 on the ground, of which the 'Flying Tigers' 
accounted for 217 and the RAF 74, at a cost of 46 in the air and 51 on the 
ground ... .. ... the ratio was five-to-one in the allies favour- higher than the 
Battle of Britain. 87 
Nevertheless, there appears however to have been a degree of carelessness in the air 
force which defies explanation. For example when General Slim first arrived at 
Magwe in March 1942 to take command of Burma Corps, arriving at dusk he found 
the airfield deserted and virtually unprotected and he was sufficiently surprised and 
concerned by this to comment on this scene, 
The airfield was completely deserted. .. It was a strange arrival, and not too 
reassuring as to either the standard of staff work in Burma (HQ India had 
informed Burma of Slim's impending arrival) or the safety of our precious 
aircraft. 88 
The Wing HQ was three miles away and the excuse seems to have been that, the RAF 
believed that the protection of the airfield was an army responsibility. Whilst it is 
possible to see this from the point of view of aircrew who were exhausted from the 
stress of constantly fighting against considerable odds, it is difficult to understand the 
attitude of the remainder of the air force personnel, including the station commander. 
Clearly Slim was disturbed by this apparent complacency, 
86 Tim Carew, The Longest Retreat, Hamish Hamilton, London 1967, p. 195. Carew served in the 14th Army in 
Burma before becoming an author. Slim's claim is not strictly true, the RAF and A VG continued to operate from 
Magwe and Akyab almost until the end of March. From then on until Magwe was captured by the Japanese, it was 
used as a forward staging airfield by RAF squadrons from India to attack targets in Bunna. 
87 Carew, ibid., does not state where he obtained these figures from. They agree with Slim's autobiographical 
account of the Burma campaign but, do not agree with Kirby, vol. 2. p.210. 
88 Slim, Defeat into Victmy, p .. 22. General Wavell (CinCindia) had sent Slim to Burma to command lst Burma 
Corps (17th Indian and 1st Burma divisions and 7th armoured bde.). 
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In plans for the defence of Burma made before the Japanese attack, great 
reliance had been place on the ability of the air force to stop, or at least delay 
the advance of the enemy columns. ...in December 1941 the air forces in 
Burma were almost negligible. 89 
The Japanese air attacks on both airfields, on the 21st March at Magwe and then on 
the 23rd March at Akyab, was to cause Wavell to agree with Peirse that the RAF 
should evacuate Burma to save what aircraft remained providing a basis to build up 
the air force in India rather than commit it to Burma before it was ready. Without 
early warning radar, the overwhelming numbers of the JAAF would again, as in 
Malaya, destroy the RAF. By the 27th the RAF had left Burma. Under the 
circumstances it seems slightly surprising that these airfields should have been so 
successfully attacked by the Japanese. However, the Japanese say that, after the air 
force raid on Rangoon airfield Japanese aircraft followed the attacking force to 
discover which airfield the RAF were using, as they were unaware that the RAF were 
using Magwe. 9° Following this a disturbed Slim was to write in his memoirs, 
... my Corps was totally without air reconnaissance, defence or support. Any 
aircraft we saw in the sky was hostile- and we were to see many.91 
The action of withdrawing the RAF from Burma was, although logical, to cause some 
bitterness among the ground forces in Burma . 
... the complete absence of any air support in the following days, caused bitter 
resentment among the fighting troops and a situation resulted which was akin 
to that which existed between the Army and the RAF at the time of 
Dunkirk . 
... their [Japanese air] attacks were directed more at disorganising such normal 
life as was still continuing than attacking the fighting formations ... In the 
absence of any allied air power, they were able also to strafe at will railway 
installations, trains and river steamers. 92 . 
Part of the problem was the disparity of operational ranges between the British and 
Japanese fighters, the operational range of the Hurricane llBs being no more than 
135 miles, the fact that there was only one operational Radar set in Burma, and that 
the Observer Corps, such as it was, had no radios. Early warning (EW) of the 
approach of enemy aircraft was, therefore, almost non existent and there were few 
AA guns for the purposes of air defence. What is of particular importance here, apart 
89 Slim, ibid, p.5. 
90 PRO AIR Z31 8455. Japanese Record of Air Operations. 
91 Slim. ibid. p.42. 
92 Mains, Lt.Col., Tony, The Retreat from Burma,An Intelligence Officer's Personal Story, W. Foulsham & Co. 
Ltd, London 1973. p. 67. The Japanese air force were obviously using air interdiction to interupt the British lines 
of communication thereby denying tactical movement and essential supplies. 
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from the comment on the air force operational airfield defence support systems, is the 
operational range of the Hurricanes. Operational range also equates with loiter time, 
that is that amount of time that an aircraft can stay in the air over its home airfield or 
other vulnerable targets. Therefore a short operational range severely inhibits the air 
commander's capacity and flexibility in the defence role and the only way this 
limitation can be overcome is with an efficient early warning system. Further, the 
ability to strike at enemy airfields in counter-air actions, interdiction tasks or 
escorting bomber formations wasreducedeven though the necessity to provide 
bombers with a fighter escort was well understood. The Japanese aircraft were 
capable of flying extremely long distances, especially both the Ki 27 and Ki 43 
fighters, and it was not a problem for Japanese pilots to attack allied airfields, carry 
out interdiction tasks or escort their bombers to such targets as Rangoon. For the 
allied air forces these tasks were mostly beyond the abilities of their fighter aircraft. 
That the Japanese were well aware of the short ranges of Allied fighters and bombers 
in comparison to their own aircraft is illustrated by the statement: '[Our]Operations 
were greatly influenced by the weather in the rainy season. During the rainy season of 
1942, the enemy air forces did not attack us because of their small force and also due 
to the short range of their planes.'93 
To add to the problems of air defence of Burma, after Singapore fell to the Japanese 
on 15th February 1942, the JAAF in Burma started to receive reinforcements of a 
number of Sentais (Wings) from the 3rd Hikoshidan in Malaya and by mid-March 
1942 had " ... 14 Regiments [Sentais] deployed against Burma."94 for the RAF this 
situation was exacerbated by the, ' ... overriding force of supply and maintenance 
factors. 95 The position of the air force was a critical element as far as Slim was 
concerned and undoubtedly had a significant effect upon him as the Commander of 
Burma Corps. He was already experienced in the.field having seen service on the 
North West Frontier of India, Eritrea and Syria. In these places he had ' .. .learnt a 
sharp lesson on the necessity of land forces and of the air forces supporting them to 
be together.'96 In Burma he found that the air HQ at Magwe and army HQ at Maymo 
(the summer capital of Burma) were some two hundred miles apart in mid-March 
1942, an impossible situation in his view. To compound the problems of the air 
defence of Burma the AOC Burma, A VM Stevenson, was also at that time 
responsible for the air defence of Calcutta, Bengal and Assam. Under the 
93 Japanese Monograph No. 64, Part 1, p.285. 
94 Slim, op. cit. p.7. This seems to be an exaggeration and Slim seems to have been misinformed. A Sentai being 
roughly equivalent to an RAF Wing. 
95 Slim,ibid. It would seem that here Slim is obliquely making a reference to the possibilities of air supply. 
96 ibid. p.9. 
63 
circumstances it is clear that apart from the rare occasions of chance, the opportunities 
for co-operation between the services were to remain extremely limited. 
The Allied air force in Burma had been destroyed as an effective operational force by 
the Japanese onslaught. From that time on, the British army was without any real air 
support apart the transport aircraft of No. 31 squadron. There is little to add to the 
comment of General Slim: 'The completely inadequate air force [in numbers] and 
their total elimination in the campaign were most grievous disadvantages to the 
Army. 97 Arguably, from the experiences of the withdrawal from Burma grew the use 
of air transport. In March, reinforcements of a battalion of the Iniskilling Fusiliers had 
been flown to Magwe by lOth USAAF Air Force bombers and some 400 civilians and 
casualties flown out. After the fall of Mandalay RAF and USAAF transport aircraft 
evacuated 8,600 people of whom 2,600 were wounded and after all the airfields were 
lost these aircraft continued to drop supplies to refugees. 98 Air evacuation ended on 
the 5th May 1942 ' ... after several Dakotas were caught on the ground by enemy dive 
bombers and three destroyed .. .' at Myitkyina airfield. 99 
Until their withdrawal from Magwe in May 1942, the RAF had attempted to provide 
air cover and support with one squadron of Buffaloes, the Hurricanes squadrons 
flown in from the Middle East, Blenheim Bombers and two Lysander squadrons from 
India. This force was nominally some thirty-eight aircraft, the RAF Order of Battle on 
the 20th March 1942 was, 
17 sqn. RAF 15 Hurricanes 
28 sqn. RAF 6 Lysanders 
45 sqn. RAF 9 Blenheims 
3rd. sqn. A VG 8 Tomahawks lOO 
The air force had been forced to fight a defensive battle from the start. The air 
defence of Rangoon had been the primary air battle. When that was lost an attack by 
the RAF on the Japanese held airfield at Rangoon brought about an immediate 
retribution from the Japanese who launched a devastating air attack on Magwe, the 
main RAF base, and a follow-up attack on Akyab, virtually destroying the operational 
capability of the allied air force in Burma, forcing the survivors to fall back into India 
and China and ending the Allied air effort in Burma. From this time on during their 
long withdrawal to India, the Army was left without effective air cover or support. 
97 Slim, op. cit., p.l16. 
98 Kirby, vol.2, op. cit., p.213. 
99 Probert. op. cif. p.95. 
100 Ford, Daniel, Flying Tigers, Smithsonian Institution Press, Washington 199l.p. 263. 
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Although this predictably enabled the JAAF to harass the British army by air attack, it 
was not as destructive as it could have been, for the Japanese concentrated their air 
attacks on the main centres of communication and population. In retrospect this 
appears to have been a tactical error on the part of the JAAF, for it enabled the 
retreating British ground forces to cross the Indian Frontier and although battle weary, 
still in good order but without transport or any armour. The commencement of the 
Monsoon in May brought all further military moves to a virtual halt until October 
1942, thus granting the British a fortuitous breathing space. The question was, how 
was this interlude best to be used in the face of the Japanese threat? 
For both the air force and the Army the campaign in Burma had been one of survival. 
General Slim, the Field Commander had realised during the withdrawal that, 
mobility, the terrain and weather dictated how future British offensives or any riposte 
to attacks by the Japanese forces were to be made. Sufficient aircraft, innovation and 
moral were all to be key factors, for the effects of the climate and the terrain were 
enervating on men and destructive of materiel. But Slim was not alone in this view. 
The air force had also gained some very hard earned lessons. Both Slim and Peirse, 
the AOC in C, had drawn the same conclusions from their first experiences of war in 
the peculiar conditions of Burma. That was that the Army and the air force were inter-
dependent and needed to operate as an integrated force if success was to be achieved. 
This meant air superiority, close air support, interdiction and air transport were going 
to be the keys to future any campaigning. Kirby comments that; 
Perhaps the greatest lesson learnt from the campaign [December 1941 to May 
1942] was the possibility of air supply for an army cut off from all other 
means of support. 101 
This was probably an understatement of the position and Kirby seems to have missed 
the point that gaining air superiority was a necessary precursor. Although air supply 
was recognised to be the answer, the problem was in being able to do something 
about it. Part of the difficulty here was in having enough aircraft. To those on the 
spot, it was readily apparent that the first requirement was to obtain at least local air 
superiority if close air support of the army and air transport were not going to suffer 
the same ill-fated result of the previous attempts during the withdrawal to provide this 
kind of support. 
In 1942 the air situation in Burma had deteriorated as it had in Malaya with the air 
force steadily overwhelmed, ' on the 31st January 1942 our operational strength was 
thirty-five aircraft, against one hundred and fifty Japanese'. Many of the allied losses 
101 Kirby, op.cit., vol.. Il, p.214. 
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were largely to lack of sufficient early warning, only one Radar being available in 
Burma. Reinforcements continued to arrive but not in sufficient numbers and were 
used in 'penny packets'.102 Both the Army and the air force doing their utmost to 
salvage what they could from a disastrous situation, for example during April over 
forty army support sorties were flown by Blenheims.103 However, it is only when 
people of the calibre of General Slim appeared on the scene in March 1942 that any 
sense of overall control begins to emerge. Slim's report of the situation at Magwe 
airfield as he found it in March 1942, can only be described as, revealing. In Burma it 
was really a question of too late and too little and in the initial phases, a refusal by 
those in authority to heed the lessons of experience. For example, the AOC Group 
Captain Manning's refusal to listen to Colonel Chennault's views on air combat tactics 
following his experiences in China and his denying Chennault access to the Control 
Room in Rangoon. 104 This arguably resulted in the inexperienced Buffalo pilots being 
less effective than they might have been, as in the air fighting around Rangoon the 
AVG seem to have shot down the majority of Japanese aircraft.105 
Lessons learned 
Adaptability and innovation was the 'name of the game' where by necessity, 'the tail 
wagged the dog.' Relatively junior officers were experiencing things as they actually 
were and reacting to the unexpected situations and conditions, most senior officers 
'took this on board' and learnt from these experiences. The main lesson learned by the 
army in Burma in 1941 and 1942 was that the difficulties of the terrain, distance and 
the weather meant that the key to both manoeuvre and logistics lay in air transport. 
This meant using air transport at an unprecedented level. The air force completely 
agreed but was aware that the key to successful air supply meant gaining air 
superiority. Air superiority also provided that important extra ingredient previously 
been unavailable to Slim by denying air reconnaissance to the enemy and would also 
enable close support operations to be more effective. 
It had also been recognised that meteorology was of critical importance in Burma, 
more so than in other theatres of war. On it depended the success or failure of air 
operations during the monsoon season, a period which had dictated the campaign 
months. In this respect it was as much a weapon of war as conventional weapons. 
Much effort was dedicated to the understanding of the vagaries of weather patterns 
which was to reap rewards when, contrary to the JAAF, the Allied air forces 
102 See Journal of RUSI, vol. 91, May 1946 .. Arthur Corungham, 'Development of Tactical Air Forces', p.215. 
103 Probert, op. cif., p.94. 
104 In fairness this was robabaly not Mannings fault. He was doubtless relying on the pre-war reports he had 
recieved from Singapore Air HQ and believed that Japanese lighters were inferior to the Buffalo. 
105 Slim, ibid., p.7. 
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continued to operate during the monsoon. The JAAF high command only seems to 
have been concerned with weather in so far as it affected local flying conditions and 
the study meteorological conditions in Burma does not seem to have been of 
paramount importance. This could have been due to the fact that senior officers were 
primarily soldiers who had learnt to fly when transferred to the flying branch of the 
army. The consequence was that the JAAF rarely undertook any sizeable operations 
during the monsoon and to withdraw their aircraft to bases in Malaya and Indo-China. 
The allied air forces reasonably assumed during the monsoon that the Japanese Army 
would have only minimal air cover. Not only did this mean that Japanese counter-air 
attacks on allied airfields would decrease, but that the RAF and USAAF could, during 
the Monsoon, attack the Japanese Lines of Communication with a reduced risk of 
interception. 
There was an element of bad feeling in the army over what they felt was a lack of 
RAF air support. As early as June 1942 the air force were responding to army 
criticisms of its action in Burma. AVM Stevenson had sent a 'paper' headed Air Force 
Co-operation with the Army' to General Alexander in reply to one from the Army. 
The general text of this attempts to put the record strait. Stevenson bluntly 
contradicted these criticisms and made the following ten specific points: 
i . The RAF [in Burma] was the only [allied] air force between Australia and the 
Middle East. 
n. Rangoon was the only port for supplies. 
m. The release of Japanese aircraft after the fall of Malaya and N.E.I. meant that 
heavy air attacks [on Rangoon] were to be expected, therefore the first priority of the 
RAF was to defend Rangoon. This was accomplished by the RAF, A VG and RIAF. 
iv. The last enemy air attacks were on the 25th and 26th February [1942], 50 enemy 
aircraft were 'downed', enemy aircraft were not in Rangoon area again. 
v. The army were covered [by air] in their withdrawal from Pegu to Prome. 
vi. loss of Rangoon meant that air force had no airfields or early warning and had to 
operate from Magwe and defend India. 
vii. Rangoon was the key to the air situation. 
viii. Limited maintenance meant that the squadrons of one bomber, one fighter, one 
army co-operation flight plus one A VG meant that the RAF in Burma were placed 
under the control of the army to establish the 'Prome' [defence] line. The weight of the 
enemy air attack on Magwe destroyed the air component. 
ix. With no aircraft left in Burma the RAF support the army by attacking Japanese 
troop concentrations at Nyaungbintha. 
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x. On the 4th May the RAF gave direct support to the army when crossing the 
Chindwin [River].106 
Stevenson dearly felt that the air force had been unjustly censured and, judging by 
the date of the document, this had elicited an early reply. But in any case in early 
1942, if somewhat belatedly, the RAF as a whole were beginning to take the need for 
air support seriously.l07 Another report mainly concerned with the situation in the 
Middle East notes the same point. 108 This is not surprising as that was where the 
tactics for air support were being practically applied and beginning to play a 
definitive role in the land battle. 
For the British, Burma was a harsh lesson in logistics and in the effect of the terrain. 
The danger lay in being tied to the limited surface transport system which inevitably 
reduced mobility. Being anchored to wheeled transport and thus to roads put the army 
at a severe tactical disadvantage. The solution lay in the use of air transport and 
supply on an unprecedented scale if the army were to divest themselves of a road-
bound military tail. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel has been reported as saying, 'The 
battle is either lost or won by the Quartermaster before it has ever begun', it was a 
lesson taken to heart by the British but ignored by the Japanese. 
From the time of the initial Japanese assault in Malaya on the 8th December 1941, 
until the end of the first campaign period in Burma in May 1942 when the Monsoon 
broke, the Japanese Army Air Force had successfully employed the same counter-air 
strategy and it had not failed them. From the outset this had been to destroy all major 
Allied air opposition before giving substantial support to their ground forces. In this 
manner the Japanese Army were mostly able to operate without fear of air attack and 
air reconnaissance. The failure of the RAF strategic defence policy meant that in 
Malaya the air force had been forced to fight on ground not of their choosing but 
more importantly a tactical air battle for survival. In Burma in places such as 
Rangoon, the air force could, to an extent choose the terms and cause severe 
casualties to Japanese air attacks.109 During February when not defending their 
airfields usually ' ... every available Hurricane was out escorting Blenheims and 
Lysanders, and attacking advancing Japanese columns ... '.l10 
106 PRO AIR '23/2076. Personal Papers of AOC Bengal Command, 'Air Force Co-operation with the Army' dated 
6th June 1942. 
107 PRO AIR 39/141 Army Support by Fighters and Bombers: Policy 
108 PRO AIR 39/129 Army Air Support: Policy 
109 An exception was when during the air battles over Rangoon when the early warning system had enabled the 
two defending Allied fighter squadrons, one RAF and one AVG, to be in the air in force with the advantage of 
altitude before the Japanese bomber force anived. The result was a ve!'y decisive victory over the Japanese. 
110 Shores, vol.2, op. cif. p.269-70. 
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In Apri11942 Col. Chennault, the commander of the AVG, was asked by General 
Chiang Kai-Shek to supply the Chinese armies in Burma with air ground support. 
Chennault turned down this request because he 
... held that without ·adequate air-to-ground communications, trained liaison 
officers and a reliable Intelligence service, such support was impracticable. He 
compromised by flying 'morale' missions to let the Chinese troops see the now 
legendary spiked sun and shark-toothed insignia of the Chinese-owned 
fighters. Ill 
In December 1941 the first Curtiss Mowhawk lVs equipped No.5 squadron RAF at 
Dum Dum, Calcutta and theseprovided the only fighter defence for India, specifically 
the vital industrial areas of the north east. Fighter aircraft of this type later also 
equipped Nos. 146 and 155 squadrons, RAF. All three squadrons later flew in the 
Burma campaign in 1942 escorting the Blenheims of Nos. 34, 60 and 113 sqdns. and 
the DC-3 Dakotas of No. 31squadron, the only air transport unit available in 1942. 
The Mohawks continued to be flown by No. 5 squadron until May 1943. 112 
The lessons of the Japanese counter-air tactics and hence air superiority had been well 
learnt by the RAF. It would not repeat the same mistake of attempting to challenge 
the Japanese by throwing its air assets piece-meal into battle. Clearly, the air force 
had done its very best to attempt to co-operate with the army with very limited and 
dwindling resources,Jirst in Malaya and then in Burma. It was cost!)' in terms of 
aircraft and crews but of unaccountable morale value to those on the ground. The air 
force effort was more protracted in Burma than in Malaya, partly because in Burma 
they were not being thrown into battle piecemeal and overwhelmed as in Malaya but 
concentrated their air effort. In Burn1a they retained the ability to protect Rangoon 
until forced to withdraw by the ground action. This was of particular importance 
during the army's withdrawal to Prome when it was 'strung out' in convoys along the 
only road and presented a gift should the Japanese air force been able to attack, the 
fact that they were not able to was due to the air force. The air losses sustained by the 
Allies and the Japanese were, almost equal'. Allied losses were 116 aircraft and the 
Japanese had lost 117 aircraft.ll3 
How much the Allied position was to be reversed less than two years later, can be 
judged by an extract of the Dispatch of AM Sir John Baldwin which covered the air 
Ill Gillison, op.cit ., p.501. 
112Thetford, Owen, Aircraft oft he Royal Air Force since 191 8., Guild Publishing, 8th rev . ed. London 1988. pp. 
190-1. 
113 Kirby, vol. 2. op. cit. p.210. 
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operations of Bengal Command 15111143-17112/43 and then the 3rd Tactical Air 
Force, 18112/43 - 116/44. 
It is certain, in the light of what is now history that these successes by 224 
Group [RAF] and the subsequent maintenance of almost complete air 
dominance was a decisive factor that turned what might well have been a 
disaster on the ground [the Arakan] into a clear-cut victory. The enemy troops, 
by a series of deep and bold movements, starting on February 4th, cut the road 
communication of major part of our land forces, including the 7th Indian 
Division. Past success in this type of manoeuvre had led the enemy to expect a 
BRITISH debacle, resulting, he hoped, in such far reaching success as the 
capture if CHIIT A GONG. The enemy had, however, neglected the factor of 
air supply [to the Admin Box], which immediately came into play and which 
our air superiority enabled us to employ by day as well as by night. Supplies 
on an adequate scale were provided for the encircled forces and it was found 
practicable to evacuate the majority of casualties by air from improvised 
strips. Their supplies good and their morale high, our troops held on to their 
positions and raided the enemy's lines of communication to good effect, aided 
by very close air support( ... ). In a little over a week, signs of shortage of 
supplies became apparent among the enemy, who was eventually driven back 
to his original position and beyond with heavy losses. Air supply is a 
comparatively new fact in operations in this theatre ..... " 114 
ll4pRQ AIR231l928. AM Baldwinextracts. p. 4. 
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Chapter3 
1942-1943: THE LEARNING CURVE 
The British forces in Burma had to overcome overriding logistics factors in all their 
operations. There was a desperate need to expand supply routes and then gain some 
measure of control over the high sickness rates, the first being dependent upon the 
second. Sick personnel were militarily 'useless mouths' and an added burden to the 
supply situation and the number of fighting men available. In 1942 and 1943 the 
Allies began to learn from defeat. They were educating the fighting forces to believe 
that the Japanese were not invincible and developing flexibility of thought, for 
example in dealing with the transport problems resulting from the loss of Burma. 
These were also the years when a major increase in the size of the RAF in India and 
Burma required, apart from aircraft and crews, a dramatic expansion in the 
infrastructure. Co-operation and trust between the army and air force became a major 
factor in the conduct of the ground war. 
By 1943 the air force was using air power not only as an aggressive weapon but, also 
developing air transport on a large scale, not only to fly-in supplies and men, but to 
evacuate casualties to base hospitals within hours, an operation which had a beneficial 
effect on morale. This was also raised by not only being able to treat the wounded but 
by using what General Parham has called, ' ... a superior medical knowledge which 
promised if correctly applied to make the Monsoon period [when the malaria rates 
increased] an ally rather than a foe'.l Malaria was however not the only disease, 
Dengue fever carried by the aedes mosquito, a day feeder, and scrub typhus 
contracted from mites were also serious endemic diseases. 2 The most up to date 
treatments and evacuation on a large scale were not available to the Japanese army, 
who were equally susceptible to Malaria. This was to have as much effect on the war 
as a weapon. 
The Monsoon was a serious problem in Burma and affected both air forces equally, 
'The chief adversary was the weather rather than the Japanese' was a comment by an 
RAF Squadron Leader. 3 Allied meteorological competence was fully exploited and 
this enabled the air force to fly operational sorties during the Monsoon period when, 
for the Japanese it was the normal practice to pull back their air units to Thailand and 
1 Parham, Maj . Gen. H.J. and Belfield, E.M.G., Unarmed into Battle; The St01y of the Air Observation Post. 
Winchester, Warren, 19.56. p.108. 
2 Bergerud, op.cit. for example, suggests that these diseases could have serious effects on the efficiency of air and 
ground units in the south-west Pacific, pp.126-137. 
3 Squadron Leader Courtney, RAF quoted in Norman Franks, The Ail: Bailie oflmphal, London, William Kimber 
1985. p. 46. 
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Malaya. Bad weather could usually be predicted and clear patches of weather found. 
These factors illustrate that the war in Burma was outside any previous large scale 
battle experience of modern air forces and armies. In 1943 the weapon was still being 
forged and new ways of fighting the war were still being developed but, the major 
problems could now be dealt with. It was a steep learning curve particularly for the 
problems of army and air force co-operation. 
After the Army had retreated to the Indian border in May 1942, the two prime British 
military objectives were; to resist any further Japanese advances during the Monsoon 
season and to defend the north east of India (the industrial heartland) from air attack 
and any possible Japanese seaborne invasion. With these two objectives secure the 
next stage was to set about winning air superiority. The air force could offer little to 
the army in the way of air support other than bombing sorties by Blenheims and later 
by Wellingtons on a limited number of targets within the range of escort fighters. This 
was supplemented by a small number of transport aircraft for logistic support. The 
bombers could only be used in the day with fighter escort to support the army but, as 
few fighters could be spared, bombers mostly carried out night attacks on strategic 
rather than tactical targets. To accomplish all these tasks it was necessary to increase 
the number of squadrons and bases for operational use before an air offensive on any 
realistic scale could take place. Fortunately the Monsoon season from mid-May to 
October 1942 provided the essential postponement from immediate Japanese 
pressure. The weather conditions were particularly bad so that neither the Japanese 
nor the British were able to mount any real offensives until December 1942. The RAF 
and the army made use of this period to establish co-operating procedures in the 'field' 
especially with regard to ground to air communication, both used radios on 
incompatible wavelengths, the RAF used VHF and the army HF. The COS had 
realised that the situation in south-east Asia was extremely serious and, 
' .. .in March 1942 they [the Chiefs of Staff] set the RAF target [in India] as 64 
squadrons, plus one transport squadron (note: only one!) and a PRU; later in 
the year the figure was raised to 83 ... 
' ... Peirse's [the AOC in C India] force would be nowhere near the front of the 
queue in terms of quality, and certainly not as far as bombers were 
concerned'.4 
Certainly this was a dramatic improvement and was encouraging but, it failed to 
recognise the need for transport aircraft. There was however, a dramatic growth in the 
number of operational Hurricane squadrons and by December 1942 these had 
increased to twelve. In many ways 1943 started with a reversal for the British when 
4 Probert, op.cit ... p.ll5. 
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the first Arakan offensive failed, a situation which was to an extent relieved by 
Wingate's expedition behind Japanese lines which did much to raise the morale of the 
ordinary soldier. Once again the Monsoon brought a respite until the second Arakan 
offensive in November and the arrival of the first Spitfire squadrons. 
The reaction of the COS to the calls for transport aircraft unfortunately demonstrated 
their failure to understand the desperate need for these kinds of aircraft in this theatre. 
Not recognising the topographical conditions they placed Burma at the 'tail end' of the 
supply chain. Yet air transport was crucial, more so than the supply of bombers. Not 
only were the road and rail communications bad by the standards elsewhere, there 
was virtually only two rail links to the front and the Indian east coast ports had 
virtually been closed. The Bay of Bengal was now an extremely hazardous place for 
shipping. The slow accumulation of transport aircraft was clearly worrying as it had 
become obvious to those on the spot that, air transport was going to play a major part 
of any future offensive undertaken on the ground. 
In November 1942 General Irwin, GOC India, appreciating that the future of 
the war in Burma lay with transport aircraft, urged Wavell to press for a force 
of 150 such planes ... 5 
The real problem for the British in India Command in 1942, remained the 'Germany 
First' Policy of the Home Government. Portal (the CAS) had already considered this 
problem in so far as the air force was concerned. He concluded that the Far East could 
only be reinforced at the expense of the effort in Europe and the Middle East with the 
5 Probert, ibid., p.l20. quoting from the Irwin Papers. 
6For a biography of Nagumo see Richard Fuller, ShOkan: Hirohito's S'amurai, London, Arms and Armour 1992. 
pp. 273-4. 
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distinct possibility that Britain would be unable to defeat Germany. Alternatively the 
COS could concentrate on these first two Theatres and leave the Far East to carry on 
as best it could. He opted for the latter course, but was subsequently forced by the 
urgency of the dangers to India to cause this plan to be modified and a limited but 
increasing flow of materiel began to reach India, mainly from the Middle East. 
However, the initial decision was to preclude any massive aid to south-east Asia and 
meant that the industrial base and the major part of the necessary infrastructure for a 
build up of allied forces to a size that would be able to take to the offensive in Burma, 
would have to be resourced and expanded by India itself. The 'Germany First ' policy 
and its effect upon the supply situation was to remain a running sore for the High 
Command in India until the imminent defeat of Germany in 1945. Churchill was 
undoubtedly concerned with this situation. He believed in the value of using heavy 
bombers in south-east Asia but viewed bombing the German heartland as a greater 
necessity. He appealed to President Roosevelt for additional US heavy bombers for 
use in South-East Asia, an appeal to which the Americans responded to a limited 
extent by sending some Liberator heavy bomber squadrons to reinforce the USAAF 
lOth Air Force based in India. Once again Churchill committed the error of not 
listening to the people on the spot, the cri de coeur was for transport aircraft and only 
indirectly for bombers.7 Bombers were really only of value bombing targets such as 
the dock areas of Rangoon and the Japanese airfields in Burma beyond the range of 
day strikes, there were few strategic targets such as industrial centres of any 
importance and few important ports. The Burma Oil fields and Refineries were 
difficult targets for bombers because, by their very nature such industrial complexes 
are dispersed. 
A massive airfield building programme was necessary in 1942; the short operational 
range of the Hurricane in 1942 meant that their airfields had to be constructed near to 
the "Front' as under-wing 'droppable' fuel tanks had still not reached Burma at this 
stage and it was also necessary to accommodate the ever increasing numbers of 
aircraft that were arriving in India and Burma. There were numerous other areas of 
the air force infrastructure which desperately needed to be expanded. This was 
particularly so for the supply units known as Maintenance Units (MUs), they were the 
essential foundations upon which the expansion of the air force in South-East Asia in 
1942 depended. Without these key elements the whole proposed size of the air force 
would have collapsed. Thus a considerable expansion of the number of Maintenance 
Units (MU) in India had to be undertaken. Apart from covering supplies, MUs also 
were where the repair, maintenance, erection and storage of aircraft occurred. How 
7 In late 1944, a similar cri de coeur but for fighters was .to be made by General Obata to Tokyo. 
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important these units were is demonstrated by the fact that in June 1942 the aircraft 
serviceability rate was 40%, by the end of 1943 it was 80% and this, in spite of the 
huge increase in aircraft numbers. 8 Radar coverage was a further essential component 
of the build-up. The lessons of the failure of providing inadequate early warning 
systems had already been demonstrated in both Malaya and Burma. Huge efforts were 
made in establishing Radar Stations and as early as the end of 1942 fifty-two Radar 
stations were operational linked to eleven filter rooms covering areas from the far 
north-east of India to Ceylon in the south. This was a major expansion. The Filter 
rooms were an essential part of the Radar system being the points where the 
information gathered from the Radar stations was assessed. The radar stations in 
Ceylon were Chain Overseas Low (COL) radar stations covering the sea approaches 
to Ceylon and operated by RAF personnel. At that time these sets were of limited 
range of 35 miles. A key factor in this expansion was the Radar Installation 
Maintenance Units (RIMU) responsible for not only establishing the Radar stations 
but also maintaining them. In referring to this particular expansion Probert comments 
that; ' .. .initiative, improvisation and rule bending were the keys to success'. 9 Apart 
from these facets of the build-up surface transport was woefully inadequate and the 
training and local recruitment, not only of Indian Air Force personnel but also the 
civilian work force was needed. 
Behind all this lay the pressing need to support any offensive by the army. Army and 
air force co-operation was now a major factor in any offensive and Burma had already 
demonstrated how the geography would determine the shape of the battle and its 
consequent success or failure. The difficulties in using the normal artillery support 
were such that here close air support was clearly going to be an advantage. In addition 
both Peirse and Slim appreciated the need for air transport on a huge and hitherto 
unprecedented scale, for example, non-essential and key personnel had been 
evacuated from Burma in thousands and this had been achieved by using the limited 
resources of one RAF transport squadron with the help of the USAAF. However, the 
future success of the use air transport depended upon first winning air superiority. 
In 1942 air support for the army had to be staged in three phases (a) reduce the 
offensive ability of the JAAF Fighters as a factor of obtaining air superiority, (b) give 
rapid support to the army when it was needed and (c) supply the army in the way of 
men and materiel with whatever it needed and whenever and wherever it was needed. 
This would mean that co-operation with the Army needed to be developed to 
unprecedented levels. Clearly meeting all of these objectives, in what was a relatively 
8 PRO AIR 10/5552 
9 Probert, op. cit. p. 113. 
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short time, was an immense task, especially so in the face of the 'Germany First' 
policy of both the British and US governments. It also had to be undertaken under 
extreme climatic conditions. However with tremendous efforts most of the targets 
began to be achieved at levels sufficient to enable realistic plans to be made. 
To gain air superiority, it was essential to have more aircraft in the air than the 
Japanese and better pilot training. The mainstay of the fighter force in Burma was the 
Hurricane which at best could rarely equal the combat performance of the standard 
JAAF fighter, the Ki-43 Oscar, and at the same time it was hopelessly outranged by 
Japanese aircraft. Part of the solution to the problem of air superiority lay in having 
an aircraft that could reach the JAAF fighter bases, normally beyond the reach of the 
Hurricanes, to carry out counter-air strikes against aircraft on the ground. Attacking 
these at their home bases, where aircraft are at their most vulnerable, would thereby 
reduce the offensive capability of the JAAF not only by destroying their aircraft but 
also their maintenance facilities. Peirse pleaded with London to obtain Beaufighters 
which as he knew had both the essential range and hitting power. Apart from an 
operational range of some 600 miles plus, the Beaufighters were formidably armed 
with four 20mm cannon and six .303 in. machine guns. 
Throughout 1942 from May to December, vigorous efforts were made by the RAF to 
build an effective fighting force. During this period, continuous pleas for aircraft and 
equipment to expand-the air force rapidly were being made by Peirseto London and, 
as the urgency and scale of the problems became obvious to London, the COS and the 
Air Ministry did their best to meet these requests, mostly by sending squadrons from 
the Middle-East theatre when they could be spared. Reinforcements in the shape of 
Hurricane fighters and Blenheim and Wellington bombers, which were rapidly 
becoming obsolete in the face of the latest German aircraft, were continually arriving, 
mostly from the Middle East. Hurricanes with newly arrived American Mohawk 
fighters, the result of an earlier French order to the US which had been diverted to the 
UK on the fall of France and shipped from the UK, provided the air defence of north-
east India and Ceylon during the remainder of 1942. On their arrival in the UK the 
Mohawks were placed in second line reserve as they were not deemed to be up to the 
performance levels required in either Europe or the Middle East. The fact that they 
were seen as suitable for the Far East shows however, even at this stage in the 
fighting in this theatre, how little the authorities in the UK understood of the fighting 
capability of the Japanese and their equipment and was another example of the 
'Germany First' policy. 
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It was during this period that the first real close support ground attack aircraft arrived 
in India from the US and a somewhat realistic approach to the problems of providing 
effective support for the army could be made.lO The Vultee Vengeance Dive bomber, 
also the result of a previous French order to the US, was to prove to be one of the 
most effective close support aircraft used in the Burma campaign due to its accuracy 
in delivering a 500lb bomb. It was however, initially to be 'dogged' by teething 
problems and needed a number of modifications all of which had to be made on the 
spot before it was to see its first action some months later in the Arakan in March 
1943 when three squadrons first became operational.ll It was a unique aircraft in 
RAF service, being the only dive-bomber used by the RAF during World War II. 
Originally the Vengeance was to be issued to 82, 84, 110 and 152 OTU with the 
remainder to go to 161 squadron. Stevenson clearly had no doubts about the 
usefulness of these aircraft and wanted as many of them as he could get. He was 
willing to exchange Blenheims for them if necessary and cites that at Akyab on the 
9th September ' .. .if he had Vengeances only half the air effort would have been 
+ 
necessary'. 
The climate in south-east Asia was particularly difficult for aircraft where the rate of 
deterioration was of concern, but after its initial problems this particular type of 
aircraft produced the highest serviceability rate of any in front-line service in this 
theatre.l2 The Dive-bombers were found to be particularly useful in two respects; 
their ability to operate in mountainous terrain and the accuracy with which they were 
able to hit a target. A figure of fifteen yards is frequently quoted which compares 
favourably with that obtained by Luftwaffe Ju 87 'Stuka' squadrons. 
During January 1943 the RAF in the Burma theatre received its first Beaufighter 
squadron No. 27 and for the first time the RAF was able to undertake long range low 
level strike operations against Japanese Lines of Communication and the airfields 
previously beyond the range of the Hurricanes. This squadron was to be joined in 
September of the same year by No. 177 squadron, also equipped with Beaufighters. 
By April 1943, due to the build-up of the numbers of Hurricanes in India it became 
possible to convert a number of these to fighter bombers, a version of the Hurricane 
which it was believed had proved its worth in direct close support in the Western 
lO Prior to this Blenheims had been used for bombing supplemented with Hurricanes to strafe. 
I l See Peter C. Smith,Vengeance: The Vu/tee Vengeance Dive Bomber, Shrewsbury, Airlifel986 and Jungle Dive 
Bombers at War, London ,John Murray 1987 for details of the problems encountered and solved with this 
aeroplane before it could see front-line service. Probert, op.cit. p.133 also comments on this. 
12 The climate particularly affected the fabric which covered the frames of some British aircraft and trials were 
carried on tluoughout the war to find a suitable protective coating . 
~PRO AlR 23/4361 
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Desert with the British Eighth Army.13 However, Cooling suggests that, 'The 
character of close support operations makes them [close support aircraft] especially 
vulnerable to ground fire'.l4 The RAF commented on this point in 1939, 'The Air 
Force has never been unwilling to face heavy losses; but it must be realised that 
highly trained pilots cannot be replaced with the same ease as infantry soldiers'. IS A 
harsh judgement but practical from the RAF point of view. By April1943 there were 
some five squadrons of Blenheim light bombers which were to provide the main RAF 
strike force for Burma, later to be withdrawn due to their vulnerability and replaced 
by Hurribombers. All of this build-up gave the RAF the offensive ability, for the first 
time in Burma, to co-operate and effectively support the army in its operations during 
1944. In late 1942 No. 224 Group RAF was formed. It consisted of; five Hurricane 
squadrons, one Mohawk sqn., three Blenheim squadrons and one Lysander Flight, all 
based around Chittagong. The transport aircraft were to come from 194 squadron. 
Throughout most of 1942 photographic reconnaissance, providing military 
intelligence so essential for the ground forces, was carried out by No. 681 squadron 
with a few Hurricanes for short range, and Mitchell bombers for the long range work; 
both types being especially modified for these tasks. This capability was to improve 
further in November 1942 when PR Spitfires first arrived in India to be followed in 
August 1943 when PR Mosquitoes arrived and the formation of No. 684 (PR) 
squadron.16 For the first time Slim was now in possession of air reconnaissance, 
something which he had sorely missed since arriving in Burma. 
The campaign in Burma is, from the view of army and air force co-operation, an 
extremely complex subject. Air support was from the start taken very seriously by the 
RAF but it was continually reminded by the JAAF that this was conditional upon 
obtaining air superiority. Added to this there was the many various and complicated 
transport and ancillary services such as aircraft fuel supply operations which were 
steadily increasing. Special emphasis was laid on the role of the Air Liaison officers 
whose job it was to keep the aircrews informed on the situation on the ground and 
during this period the army became a great deal more confident in the abilities of the 
air force to attack targets in close proximity to their own positions. To aid this 
situation aircrews were encouraged to visit the forward ground positions to obtain 
13 See Eduard Mark, Aerial Interdiction in Three Wars: Air Power and the Land Battle in Three American Wars, 
Washington DC, Centre for Air Force History 1994. p. 313. Although this is the accepted wisdom, this view is 
contradicted by Mark. Low-level fighter-bomber attacks are expensive against well defended targets and the 
bombing accuracy degenerates. 
14 Benjamin Franklin Cooling, ed., Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support, Washington DC, 
Office of Air Force History 1990. p. 538. 
15 PRO AlR 35/214, Memorandum dated 21st November 1939. 
16 Probe1t op.cit. p. 120. 
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first hand knowledge of the conditions and these levels of co-operation led to a 
complete breaking down of the old service barriers. This can partly be ascribed to the 
fact that younger officers were involved and the tropical climate affected all equally, 
added to which Burma was at the end of the line in so far as receiving supplies was 
concerned. Most service personnel irrespective of service were, if not aware of the 
Germany First policy, then certainly of its effects upon their well being, and they all 
seemed to be in the 'same boat'. 
Air support for the Eastern Army was provided by Bengal Command but during 1942 
this became the job of the Third Tactical Air Force (3 T AF) and commanded by 
A VM Baldwin. When Slim took command of the 14th Army, Bald win and Slim 
jointly decided, if not to operate a joint HQ, then to operate their HQs side by side. 
Mobility was the essence of the 3 TAF and Group Control Centres, the Centre 
actually controlling aircraft in the Air, as were the Group Operations Rooms. 
However, this was in practice delegated to the Wing Operations Rooms a matter 
dictated by the great distances involved and the continuous problem of radio 
communication in Burma. Every evening the Army and RAF HQs determined the 
following days programme for the majority of their squadrons with the residue for use 
by the Wing Commander at Army Air Support Control (AASC) as they may be 
required and determined by the military situation. The Wing Commander at AASC 
was in effect the RAF representative at army Corps HQ.l7 
The problem with close air support in Burma was the difficulty of identifying targets 
from the air against the background of dense jungle cover. To overcome this difficulty 
RAF officers were attached to Army units to act as air controllers, and it was 
considered essential that they had all had previous operational flying experience. 
Identifying targets in the thick jungle areas was another part of the learning curve. 
Experience gradually led to dealing with this problem by using coloured smoke 
mortar or artillery shells. This system was only really effective near to the 'front line' 
because of the difficulty in moving guns or bringing up mortar bombs and artillery 
shells to where they were required. To help to overcome this problem RAF pilots 
were used as ground controllers as they were aware of the problems of identification 
of targets that the pilots in the air faced and in some cases the AOPs were used. 
However, the Japanese reacted to this very quickly (it was obviously in their interest 
to do so) and would lay on a counter barrage of smoke to confuse the allied air crews. 
This was overcome by using combinations of colours to mark out an area or a specific 
target before the enemy had time to establish the system being used and to produce a 
17 Generally an Army Corps was made up of three Divisions and two or t1u·ee Corps made up an Army. 
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counterfeit smoke. But it was always a question of time and depended upon how 
quickly allied support aircraft could get on target. 
Indian Transport Situation 
Transport and mobility were the keys to the war in Burma as these were major 
components of logistics supply, whether army of air force, 'Logistics is one of the 
most demanding aspect of military operations' and in Burma this was doubly so.l8 
The loss of Burma placed a severe strain on the transportation system and industrial 
economy of India which, in turn affected the necessary build-up of Allied military 
forces and all their adjuncts. The road, rail and sea transport networks in India had 
become a major factor in the war against the Japanese as a consequence of which the 
importance of air transport grew until it also became a major factor. There were 
however, severe problems inherent in the existing transport systems which were not 
common to other war Theatres. The situation had to be solved if there was to be any 
hope of resisting future Japanese advances, the reinforcing of the army and air force 
and the possible recovery of the territory which had been lost. The loss of Burma had 
also caused a complete shift in the economic and transport balance of the war in 
south-east Asia, moving it from the East to the West of the sub-continent where 
Bombay and its important port were located. Due to the threats of Japanese air and 
submarine attacks in the Bay of Bengal, all incoming traffic had now to be routed 
through Bombay on the West coast and this put a tremendous strain on the railway 
from Bombay to Calcutta and Assam. 
In 1941 the Indian railway system carried the bulk, some ninety per cent, of all the 
internal traffic. However, there was an additional difficulty, the railway system 
operated on two differing gauges, 'Broad' a 5 feet 6 inch wide track in most of India 
and 'Metre', a 39.4 inch wide track, from Allahabad and into the north-east of India 
and Assam. This meant that railway traffic loads from the west (Bombay) had to be 
transferred to the metre gauge railway if their destination was Assam and beyond to 
the fighting front. The road network was limited, had few surfaced roads and had an 
extremely restricted traffic flow, added to which was problem of crossing the Ganges 
and Bramaputra Rivers for both road and rail traffic. Both these rivers cut across the 
west-east routes but were only bridged in their upper reaches, all other crossings were 
made by ferries. Coastal shipping, which carried bulk cargo to the east coast ports was 
now routed to ports on the west coast necessitating the development some west coast 
ports. This made the railways a key component to any expansion of either the 
economy or the armed services. 
18 Eduard Mark, op.cit. p. 283 
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The strain on the railways in 1942 had been exacerbated by three major factors; firstly 
that skilled and experienced railwaymen along with ten per cent of locomotives and 
rolling stock had been sent to the Middle East and Iraq to supplement the railways 
there, at a time when India· did not appear to be under any immediate threat. 
Secondly, was the loss of the oil fields in Burma. In 1941 India supplied fifteen per 
cent of her own needs from the oil fields at Dogboi in north-eastern Assam and 
Attock in the Punjab, the rest came from Burma and the Netherlands East lndies.l9 
The loss of these latter two sources of supply meant that the short-fall in petrol, oil 
and lubricants (POL) had to be met from the Persian Gulf and the USA. Thirdly, the 
aforementioned possibility of Japanese air attacks on shipping in the Bay of Bengal 
and the approaches to the east coast ports and Calcutta had meant that these ports had 
been closed to Oil Tankers.20 In the event Calcutta did not undergo its first Japanese 
air raid until December 1942. 
With the east coast ports closed to shipping this meant that POL had to be transported 
by rail from Bombay across India, thus increasing the demands on the railway. Apart 
from the needs of the military in Assam, added to this were the demands made by the 
by now exclusive air-route over the Himalayas, the so called 'Hump Route', 
developed by the US for maintaining a supply route to China. The loss of Burma had 
also meant the loss of the Burn1a Road and the airfields used for the 'Hump' route 
were all in eastern India. These three factors, were to have immediate and important 
consequences for any future build-up of military forces and materiel. As Woodbum 
Kirby tersely states, 
Throughout 1942 this [the railway limitations] acted as a brake on the build-
up of the administrative services and slowed down all India's military 
preparations .21 
The vital component of any modern war is oil and in 1942 the estimated demand for 
oil in India was two and a half million tons. Assam could produce 280,000 tons and 
the Punjab 85, 000 tons, the remainder had to be imported from either the Persian 
Gulf or the USA but, most oil would now have come through Bombay .22 Added to 
this was the very necessary need for aviation 'white' fuel if the air force was to be 
expanded to a level which would enable it to gain firstly, air superiority over the 
JAAF and secondly meet the rapidly increasing demand for air supply. The problem 
at Bombay was that there was only one Berth for discharging white fuel and that only 
19 The oilfield at Digboi was particularly threatened as it was only some thirty miles from the Burma frontier. 
20 Japanese aircraft had raided Ceylon in April1942. 
21 Woodburn Kirby, vol. II .op. cit., p. 189. 
22 Figures from Woodburn Kirby, ibid. p. 190. 
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available during the hours of daylight because of the dangers associated with the low-
flash-point of white fuel. The rating required for many pre-war aircraft engines at this 
time was 87 octane but for the Rolls Royce Merlin XXs, which powered Hurricanes 
and Spitfires and equivalent engines, a fuel of some 100 octane was required if they 
were to perform efficiently.This normally came from Abadan in Iran or the US and 
such was the shortage of this particular fuel in the UK that it was reserved entirely for 
the Hurricanes and Spitfires of Fighter Command prior to and during the 'Battle of 
Britain'.23 Aviation fuel had been previously supplied to India from the oil refineries 
in Burma as they had the necessary cracker and topping up plants to produce the 87 
octane fuel required by the aircraft engines then in use. 24 
One immediate response to this oil transport crisis was to start new drilling in the 
existing oil fields in an attempt to increase production. The other was to commence 
building a 276 mile 6-inch oil pipeline from Bombay to Bhusawal to relieve the 
pressure on the railways. This would reduce the turn-around time of rail tank wagons 
caused by the steep gradients of the hills between Bombay and Bhusawal known as 
the Western Ghats which have been described as the, 'precipitous Western Ghats' due 
to the steep railway gradients25. The construction some 600 miles of a 4-inch oil 
pipeline was also started to supply the new RAF airfields under construction in 
Assam and also for the 'Hump Route' and the expanding military base at Dimapur 
(Manipur Road).26 This was particularly necessary, for if the RAF were to be able to 
gain air superiority and thus support the army in Burma it needed adequate supplies 
offuel. 27 There was a requirement to increase the number of operational airfields and 
there were special airfield construction units with the job of building airfields every 
20 - 30 miles with the average length of time to build an airfield of two to three days. 
The second problem was that these airfields needed constant and reliable supplies of 
aviation fuel to remain operational and this was solved by the building of a 1000 mile 
oil pipe line from Chittagong to Imphal, feeding all the airfields en route. 
Later (in 1944) fuel supply was a crucial aspect of the whole of the air effort in the 
Battle of Imphal. Without aviation fuel the vital airlift and air support operations 
would have ground to a halt. The limited capacity of Indian road and rail systems, the 
distances involved, the change in the railway gauge between north-east India and the 
23 Such were the perceived priorities of the day that most of the 100 octane produced by Abijan was to be sent to 
Russia to fuel UK and US Lend Lease aircraft. 
24 See Corley, T.A.B., A HistOJ y of the Burmah Oil Company Volume 111924-1%6, passim, London, Heinemann 
1983. 
25 Kerr, Ian J. Building the Railways oft he Raj 1850- 1900, Delhi, Oxford 1997. p.208. 
26 See Woodburn Kirby, ibid., p. 190. 
27 Lack of fuel was one of the major reasons for the collapse of the Lu.frwaffe air defence of Germany in 1945. 
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railways further east, meant very long transit times. They also required large numbers 
of vehicles and rolling stock which were simply not available in north-east India. 
Neither the railway lines nor the roads had been built to meet these kinds of demands. 
The railway administrational organisation was already under extreme pressure to 
maintain the normal daily 'requirements of the war in Burma. Attempting to meet the 
demand for fuel without the pipe-line would have resulted in major failure in logistic 
supplies for the army and air force. Because British railway engineers were fully 
stretched in the other war theatres, American railway engineers, with their particular 
brand of railway expertise, were brought in to help organise new railway operating 
procedures to improve the flows. 
Air Transport and the problems of using artillery 
The need for sufficient transport aircraft became of primary concern during 1942 and 
1943 when it was realised that this was the means by which it was possible to 
overcome the extensive supply problems caused by the lack of available surface 
transport and the terrain. Typical of the new dilemmas which were continually being 
encountered were those in attempting to use artillery in the severe conditions of the 
jungle-covered mountainous terrain of Northern Burma. Artillery logistics are always 
of concern to artillery commanders even under the most favourable conditions, if an 
effective use of field artillery is to be made. Apart from the problems of moving 
artillery, the rate at which ammunition is used, the Daily Ammunition Expenditure 
Rate (DAER) is the logistic centre of all artillery operations as much as is the 
location. Moving guns along the few roads and tracks in Burma terrain and 
attempting to mass them was clearly a major problem. For example, in northern 
Burma unorthodox artillery positions had to frequently be used where level surfaces 
were at a premium. It was not unusual for guns of differing calibres to be firing from 
the same piece of ground such as a road or along a narrow ridge where the guns 
would virtually be lined up 'in file'. Under these kinds of circumstances supplying 
ammunition was a problem. and arranging heavy artillery concentrations was almost 
impossible for both the British and the Japanese. The twin problems of flat space and 
supply were not always reconcilable. As Bailey emphasises, 
Artillery was used little in jungle areas before the Second World War and few 
anticipated the requirement to mount large-scale operations across such 
hostile terrain. The Japanese preparedness to do so accounted in part for their 
early successes, and the US and British armies quickly acquired jungle skills 
to match. The main problem for artillery in that theatre was lack of 
mobility, which also inhibited fire power by interfering with the logistic re-
supply. Artillery had to keep up with its supported arm, often moving directly 
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across country along inadequate tracks or freshly cut routes ..... and the 
value of aircraft was quickly learned. 28 
This was a particular aspect of the war in Burma which Bailey puts in perspective, 
Aircraft have greatly improved the speed and flexibility of logistic resupply 
in certain situations . ... , but their potential was realized only in the later stages 
of the Second World War, particularly in South East Asia.29 
Even more to the point, he also illustrates in relation to logistic supply, that in one day 
on the Western Front in 1918 the British 4th Army fired 3,700 railway wagon-loads 
of 18 pdr. ammunition and that the Russian siege of Berlin in 1945 used over 8,500 
railway wagon-loads of ammunition. The freight wagons of the Indian railway metric 
system had a carrying capacity of 6 tons (13,440lb.). This assumed solid freight such 
as sand but, artillery shells, for example, are a very specialised form of freight due to 
the manner in which they are stacked and this is a determining capacity factor. The 
other limitation on the supply was the train flow on the railway line from North-East 
India to the railhead at Dimapur some one hundred miles from the frontier of Burma, 
and flow directly relates to distance and the average journey time. There was no 
possible way that massed artillery at the levels in other theatres could have been 
achieved in Burma without a massive expansion of the rail network in a short period, 
a huge time and labour consuming task beyond the capacity of Indian Railways. 
Apart from this there were the problems in Burma of sufficient visibility for the 
artillery observers to spot the fall of shot in jungle areas and there were also other 
dilemmas with using artillery in this type of terrain. These were involved in the 
necessity for shells to clear the close tops of trees and the crests of nearby ridges. The 
standard gun as used by the Artillery is designed to project a shell over the maximum 
distance possible for a given amount of explosive and this is critically related to the 
angle at which the gun is fired and thus the trajectory or path of the shell through the 
air. Normally the greatest angle at which even a howitzer, an artillery piece especially 
designed to fire at a high angle and thus with a limited range, can be fired is 45 
degrees, the 'upper register' in artillery parlance. This angle is essential for mountain 
and jungle warfare and was not normally possible for guns other than howitzers. 
However the problem had to be solved.30 This was accomplished by digging the 'trails 
'of the guns in below the normal ground level. Artillery could not overcome the 
problem of firing into enemy positions in the 'dead ground' which occurs on the 
reverse slope of ridges near their crests, where close air support could be effective. 
28 Bailey, J.B .A. Field Artillery and Firepower, Oxford, The Military Press 1989. p. f57. 
29 Bailey,ibid, p. 32. 
30 The the 3.7 in. Howitzer was used by the Indian Army Mountain Artillery. It had a maximum range of 6,000 
yds. with a 191 12 lb. shell and was carried on eight American bred mules. A battery consisted of fow- guns. See Pat 
Carrnichael, Mountain Battery: Burma 1942, Bournemouth, Devin 1983. pp. 3-4. 
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Using air transport to provide logistic support for the artillery was always 
problematical. The mainstay of the RAF air transport force throughout the whole of 
South-East Asia was the Douglas C-47 Dakota, a twin-engined transport with a fully 
loaded operational range of 250 miles. 31 It had a capacity for a disposable load of 
some 8746lb, although the maximum loads carried in Burma were usually of about 
7000 lb. This could increase to 7500lb depending on the kind of load and the 
terrain.32 Theoretically, therefore, a C-47 could carry 350 x 25 lb shells or 87 x 5.5 
inch shells and they were also used to transport loads of 28 x 250 lb bombs but, space 
was as much a determining factor as was platform loading. 33 
When there were difficult ground conditions for the artillery such as dead ground or 
clearance problems, aircraft were used to bomb the target, from late 1942 these were 
usually the Vengeance dive-bombers. These could deliver a 500 pound bomb with an 
accuracy of some fifteen yards to clearly identified targets which, more often than not 
were Japanese bunkers. The destructive force of the 500lb bomb had the useful 
attribute of being far greater than that of a 5.5 inch 100 pound artillery shell. Prior to 
this the Blenheims had been used but they were only capable of delivering 250lb 
bombs, accuracy was a distinct problem and they were relatively ineffective. Later 
this task was taken over by Hurribombers, these were Hurricanes which were adapted 
to carry two 250lb under-wing bombs but, by this time (in 1944) the campaign was 
moving towards the more open country of Burma where it was possible to make use 
of tanks to shell bunkers at very close range. Before this, due to the problems of using 
artillery, especially in the hilly and mountainous terrain of the Arakan and along the 
Indian border, a greater reliance was placed on the use effective air support and co-
operation than in other theatres of war and consequently the importance of co-
operation and communications between the air and the ground forces increased. 
Co-operation and the AOPs 
It could be said that the AOP squadrons epitomised the spirit of co-operation between 
the Army and the RAF. The concept of an Air Observation Post (AOP) owes its 
origins to a small but devoted band of Royal Artillery Officers who had formed their 
own Flying Club during the 1930s. It was the result of a great deal of effort and time 
by these men led by Major, later Major General Parham who very strongly believed 
that the way to achieve 'good artillery shoots' was to exploit the air by having flying 
31 Probert, op.cit. p. 243, Map 10. 
32 See At. Lt. Douglas Williams, 194 Squadron; Royal Air Force- 'The Friendly Firm' (Burma Campaign), 
Braunton, Merlin 1987. p. 25 and passim. 
33 Williams,l94 Squadron Royal Air Force 'The Friendly Firm', pp. 53-4. Shells could be carried in wooden 
cases but more likely as in the case of bombs, lying on the floor. 
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observation posts. They believed that the best way to achieve this was to use a very 
light and simple to maintain aeroplane that could fly from almost any flat piece of 
ground of something of the size of a football pitch and located almost alongside the 
'gun' batteries for which they were spotting. In Burma, because of the nature of the 
terrain this original concept was extended to include; observing for air strikes, close 
air observation of Japanese positions and troop movements and on occasions, casualty 
evacuation. 
The first and only Air Observation Post (AOP) squadron in this theatre, No. 656 RAF 
arrived in India in 1943. It was a truly mixed squadron, as were all the AOP 
squadrons. All its pilots were Royal Artillery officers, the administration officers 
were all RAF but the rest of the squadron was almost equally RAF and army. All the 
AOP squadrons were designed to be completely independent as were the three flights 
of the squadron which were also broken down into individual sections which 
consisted of an Auster aircraft, a Pilot and four ground staff with supporting transport. 
Everything possible was arranged so that a section could maintain itself in the field 
with major support from the HQ flight if required. 656 squadron first went into action 
during the second Arakan offensive in 1943 shortly after arriving in India. The in-
theatre allocations of AOP squadrons illustrate the results of the 'Germany First' 
policy and its effect on the Burma Theatre, even for units as small as this with an 
establishment of 196 officers and men. An examination of the squadron distributions 
in 1944 shows that there were seven of these squadrons in Europe, four in Italy and 
originally two in Africa, the 1943 North Africa allocation being the very first of these 
squadrons to be sent into action, which was later transferred to Italy.34 
Apart from the normal meteorological difficulties, the problems of flying any aircraft 
but especially a light aircraft were considerable, especially over thickjungle.35 Apart 
from that of being captured by the Japanese which for most aircrew usually meant 
execution, the dangers were very much to the front of most, if not all, of the minds of 
aircrew and were very aptly described by Maslen-Jones after an Auster in his 
squadron had crashed in dense jungle after running out of fuel. 
The incident sharpened our thoughts as to the dangers of crashing into the top 
of the jungle, ... This particular incident had been heightened by the fate of an 
RAF Hurricane pilot who had crashed into the top branches of the jungle 
canopy. Injured and with his legs trapped in the wreckage and unable to reach 
34 E.W. Maslen Jones, Fire by Order: Recollections of an Air Observation Pilot of No. 656 Squadron in Burma, 
Barnsley, Leo Cooper 19%. 
35 The loaded weight of an Auster was 1,700 lb. and it was powered with a 130-h.p. engine. See Thetford, Owen, 
Aircraft of the Royal Air Force since 1918. 8th revd., ed. London, Guild 1988. pp. 178-9. 
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ground level he was attacked by the red ants who live in nests at the top of 
trees. It took a search party several days to recover his body.36 
It was also very difficult to spot from above aircraft which had crashed in the jungle 
and this reduced the chances of rescue. Some of the aircrew who survived this 
experience, particularly those operating in close support of the army, had literally 
'walked out', back to the British lines. 
The First Arakan Offensive; December 1942 - March 1943 
It has been said of the Arakan that, 'There were few less desirable places in which to 
fight a campaign•.37 and during the Monsoon there is a two hundred inch rainfali.38 
On the Mayu peninsular and the Kaladan Valley, where the fighting mainly took 
place, the Mayu Range of hills and the Arakan Hill Tracts rise to over two thousand 
feet and are covered in dense jungle. On the peninsular numerous creeks ( chaungs) 
run down to the sea cutting the coastal plain. Apart from a sandy beach there are 
numerous Mangrove swamps, the area is swarming with leeches and malaria is 
endemic. From the point of view of both the army and the air force this area is a 
difficult battleground. 
In 1942, air reconnaissance had shown that the Japanese were building airfields in the 
Arakan and thus posing a direct threat to the north-east of India and Assam. Partly 
due to this and partly due to Wavell's enthusiasm to attack the Japanese, at the end of 
1942 the army was toJaunch its first offensive to attempt to recapture the Mayu 
Peninsular and the port and airfield at Akyab in the Arakan, Operation CANNIBAL. 
There were various reasons for choosing this particular area of Burma. If there was to 
be any attempt to launch an amphibious operation to retake Rangoon then the ability 
to gain air superiority was important for not only would this provide air protection to 
the landings, it would also facilitate air support especially air supply. In particular, 
the airfield and port of Akyab were both critically important if there was to be any 
future attempt to use an amphibious operation to retake Rangoon some 330 miles to 
the south and therefore also within the operational range of RAF bombers. 
This first offensive was undertaken against a background of insurrection in India 
which had broken out into violence in August 1942. The Indian Congress Party led by 
36 Maslen-Jones, Fire by Order, pp. 72-3 
37 Louis Alien, op.cit., p.91, quoting from Lt. Gen. Sir Geoffrey Evans, Slim as a Militwy Commander, London, 
Batsford 1969. 
38 See Bunge, Fredrica M. ed. Burma; A Counl1y Study: Foreign Area Studies, 3rd, ed. rev ., passim, Washington 
OC, The American University 1971. 
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Gandhi launched a 'Quit India' campaign of civil disobedience, he was arrested along 
with most of the Congress Party leaders, including Chandra Bose and imprisoned. 39 
Civil disobedience was in fact an insurrection of some force, ' ... the rebels were tearing 
down telegraph poles, telegraph lines and tearing up the railway lines. They destroyed 
every [form] of communication they could and dismantled bridges and culverts.'40 
This seriously interrupted the lines of communication to Calcutta from Bombay and 
Delhi and to the 'front'. It tied down 57 battalions of infantry, the equivalent of six 
army divisions and part of the RAF and ' ... had a considerable effect on the ability of 
the Indian Army to take to take the offensive in the dry season of 1942-1943 .. .'41 
Although at the time and possibly now, the first Arakan offensive in December might 
be seen as a failure, in retrospect this can arguably be said not to have been so for 
valuable lessons were learned which were later to be exploited. For the Japanese, the 
British failure seemed to confirm their belief in their tactics and although managing to 
regain any ground which they had lost, in reality they gained nothing but what was to 
be a pyrrhic victory. The object of the British offensive was to invade and occupy the 
Mayu Peninsular and the port and airfield at Akyab using the 14th Indian Division 
and with RAF 224 Group (AOC Air Comdr. Gray) in support. It was rightly believed 
that the peninsular was not heavily garrisoned by the Japanese 55th Division, and 
therefore the opposition was expected to be light. The speed and determination of the 
Japanese reaction and their subsequent offensive action took the British completely 
by surprise and theywere forced to retreat, the 14th Indian Division only being 
extracted with difficulty. 42 
The plan called for a rapid southward advance along the main axis of communication 
in the area, an unmade road before the Japanese could bring up reinforcements. The 
army were to use trucks and mules for their transport and the job of 224 group RAF 
was to suppress enemy air activity and to provide close air support to the ground 
forces when called upon. Due to unexpected and therefore unplanned for weather 
conditions at the start of the offensive the expedition was delayed for at least ten days 
until the 17th December. It was to prove to be a critical delay. It resulted in the only 
road becoming a quagmire for the wheeled transport, mostly 15cwt trucks, and left 
the advance dependant upon the remaining means of transport, the mule pack 
animals. It was to prove the undoing of the plan for it gave the Japanese time to bring 
39 Bose escaped and after a peliod in Germany reached Singapore and became the leader of the Japanese 
organised and equipped Indian National Army. 
40 Leslie Robins, Policing the Raj, London, Robins 1985, p. IOO. 
41 Kirby, op.cit., vol. 2. p.p 246-7. 
42 See Louis Alien, Burma: The Longest Warl941-45. p. 96. The Arakan was ganisoned by the Japanese 33rd 
Division but, only two battalions faced the 14th Division. In January 1943 the 33rd division was reinforced by the 
55th division in January and in position in February. 
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in reinforcements and to dig-in behind well protected defence positions which 
brought the advance to a halt. Up until this time the Japanese had always been on the 
offensive and this was the first occasion when they had been on the defensive and 
brought the British advance forces to a halt by using 'bunkers'. RAF air 
reconnaissance showed that the Indian division was then in a precarious position for 
the Japanese, using their standard outflanking tactics, infiltrated a substantial number 
of troops to the rear in an attempt to establish road blocks to cut the division off. It 
was precisely these tactics which had so rapidly gained the Japanese ascendancy in 
the advances into Malaya and Burma. With 14th Indian Division cut-off in this way it 
was a reversal for the British which was only saved from being a disaster by the use 
of 224 Group of the RAF providing air cover, close support and transport aircraft. 
Particularly heavy use was made of close support aircraft, mainly Hurricanes and 
Blenheims to bomb and strafe and on 27th November 1942, Vengeance dive-bombers 
for the first time and made continuous air attacks on the Japanese outflanking troops. 
The 250lb bombs used by the Blenheims were not effective against the Japanese 
bunkers. 43 The air attacks ultimately helped to bring the Japanese outflanking 
movement to a halt. 
The troops of the 14th Indian Division were unable to receive supplies by road at this 
juncture and the RAF transport squadrons, using Dakotas and Hudsons, carried out a 
series of supply drops to the beleaguered troops enabling them to fight their way out. 
It was, from the point of view of inter-service co-operation, a vital first lesson in the 
use of close air support, air interdiction, and transport aircraft, in this case to extract 
an army formation in difficulties. It proved the real value of transport aircraft in the 
kind terrain and the weather conditions which were to be expected in Burma. It also 
proved that army formations could afford to have their lines of communication cut 
and still receive logistic supplies. During the whole campaign the RAF put in a 
tremendous effort and ' ... the entire strength of 224 Group was at critical moments 
deployed in direct ground support'.44 
The Army in the Arakan already owed a great debt to 224 Group, which had 
achieved marvels of sustained effort to cover the recent withdrawals. More 
than once the troops could not have extricated themselves without this [air] 
cover. 45 
The Japanese failed to appreciated the tactical potential that the use of air transport 
had demonstrated. It was here that the British army discovered that it could 
completely rely on the air force to continue to supply them as well as providing air 
43 Alien ,Burma, ibid. p.98. 
44 Probert, op.cil. p. l33 . 
45 Slim, op.cil. p.l59. 
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/ support. It was during this period a scheme called 'Rubber-neck' was started, ' ... which 
was to get pilots down to the front line .. .in order to get the idea of what the army was 
up against'.46 By May the first Arakan offensive was over and the British Army was 
ostensibly back where it had started but now with the new knowledge of the potential 
of air supply. 
On the 18th December 1942 Bengal Command changed to being the third Tactical 
Air Force (3T AF). The Operational Statistics of the 3 TAF show that Air Support for 
the 14th Army grew from very small beginnings, starting with two Hurricane 
Squadrons and one Lysander squadron. 47 Initially their main effort was in the Arakan 
escorting Blenheim bombers and directly supporting the 14th Indian Division in its 
offensive in the Mayu Peninsular in 1942, but the number of squadrons were to grow 
steadily as the Japanese increasingly contested the air space. The army and 3 T AF 
were also supported by No.31 squadron RAF, the only available air transport 
squadron in India Command. During the first offensive the RAF flew some 5000 
operational sorties in support of 14th Indian Division in the Arakan.48 Between April 
and December 1942 there were altogether some 543 air transport sorties including 
those flown in the Arakan, mostly flown by 31squadron.49 
The breakdowns made by the early Operational [statistical] Reports of the Third 
Tactical Air Force are fairly simple and are limited in character at this stage (early 
1943) and tend to lump the statistical details together. This is understandable in an air 
force with limited numbers of personnel struggling to provide maximum effort on 
operations. It can be assumed that trained personnel were required for the more urgent 
jobs of fighting. What is important at this stage is to realise that when the army were 
in trouble on the ground and in spite of the severity of the Monsoon which makes 
flying very risky, the air effort was kept up. It was constant willingness to support the 
army which laid the foundations for the feeling among the troops that, 'the RAF won't 
let us down'. The conditions of low cloud and mountains rising to 7000 feet caused 
problems of visibility. 'The normal air navigation, as used in Europe, is useless over 
the hills and valleys of Asia. In squalls like these you guess and keep your fingers 
crossed.'50 There was for example, during the Monsoon, the ever present possibility 
46 Norman L. Franks, HwTicans over the Arakan, Wellingboriough, Patrick Stephens 1989. p.148. 
47 PRO AIR '23/2072. Operational Statistics , 3rd Tactical Air Force. 
48 Kirby. vol. 2. op.cit., p.355. 
49 Probert. op.cit. , quoting Narrative 3, A pp. 9. p. l34. 
50 Extract of a letter from Sgt. Simon Eden RAF Dakota navigator He was the son of the Foreign Secretary killed 
in Burma in 1945 and quoted by Wynn from Eden Memoirs. Humplirey Wynn, Forged in War: A History of RAF 
Transport Comnwnd 1943-1967, London, Stationery Office 19%. p.52. 
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of Cumulonimbus cumulus [Anvil] cloud, which is dangerous for aircraft. 51 
'Monsoons in India and Burma were a formidable natural hazard to aircrew, often 
proving fatal if their aircraft inadvertently flew into towering cumulo-nimbus 
clouds.'52 Humphrey Wynn calls them ' ... the Killer Monsoons.' 53 
There can be little doubt that from the first Arakan operation the high regard 
established for each other formed the basis for the strong levels of co-operation 
between the army and the air force. RAF personnel were appalled by the conditions 
on the ground faced by the fighting and transport soldiers and had a great admiration 
for the 'brown jobs'. Arguably, this is one of the critical points in the war in Burma for 
it was to prove conclusively, especially to the army, of the value of air power in these 
conditions. At the same time the air force realised that it had two primary functions, 
to gain the battle for air superiority and secondly to give the army the maximum 
support that was possible at any given moment. This was a war unlike any other, 
without precedents to guide and the learning curve was steep and would not allow for 
error. 
The Arakan offensive had seen the first successful use of the Vengeance dive-
bombers which were to be joined in early 1943 by three more Vengeance 
squadrons. 54 The value of the dive-bomber as a battlefield weapon had previously 
been derided by the RAF but they were requested by the army since their experiences 
in France in 1940.55 The use of dive-bombers on the battlefield is still a subject for 
historical debate, but the army in Burma seems to have had little doubt as to its 
effectiveness, 
By 1942-43 experience elsewhere had taught the British the value of massing 
and organising their artillery to maximise firepower in the attack; but in the 
Far East they lacked the resources to effect this. The consequences of 
attacking with insufficient fire support became evident during the Arakan 
campaign between December 1942 and May 1943. On 6th January the British 
met prepared defences, against which the indirect fire of the 25 pdr. proved 
ineffective. The best way of destroying bunkers was by direct fire, or dive-
51 The reputation of the dangers of this type of cloud for destroying aircraft is such that,all aircraft, without 
exception, will fly around it if at all possible. 
52 Wynn, ibid. p. 51. 
53 Wynn, ibid. p.48. 
54 Shores, Christopher, Ground Attack Aircraft of World War IJ, Macdonald and Jane's, London 1977. 
p. 171. 
55 See Peter Smith, Into the Assault: Famous Dive-Bombers Aces oft he Second World War, London, John Murray 
1985. pp. 169-70. During the Battle of Britain dive-bombers of the Luftwaffe contrary to popular belief, 
effectively put out of action a number of RAF fighter airfields; for example, Tangemere, Lympe and Middle 
Wallop, without suffering insupportable losses . 
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bombing, and as the war progressed 'bunker busting' became an essential and 
specialist artillery task. 56 
In this kind of terrain, when direct fire was needed, there was often going to be a 
problem in bringing [heavy] artillery forward, consequently it was often only medium 
artillery such as the 25 pdr. gun or mountain artillery of 3.7" calibre, which could be 
used. As Bailey makes clear, frequently these were not going to be able to destroy the 
most obstinate of targets. In the first Arakan offensive the line of advance was 
'dogged' by having to use one single-way track hurriedly improved to take, in the first 
instance, 15cwt. trucks and later 3 toners. This track was not all-weather and 
unseasonable heavy rain rapidly made the track unusable at times for vehicular traffic, 
resulting in difficulties in bringing artillery up to the forward line. This often applied 
when it was necessary to mass heavy artillery forward or for bunker busting. Bailey 
makes the interesting comment that, 'Barrages [in Burma] were expensive it terms of 
ammunition and dangerous to advancing forces, shells often prematurely burst 
amongst the trees'.57 Hence, the usefulness of the Vengeance which could carry two 
500lb bombs. Bailey and Hogg argue that this reliance on direct artillery fire was no 
panacea for 'bunker busting', during an engagement in the Tiddim area in February 
1944 during the Imphal battle, 
... 684 rounds from 3.7-inch howitzers and 670 rounds from 25 pdrs were fired 
into an area of bunkers just 250 metres square, but no material damage was 
suffered by the bunkers. 58 
In the case of Burma where the terrain was arguably amongst the most difficult 
encountered by British forces during the Second World War, Bailey suggests that the 
use of air attack, either in the form of Dive bombers or heavy bombers or a 
combination of both could replace artillery. The RAF now had the beginnings of 
sufficient numbers of aircraft to be able to give this kind of close support to the 
ground forces and to go over to the offensive and to contest air superiority. 
Nevertheless, they were yet to receive sufficient transport aircraft to provide the 
necessary supporting air transport on a large scale. 
In February 1943, during the offensive in the Arakan, the first Wingate 'Chindit' 
expedition into Burma, Operation 'Longcloth', demonstrated for the first time that a 
56 Bailey, op.cit. p. 229. 
57 Bailey, p.229. 
58 Bailey op.cit., p. 229, n. 194, quoting Hogg (170) p. l33. Another example was Fort Dufferin in Mandalay. 
Tanks [at point blank range]made little impression on the Japanese Bunkers and heavy artillery had to be used. 
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British Army formation could successfully beat the Japanese in jungle fighting. 
Wingate's group was originally known as the 77th Brigade and was formed July 1942, 
it later became known as the Long Range Penetration Group59. The Brigade was 
designed to operate on foot away from roads in 'eight columns' complete with its own 
transport using mules and some horses. ·· Complete army and air co-operation was 
established through each column having its own RAF air liaison section to radio 
supply requests back to base, choose 'dropping zones and talk the transport aircraft 
'in'. The responsibility for air re-supply was undertaken by aircraft of the RAF from 
the two available Transport squadrons Nos. 31 and 194 on special detachment but, 
due to other commitments, especially the first Arakan offensive, where a maximum 
number of sorties were being carried out, there were never more than three aircraft 
each of Dakotas and Hudsons flying from Agartala airfield in north-east India. 
Wingate and his columns crossed into northern Burma in February 1943 and operated 
for almost four months harassing Japanese lines of communication. Arguably, due to 
the casualty rate of almost thirty per cent of the three thousand who had crossed the 
Irrawaddy, it was not a tactical success. Nevertheless, in respect of morale, an 
underestimated element of warfare, it was a successful achievement. For the RAF this 
was an important operation for much experience and confidence was gained in the 
ability to navigate and find 'dropping zones' in what was very difficult country. On 
one occasion an RAF Dakota managed to land and evacuate 17 sick and wounded 
men. Additionally eight air strikes took place, virtually on an ad hoc basis. RAF 
sections complete with weighty radio equipment, the 1082/83 set alone weighed over 
200lb, were attached to the columns to call for air supply by directly radioing the 
base.61 Unfortunately, they had no means of communicating with strike aircraft, they 
operated on a different radio frequency and this was a problem throughout the whole 
of the campaign. Moreover, RAF fighters escorting RAF transport aircraft could not 
contact them by radio, although this was not so with transport aircraft of the 
USAAF.62 Nevertheless, the RAF pilots and their sections marching with the columns 
was a demonstration of co-operation and commitment to the ground forces. In May 
1943, with the coming of the Monsoon, the Wingate force returned to India. 
The downside of the Wingate operation was that it demonstrated to the Japanese, that 
a military force could cross the grain of the country where there were few tracks. In 
particular to General Mutaguchi, commander of the Japanese 15th Army who when 
commanding the 18th Division believed that, 
59probert, op. cif. p.135. 
61 See Da~id Rooney, Wingate and the Chindits: Redr~ssing the Balanc~. London, C~ssell 1994. p. 89. For details 
of dropping technique. The RAF sections consisted of one officer pilot and four radio operators. 
62 PRO AIR 23 / 207~ 
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... the border mountains were not passable by a large force .... Then, in 
February and March 1943, news came to Mutaguchi and Sakurai that a British 
Force had successfully crossed the uncrossable terrain, ... 63 
It caused him to realise that it was feasible to cross the grain of the country. 
According to Kirby this led to the assaults on Imphal and Kohima.64 However, once 
again in May 1943 the onset of the Monsoon brought campaigning in the Arakan and 
elsewhere to an end. The Japanese, as was their custom withdrew their air force to 
Thailand and Malaya however, 
... each air force realised that it was essential to try to neutralise the other. 
The fight for air superiority had so far proved inconclusive; now either Eastern 
Air Command or 5th [Japanese] Air Division [Hikoshidan] had to win it. 65 
and the arrival of the first Spitfires December 1943 was to prove to be a major factor 
in the contest. 
At the end of 1943 the number of all RAF sorties had increased to 1,913, a significant 
indication of the increasing strength of the air force in Burma. The strength of the 
JAAF's 5th Hikoshidan was 370 aircraft and RAF Eastern Air Command had 420 
aircraft. However, some two hundred of these were fighters, including the newly 
arrived Spitfires which now equipped three squadrons and which were about to 
become operationai.66 The opposing air forces were roughly equal in numbers and 
battle for air supremacy was again to be fought over the Arakan but this time it was to 
be even more critical as the demand for air supply was to increase dramatically. With 
the arrival of the first operational Spitfire fighter squadrons in November the balance 
of air superiority was starting to change for, 'until their arrival on the Burma front, the 
Oscars had proved tough opponents for the Hurricanes'.67 
So important was this new offensive to future co-operation that Baldwin the AOC 
3TAF, produced an extract which covered the air operations of Bengal Command and 
3rd Tactical Air Force, 15/11-17/12/43 and 18/12/43 - 116/44 referring directly to the 
Second Arakan operation, 
It is certain, in the light of what is now history that these successes by 224 
Group [RAF] and the subsequent maintenance of almost complete air 
dominance was a decisive factor that turned what might well have been a 
63 Brian Bonded., Fallen Stars: Eleven Studies ofTwentieth Century Militmy Disasters, Louis Alien; Mutaguchi 
Renya and the Invasion of India, London, Brassey's 1991. p.215-6 and passim. 
64Kirby, op.cit., vol. 2. p.329. 
65 Probert, op. cif., p. 159. 
66 ibid. p. 159. 
67 Norman Franks, op. cil. p. 53. 
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disaster on the ground into a clear-cut victory. The enemy troops, by a series 
of deep and bold movements, starting on February 4th, cut the road 
communication of major part of our land forces, including the 7th Indian 
Division. Past success in this type of manoeuvre had led the enemy to expect a 
British debacle, resulting, he hoped, in such far reaching success as the 
capture of Chittagong. The enemy had, however, neglected the factor of air 
supply, which immediately came into play and which our air superiority 
enabled us to employ by day as well as by night. Supplies on an adequate 
scale were provided for the encircled forces and it was found practicable to 
evacuate the majority of casualties by air from improvised strips. Their 
supplies good and their morale high, our troops held on to their positions and 
raided the enemy's lines of communication to good effect, aided by very close 
air support (see Appendix 'E'[in the extract] ). In a little over a week, signs of 
shortage of supplies became apparent among the enemy, who was eventually 
driven back to his original position and beyond with heavy losses. Air supply 
is a comparatively new fact in operations in this theatre ..... 68 
It is quite clear from this Dispatch from Air Marshal Baldwin that Air Transport has 
become a major component of the air operations of 3 TAF. To this end Troop Carrier 
Command was created on 15th December 1943 by order of the HQ of Eastern Air 
Command, in compliance with a Directive from HQ SEAC and it did not come under 
the control of 3rd Tactical Air Force until the middle of 1944. 
The Command was charged with the task of providing air transportation for 
airborne and air transit forces in the support and training of the Army Group, 
S.E.A. and other land and air forces included in the operations in Burma. The 
Command was empowered with operational control over American Troop 
Carrier Squadrons and British Transport Squadrons to be assigned to it. 
Brig. Gen. William D. Old was appointed air commander of Troop Carrier Command 
with his HQ at Comilla, India (2nd Jan.'44) deliberately so that it was close by HQ 
14th Army, 3 TAF and supply bases. 
The following TCC effort was for the period of Jan- May 1944 and demonstrates the 
value of the airlift capacity of this Command. 69 
68 PRO AIR23/ l<J28 Baldwin op.cit.p. 4. 
69 Statistics extracted from AIR 23/1928. Baldwin Dispatch Air Operations Bengal Command and Third Tatctical 
Air Force. 
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Sorties 
Jan. 2013 
Feb. 3014 
Mar 4675 
April 6875 
May 10067 
26,644 
Tonnaae70 !:> 
5660 
10047 
12642 
18476 
22485 
69283 
Troops 
22002 
30665 
59825 
112492 
Casualties 
181 
651 
4788 
8996 
8593 
23209 
The steady increase in the number of sorties reflects the improving weather situation 
during the Monsoon and the additional squadrons which joined the Command, partly 
due to the need to rapidly switch the effort from supporting the West African Division 
in the Arakan to the Kohima and Imphal areas where the British forces had been 
surrounded by the Japanese 15th Army. This had every prospect of advancing into 
India unless the ground forces could be relieved. 
The new squadrons which joined in the effort were the 315th (organised from 
elements of the 1st and 2nd Transport squadrons) and 27th squadron direct from the 
US. Both squadrons went to Sylhet (on the Kohima Plain) and were joined there by 
No.98 Airdrome squadron. All arrived at Sylhet in early January. 
As the Dispatch states, 
Three main commitments would arise in the near future: 
The supply of a Division about to commence an offensive down the Kaladan 
Valley. The establishment of a large reserve of supplies at Tiddim. The 
initiation of greatly increased supply dropping activities in support of the CAI 
[Chinese, American and Indian forces] in northern Burma. 
In addition the command would have to supply the 16th Bde of3rd Ind Div. 
who would be marching in to Central Burma to meet up with Wingate's troops 
who were to be flown in (by Nol. Air Commando, Cochran). 
Events were occurring, the 7th lnd Div. and other units were encircled in the 
Arakan in February. In two weeks 900 sorties were made in the face of 
intense ground fire. All transport had to fly at relatively low altitudes when 
dropping supplies. C-46s from the Hump were 'borrowed' from Feb. to help 
with the intense demands made upon the Command. In April ; the 5th Div. was 
moved up to Imphal in 758 sorties. 71 
70 PRO AIR 23/ 1928 op. cit .. The tonnage quoted is possibly in short tons, but the dispatch does not clarify this. 
However both tons and shmt tons were used as measurements of weight. But the custom seems to have been to use 
short tons when applied to aircraft. See glossary for definitions. 
71 PRO Air 23/1928 ibid. 
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The Second Arakan 1943, the Battle of the Admin Box and Operation Ha-Go 72 
Following the abortive first British offensive in the Arakan, both the air and ground 
wars were in 1943, due to the onset of the Monsoon, less intense and remained 
quiescent. Towards the end of the year it was decided that there would be a renewed 
attempt to recover the Arakan and the port and airfield at Akyab but, now XV Army 
Corps was assigned to the task. The plan was for the 5th and 7th Indian Divisions to 
advance southward down the Mayu Peninsular, the 5th Division on the coastal side of 
the Mayu Range and the 7th on the other side. Meanwhile the 81st West African 
Division, relying completely on air supply, was to move south down the Kaladan 
Valley to guard the left flank of the advance. At this time the Japanese were also 
planning an offensive in the Arakan, Operation Ha-Go. The Japanese offensive was 
launched by the 28th Army commanded by Lt. Gen. Sakurai Shozo and spearheaded 
by 55 Division under Maj. Gen. Sakurai Tokutaro. 73 The intention was to provide a 
feint for Mutaguchi's proposed attack on Imphal in early 1944. The Japanese believed 
that to meet this offensive the British army would retain its five divisions in the 
Arakan and be unable to reinforce the Central front at Imphal. The British Arakan 
offensive started in November 1943 but, by the 9th January the leading elements had 
been brought to a halt by Japanese 'Bunker' defences. Vengeance dive-bombers were 
called in and made a satisfactory attack ' ... but a follow-up by Liberator bombers [of 
the USAAF] fell short amongst the tanks, damaging three and causing some 
casualties amongst the crews•.74 The Bunkers were finally destroyed by tanks firing at 
close range. Any attempt to advance was strongly contested by the Japanese and 
during January two of the Vengeance squadrons made 552 dive bombing attacks in 
support of the army, with the Hurricanes continually flying ground support sorties. 75 
As the leading army divisions pushed down the peninsular the Japanese started to put 
up air sweeps of over one hundred aircraft at a time over the Arakan but, in their bid 
for air superiority they were to be strongly contested by the RAF fighter squadrons. 
On 31st December 1934, thirteen Japanese bombers and fighters were shot down by 
Spitfires over the Arakan for the loss of one Spitfire. This was to followed on the 15th 
January with sixteen Oscars fighters were destroyed 'in full view of jubilant British 
and Indian troops' with the loss of two Spitfires.76 Nevertheless, this immediate 
72 See Alien, Burma: The Longest War, op.cit., pp. 157 &170. U translates into C and Ha into Z whilst Go can be 
translated into Operation., thus 'U-Go' and 'Ha-Go' can be read as Operation C and Operation Z. 
73 Alien, Bunna, op. cit., pp. 170-l. Fuller, op. cit. pp. 186-8. 
74 Bryan Perrett, Tank Tracks to Rangoon: The Stmy of British Armour in Burma. London, Robert Hale 1978, pb. 
ed. 1992. p. 84. 
75 Prober!, op. cit., p. 166. 
76 Perrett op. cit. p.86. 
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success was limited to the Arakan, elsewhere the Japanese still offered a significant 
threat to the 'Hump' route to China and elsewhere on the 900 mile front. 
The Battle of the Admin Box 
The army's advance in the Arakan had been effectively slowed when on the 4th 
February the Japanese launched 'Operation Ha-Go' with a thrust on the east of the 
peninsular to cut off and surround the 7th Indian Division with the intention of 
destroying it. This was to be followed up with the destruction of the 5th division 
advancing down the coastal plain on the west side. The expectation was that with the 
threat of being cut-off the two divisions would attempt to withdraw and disintegrate 
in the process. Suffice it to say here that, contrary to this and following the anny's 
new and aggressive tactics, that part of the 7th Division which had been cut-off, the 
administrative HQ and the divisional supply area, was formed into a defensive 
'Admin. Box'. Supplied by RAF 'air drops', it held it's ground. What then developed 
was some of the bitterest fighting of the war as the Japanese fought to capture this 
area and its valuable supplies. In the air a fierce battle was fought to maintain the air 
superiority necessary for the transport Dakotas to be able to operate and carry out the 
vital air supply 'drops' into the 'Admin. Box. Apart from the problem of Japanese 
fighters, when the Dakotas made their low level approach to the dropping zone (DZ) 
they were vulnerable to Japanese small arms fire and took a considerable amount of 
damage as a result. Typical of this particular aspect one member of a Dakota crew 
was later to write, 'We began our drop at 500 feet and had to pass over enemy lines on 
each circuit. On the third or fourth run we actually heard gunfire over the roar of the 
engines'. 77 This particular Dakota had one engine put out of action but managed to 
return to base. To keep the 5th and 7th division supplied by air, 'American and RAF 
Dakota squadrons of Troop Carrier Command ... were now flying a shuttle service of 
daylight sorties .. . with [Hurricane] fighter cover•.78 So successful was air supply that 
by the 20th February the Japanese were in a serious supply situation having failed to 
capture the 'Admin. Box'. The 5th and 7th Divisions were able to hold off the 
Japanese and with the remainder of the Corps forced the Japanese 55th Division to 
retreat. The supply was undertaken by two RAF Dakota squadrons ' ... the massive 
intervention of transport aircraft, amounting to over 700 sorties, had a decisive effect 
1 79 
However, this particular incident was critical not only in the Arakan but, was 
arguably more important to the conduct of the war as whole in Burma for, ' ... they [the 
77 Williams, op.cif., p. 25. 
78 ibid .• p. 27. 
79 Probert, op.cit. These were Nos. 31 and 62 squadrons. p. 169-70. 
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Japanese] could not conceive ... that a major force, once isolated, could be properly 
supplied [by air] for long enough to affect the outcome•.80 Not only had the transport 
aircraft of Troop Carrier Command (TCC) managed to supply the 81st West African 
Division advancing down the Kaladan Valley, but had also undertaken to keep 
supplied both the 5th and 7th Divisions. One Dakota had been lost to enemy action 
during the whole operation which illustrates how necessary and effective the air 
superiority battle had been. In February the RAF Vengeance dive-bombers flew 552 
sorties in support of the ground forces and in one week had flown some 269 sorties, 
army and air force co-operation was beginning to come of age. In January 1944, No. 
656 AOP squadron arrived in the Arakan and during the siege of the Admin. Box they 
had flown in to evacuate casualties to be followed by American L-5 Sentinels and 
between them flew out two hundred seriously wounded men. In all light aircraft 
' ... evacuated over 1,000 casualties in the Mayu and Kaladan areas; their devotion and 
their ability to land their aircraft in small jungle clearings undoubtedly saved many 
lives'. 81 In all some six thousand casualties, sick and wounded, had been flown back 
to base hospitals in India during the whole Arakan campaign. In Burma the transport 
aircraft were now recognised as weapons of war. 82 In the closing months of 1943 the 
air situation was beginning to be the reverse to what it had been in 1941 and 1942. It 
was now the Japanese who were being forced to put their major effort into contesting 
air superiority and to foregoing the air support needs of their ground forces. There 
was however one notable difference, that was now the added element of Allied air 
transport, it was to prove a decisive ingredient in the campaign and something which 
was disregarded by the Japanese to their ultimate cost. It had continued to be a steep 
learning curve for army and air force co-operation but, it was now beginning to show 
a dividend. 
The Spitfire Effect 
From November 1943 the first Spitfire fighters became operational in the Arakan and 
immediately were able to challenge the previously invulnerable Japanese 
reconnaissance aircraft and in particular the 'Dinahs' of the JAAF. Not long after 
arriving at Chittagong they had, ' .. . shot down a formation of four Dinah 
reconnaissance aircraft which had hitherto been able to operate with impunity ... ' , .83 
This was of incalculable value to any future offensives , from now on this was to 
result in the Japanese High Command becoming, to all intents and purposes 'blind', 
not only to the Fourteenth Army's movements but also to RAF airfields and aircraft 
80 Kirby, vol. 3. op.cit., p. n. 
81 Probert, op .cif., p. 172. 
82 ibid. p.l72. 
83 Probert ibid. p.l60. 
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and troop movements which could no longer be either detected or estimated. The 
Spitfires were the only RAF fighters that had a sufficient rate of climb and speed to 
successfully reach the altitude at which these particular reconnaissance aircraft 
habitually operated. This was particularly significant as it was the real beginning of 
denying air reconnaissance to the Japanese and although the Spitfires had a limited 
operational range, they were also the first RAF air defence fighters in India and 
Burma that were able to compete with the capable Oscar fighters of the JAAF. 
Spitfires contrary to the mythology were not the bulk of the fighter force during the 
Battle of Britain and also contrary to mythology were almost an accident of the 
Bomber versus fighter debate that raged in political and RAF circles in the 1930s. 
The Allied Air Force was, in July 1943, facing the 3rd Air Force of the Japanese 
Army whose zone of operations covered not only Burma but also Thailand, lndo-
China, Sumatra, Java, North Borneo and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. The 5th 
Hikoshidan (Air Division) were responsible for Burma.85 Clearly the Japanese were, 
at this stage in the air war, having problems for it is reported that in August an Air 
training Unit was established in Singapore which, ' ... devoted itself to the training of 
non-commissioned officers and endevoured[endeavoured] to increase the ability of 
the trainees who were far below [for flying personnel] the regular standard'.86 The 
Japanese airfield construction and maintenance unit were reportedly very effective 
especially as most of their mechanical equipment had been transferred to the 
'Southeast Area' [South-West Pacific] after the end of 1943. They report that in the 
Summer of 1942 there were thirty airfields in Burma but by the Spring of 1944 some 
one hundred and ten were in operation. 87 However in 1944 two factors appear to have 
limited the use of these airfields, the threat from Allied airborne forces and the ability 
of the Allies to strike at airfields in Burma, Thailand and lndo-China. This was 
compounded by fiscal funding of airfields in Thailand and Indo-China, to which the 
JAAF tended to pull back to during the Monsoon, which seems to have started to 
become a problem although this is not explained in the Japanese Monographs.88 The 
'Wingate effect' and thus co-operation seems to have borne unexpected fruit. Much as 
the Allies had done, the Japanese had by 1944 established Radar cover in Burma 
particularly in the Rangoon area but is not possible to establish the range of the radar 
85 Japanese Monogr~ph No. 56, Air Operation Record (2nd Period of the Southwestern Area). First 
Demobilisation Bureau, August 1946. p. 16. 
86 Japanese Monograph No. 56. ibid. p. 15. 
87 Monograph No. 56. ibid. p. 21. 
88 Both Thailand and Indo-China were seen as Allies by the Japanese. See Monograph No. 56, p. 21. 
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that the Japanese were using or how effective they were but the number of 
interceptions by Japanese fighters were not it seems, significantly increased .89 
89 There are no details in the Monographs although it is .mentioned. 
101 
British problems in 1944 
Chapter4 
RIPOSTE 1944 - 45 
and 'The Countfy of the Blind'1 
The overall British strategy in 1944 was to retake Burma and south-east Asia from the 
Japanese, but there were various constraints to be resolved before this could be 
undertaken and the original objectives were changing to meet the new circumstances 
of the war against Japan. Not least of these were the uneasy political relations with the 
other two Allies and difficulties of obtaining their co-operation, for neither the US nor 
China, saw the regaining of Burma and other British colonial territory as a priority. 
The US was only interested in north Burma to re-establish the land link to supply 
China, the Ledo Road, as a means not only to keep China in the war against Japan but 
also for establishing air bases for bombing the Japanese home islands.2 China was 
only interested in Burma to re-open the port of Rangoon, thus facilitating American 
aid for their own purposes, that of their continuous war against the communists under 
Mao Tse-tung in the north of China, ' ... Chiang and Mao devoted far more effort to 
husbanding men and resources for the post-war showdown than in fighting the 
Japanese'. 3 To this end the Chinese were not particularly interested in committing 
their army to north Burma unless there was to be an amphibious landing to retake 
Rangoon. 
Winston Churchill, was keen on an amphibious operation not only to retake Rangoon, 
'Operation Dracula', but to strike further south at Sumatra, 'Operation Culverin'. This 
would expel the Japanese from Malaya and Singapore and also enable Britain to enter 
the war in the Pacific via lndo-China and attack Japan. Accordingly he had appointed 
Admiral Mountbatten, with his claimed or supposed knowledge of amphibious 
operations, as Supreme Commander SEAC. But realistically Churchill was forced to 
accede to the American view and could not act unilaterally as the British needed US 
support and materiel aid. Thus the SEAC offensives were to be limited to Operation 
Thursday (Wingate) which was launched to support General Stilwell and the Chinese 
advance in the north to take Myitkyina with its valuable airfield, and to an advance 
further south in the Arakan to ensure the security of Chittagong and the airfield at 
Cox's Bazaar. To support these moves the US was willing to send an additional four 
I Quote from 'The Country of the Blind', the full quotation reads, "In the Country of the Blind the One-eyed Man 
is King'?". H.G. Wells, The Complete Short Stories of H. G. Wells, London, Ernest Benn 1927, 22nd. imp.l974, 
p.179. 
2 In 1943 and 1944 there was a change in American policy and the emphasis moved from aid to that of building 
air bases in China to accommodate the arrival of the B-29 Superfortress in the CBI Theatre. 
3 Robert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Classic Histmy of Guerrilla Watfare from Ancient Persia to the 
Present. London, Little, Brown 1994. p. 438. See also pp. 438-51 for an illuminating discourse on this situation. 
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hundred aircraft to the theatre. Myitkyina was favoured by the US as a main base for 
the air supply of China and any advance on the Central front to retake Burma 
overland, "Operation Capital" was, in January 1944, not considered by either the 
British or the US as an option. However, fate in the person of General Mutaguchi 
Renya, was about to play into the hands of the British and change the shape of the 
campaign. 
The changing circumstances of 1943 and 1944 also altered the Japanese official 
strategy in Burma from one of offence to that of defence.4 Far from any aggressive 
moves being made, Mutaguchi's aims were supposed to be, to secure the Imphal 
valley as a better defensive position than that existing in front of the Chindwin. The 
Japanese policy in 1944 was to defend the north-west flank of their conquests. This 
task was not helped by the gradual depletion, due to transfers of the Japanese Army 
Air Force in Burma, to other Theatres. Professor Alvin Coox suggests that, during the 
course of the war, the Japanese Army began to feel more and more, that the Navy was 
letting them down.5 It was certainly true that some Japanese Army Air Force units 
were being transferred from Southern Area Command, mostly from Burma to the 
south-west Pacific area and the Philippines, to reinforce the Japanese Navy Air Force 
in these regions, which were their direct responsibility. 
In the winter of 1943 Slim's concern on the central front was the logistic supply of IV 
Corps at Imphal, so that it could advance to or beyond the Chindwin River. 
... he ... now began to wonder whether he could effectively assemble and supply 
a sufficient number of divisions to overwhelm the forces they would have to 
meet, particularly as intelligence indicated that the Japanese in mid-Burma 
were reinforcing. 6 
Mutaguchi's 15th Army was in the process of being reinforced with the 31st and 15th 
divisions for Operation U-Go and bringing its strength up to five divisions. Slim's 
worry over the logistics situation concerned the numbers of transport aircraft 
available, with XV Corps advance in the Arakan requiring the 81st West African 
Division in the Kaladan Valley to be completely supplied by air and Wingate's 
Operation Thursday to support Stilwell's advance on Myitkyina, which was to be 
launched in March 1944 and which also required air supply. His worries were caused 
by the lack of ground communications. In the meantime, the Japanese launched 
Operation U-Go while the Japanese 28th Army's feint, Operation Ha-Go in the 
4 The Japanese were now under considerable Allied pressure and on the defensive in the south-west Pacific. 
5 The Unfought War: Japan 1941-1942, Fifth Research lecture, ed. by Alvin D. Coox, San Diego State 
University 1992. p. 50 and passim. 
6 Ronald Lewin, Slim, op.cit. p. 145. Interestingly he does not indicate the source of the intelligence. 
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Arakan, was already under way. The object of U-Go was to forestall any British 
offensive by occupying the plain of Imphal which was fed by only three passes, one 
of which, that via Kohima, had a good all-weather road. Mutaguchi was convinced 
that he would be able to capture the British supply dumps on the plain. He ignored the 
communications problems and suffered a disastrous defeat as a consequence. The 
military problems in northern Burma in 1944 were considerable for the difficult 
terrain coupled with the resultant dearth of land communications meant that logistics 
supply was of uppermost significance. But during 1944 the two most decisive battles 
of the whole campaign, Imphal and Meiktila were fought, the first severely damaged 
the fighting capability of Mutaguchi's 15th Army and the second was to cut Sakurai's 
28th Army in two. 
Intelligence was a particular problem in Burma as Field and Signals intelligence was 
'scarce' when compared to other Theatres and both Slim and Scoones at IV Corps 
complained at this serious Command deficiency. In 1943, ' ... signals intelligence was 
not offering him [Slim] sufficient information about enemy reserves or enemy 
intentions, .. .'7 This in itself is surprising as most Japanese air force communication 
was conducted by wireless rather than land-line telephony mainly due to a shortage of 
materials [cable etc.]. The only land lines in operation were those between Rangoon, 
Toungoo and Meitkila, communications by land line were impossible to intercept 
except by 'tapping' them. 8 According to the Japanese 'All other communications were 
carried out solely by radios'.9 They were also making use of signals intelligence by 
intercepting radio signals and they noted that, ' ... air transports running between India 
and China were able to handle nearly 10,000 tons a month.'10 As Slim pointed out, 
'we knew something of Japanese intentions, but little of the disposition of their 
reserves, and practically nothing one of their most important factors that a general has 
to consider- the character of the opposing commanders'.11 The failure of Allied 
signals intelligence, if that is what it was, can possibly be ascribed to the difficult 
atmospheric conditions generally found throughout south-east Asia. There was a 
running dispute between Slim and the intelligence services on for instance, the 
7 A1drich, op.cit. p. 220. Wireless signals in this part of the world were also often badly affected by the terrain 
and the weather. 
8 Telephone 'Tapping' could only be done by intelligence agents on the spot and was therefore a dangerous and 
impractiacal senario. It would also need a Japanese linguist. 
9 OCMH Japanese Monograph No. 64, Part I, p.289. 
10 OCMH Japanese Monograph No. 64, Part 11, p.309. This estimate is surprisingly close if it refers to March 
1944 but Major Ogata does not clarify this point. By August 1944 some 29000 (short) tons per month were being 
flown to China over the 'Hump' route. Kirby, vol.4, op.cit., A pp. 25, p. 518. A short ton is 2000 lb. 
11 Slim, op. cif. p.221. 
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effectiveness and primary role of Force 136, a branch of SOE operating in Burma 
which in Slim's view should have been gathering intelligence.12 
The lack of information on Japanese commanders is surprising, the Secret Intelligence 
Service (SIS) in Delhi ought to have been aware of their histories as gathered by 
Military Attaches, language course officers and those intelligence agents who had 
been operating in pre-war Japan.l3 Colonel G.T. Wards for example, had served as 
Assistant Military Attache in Japan between 1936 and 1942 and throughout the war 
served in India and knew the Japanese commanders.14 Lieutenant General Mutaguchi 
commander of the 15th Army had served in France in 1928 and later instigated the 
Marco Polo Bridge incident in 1937; General Kawabe, C-in C Burma Area Army in 
1943, had been a Military Attache in Germany and General Obata Hideyoshi, C-in-C 
of the JAAF 3rd Air Force in 1943, had been a military student in England in 1923.15 
There was however a problem of a serious lack of intelligence officers who were 
linguists to interpret and examine the detritus of the battlefield such as diaries and 
maps. In this area of 'battle intelligence', ' .. .linguists were rare birds'.16 For example, 
at SOAS the number of students studying Japanese between 1923 and 1941 averaged 
only eleven per year.17 As late as 1941 requests had been made by the School to both 
the Foreign Office and the War Office to increase the number of students, requests to 
which the War Office had replied, 'So far as can be reasonably foreseen at present, 
... we feel we are reasonably insured in the matter of officers knowing Oriental 
languages.' 18 In fact the first SOAS course for the military did not start until February 
1942.19 Scoones' comments critically on the failure of intelligence stating that he was 
unaware of the arrival on his front of the Japanese 53rd Division which demonstrated, 
' ... a pretty poor chit for our higher intelligence organisation•.20 This was further 
compounded by their being few prisoners of war to be interrogated and none ever 
above the rank of Captain. For example when Meiktila in central Burma was captured 
12 See Charles Cruikshank, SOE in the Far East, OUP 1983, pp. 163-90, for a full discussion of this particular 
facet of the war in Burma. Force 136 was the SOE in south-east Asia, its function was not intelligence but to raise 
local insurgency forces. Allen, op.cit., pp. 573-79. 
l3on this subject see Richard J. Aldrich, Intelligence and the War Against Japan: Britain, America and the 
Politics of Secret Service, CUP 2000 p. 34, and Elphick, Far Eastern File, op. cit., pp. 228-36. Wards is 
mentioned in an unpublished essay by Dr. Phi lip Tow le 'The British General Staff and Japan 1918-1941 '. 
14nvM 92/24/1, Personal papers of Col. G.T. Wards CMG OBE. 
15 Richard Fuller, Sh6kan- Hirohito's Samurai: Leaders oft he Japanese Armed Forces 1926-1945, London, 
Arms and Armour 1992. pp.126-8, 159-60.and 175 -6. Mark M. Boatner III, The Biographical Dictionwy of 
World War //, Novato Ca., Presido 1996. p. 386-7. 
16 Alien, Burma: The Longest War, op.cil. p. 3%. 
17 Sue Jarvis, The Japanese Codes, Bletchley Park Trust 1997. p. 13. This was at SOAS and most students were 
diplomats. 
18 Quoted in Sue Jarvis, The Japanese Codes, ibid. p.13. 
19 See Sadao Oba, The Japanese War: London University's World War// secret teaching programme and the 
experts sent to help beat Japan. trans. by Anne Kaneko, Folhtone Kent, Japan Library 1995, for a history of the 
training of British military linguists and translators. 
20 PRO WO 203/56, Letter dated 24 June 1944, quoted in Allen, Burma: The Longest War, op.cit. p. 395. 
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in 1945, 'Over 2000 Japanese bodies were counted in the town area, ... [and] forty-
seven prisoners were taken.'2l This was regarded as a high ratio for prisoners but it 
was thought that the actual number of Japanese dead was higher as many had been 
killed in bunkers and even those in hospital fought to the death in any way they 
could. 22 
The shortage of trained military intelligence personnel was undoubtedly a problem in 
south-east Asia generally, 'There was always a great demand for Japanese linguists in 
the Army, especially in Burma, and there were never enough.'23 Under these 
circumstances air reconnaissance became and remained a critical part and arguably 
the main source of intelligence for the army 'in the field' and an area of constant co-
operation between the two services. In other Theatres, Allied air intelligence was 
continually being pulled between the needs of the army, of the air force and those of 
higher command as the discovery of the V-1 sites and the V-2 at Peenemi.inde 
illustrates.24 As far as counter-intelligence goes, with the introduction in Burma of the 
Spitfire in December 1943, intelligence provided by air reconnaissance was 
increasingly being denied to Japanese commanders as their Dinah reconnaissance 
aircraft were falling victims to the Spitfires and they were, in effect, forced to plan 
and fight battles metaphorically blind.25 Colonel Nonaka states, ' ... Type 100 [Dinah] 
Headquarters Reconnaissance planes were frequently falling into the clutches of 
enemy [fighter] planes. Entering 1944, missing planes were very numerous.'26 
Air intelligence and air supply were now being seen as the keys to the campaign, but 
it was equally clear that this required not only air superiority over the air corridors 
and the supply airfields but also the construction and maintenance of those airfields. 
These issues were fundamental to all air operations and it was now accepted by both 
the army and the air force that airfields were an essential component of any future 
offensives. A critical part of this was the supply of aviation fuel upon which 
everything depended if aircraft were to be able to also operate throughout not only the 
'dry' season but also the Monsoon. Airfield runways and taxitracks needed to be able 
to stand up to very heavy traffic. The materials required for this created an additional 
supply burden on the logistics train, a burden not experienced to the same levels 
21 Alien, Burma ibid. p. 339. 
22 Alien, Burma, ibid . p.339-40. 
23 Sue Jarvis, The Japanese Codes, op.cit., p.l3. 
24 See David Johnson, V For Vengeance:The Second Battle of London, London, William Kimber 1981. pp. 32-4. 
Photographic reconnaissance put in a considerable eff01t in 1944 to discover not only the V -2s but also the V -1s 
and their launching sites in n01them France. 
25 A similar situation occurred in Europe where, for the three days following the D-day landings, aerial 
reconnaissance over the Beachheads was completely denied to the Wehrmacht . 
26 OCMH Japanese Monograph No. 56. Air Operations record (2nd Period of the Southwestern Area) August 
1946, First Demobilization Bureau. Washington DC, US. Army Historical Center. p.234. 
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elsewhere. The supply and maintaining of an army and an air force in the field is a 
difficult enough dilemma in the best of circumstances, but in Burma these problems 
were magnified to previously unimagined levels. Conditions not previously 
experienced could only be overcome by extraordinary feats of air force and army co-
operation. 
Airfield construction 
The operational ranges of military aircraft were critical in the campaigns in south-east 
Asia. They determined the limits of air transport operations and counter-air actions. 
On the ground, the terrain restricted and dictated the capacity of the lines of 
communication and impound time penalties. Consequently air transport, which did 
not suffer these constraints, supplanted traditional transport methods. Base supply 
airfields needed to be as far forward as possible and the construction and maintenance 
of forward airfields and their air supply heads, combined with the protection of the air 
corridors, was vital for success. The role of airfields came to be recognised in all 
quarters, especially the air transport squadrons. 
The zeal displayed by your forward airfield engineers in constructing new 
fields in record breaking time( ... ) the fine co-operation demonstrated in 
conforming( ... ) to our every request( ... ). We were able at all times to rely on 
the provision of suitable airfields to meet our supply landing needs, and in fact 
on occasion found ourselves hard put to keep up with the amazing speed with 
which airfields materialized overnight. 27 
The building and maintenance of airfields were the responsibility of the army whose 
Royal Engineer teams were also responsible for the construction and maintenance of 
roads. It was realised that, as the army advanced, airfields would also have to be 
constructed to keep pace and to stay within the limits of the economic operational 
ranges of the aircraft. For this, as early as March 1943, a General Reserve 
Engineering Force (GREF) had been created operating directly under GHQ India 
' ... charged with all airfield and road construction in Assam•.28 Where possible roads 
would also be needed, not only on the general lines of communication but also as 
feeder routes from any advanced supply airfields. Airfields required specialised forms 
of runway surfaces if they were to remain operational, especially during the Monsoon. 
The Japanese believed there were over one hundred and thirty airfields in eastern 
India (Bengal and Assam) by the end of 1943. In addition, a significant change in 
tactics seems, according to the Japanese, to have taken place. To disperse aircraft, 
27 Slim Papers, Box 6/3, CCC. Letter from Brig. Gen Evans, CCTF to Slim, 1st June 1945. 
28 Robin Higham, Bases of Air Strategy: Building Airfields for the RAF 1914-1945. Shrewsbury, Airlife 1998. 
p. 209. 
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airfields described by Masa Tanaka as 'fortress airfields' seem to have been 
constructed and were made up of, up to three close-linked airstrips connected by 
'taxiways'. 29 This, they thought, was done to make any Japanese attempts to attack 
aircraft on the ground much more difficult. 
The tyre pressures of British aircraft were half that of the American aircraft such as 
the Liberators that were now beginning to be used and the American aircraft caused 
problems, ' ... the RAF had managed to keep tyre pressures [for bombers] at 43-45lb 
psi ... , the USAAF B-17s carried 85 lb psi ... and that put much more stress on the 
taxitracks [and the runways]'.30 Although this comment refers to the UK during 1943-
45, similar problems were occurring in maintaining runways and taxi tracks on 
airfields in India and Burma. The reason was that the British aircraft used 'balloon' 
type tyres which had a much bigger 'footprint', which spread the weight of the aircraft 
over a bigger area, than those used on American aircraft . Tyre pressures of the 
Spitfire Vs and Hurricanes in Burma were 51-55 psi. and the Auster used by the AOP 
squadrons and the L-5s used by the USAAF had tyre pressures as low as 12-13 psi, 
which were ideal for rough landing strips.31 Fortunately the C-47 Dakotas transport 
aircraft were also equipped with 'balloon' type tyres at 50 psi. Originally produced as 
a commercial airliner in 1935, the Dakota was designed to operate from grass airfields 
when necessary and was equipped with 'balloon' tyres, as few airfields in the US had 
hard runways in the early 1930s.32 Japanese aircraft, including the Nakajima Ki-43 
Hayabusa Oscar fighter, appear to have also been equipped with tyres that similarly 
used about 50 psi and presumably for the same reason, to operate from airfields not 
equipped with hard runways.33 
The runway problem was partly resolved by the use of Perforated Steel Plate (PSP) 
but, when advanced airfields were being constructed in a hurry, PSP had to be 
airlifted in and due to its weight took a considerable portion of the available airlift 
capacity. There was a lighter alternative, Bithess, bituminised hessian strips used 
elsewhere but made in India using local jute as a substitute hessian. This material was 
also found to be stronger than that sent from the UK and provided an adequate 
29 OCMH Japanese Monograph No. 64, op. cif. p. TJ7. This was a Japanese perception, there seems to be no 
Allied reference to this form of airfield construction , however the Japanese certainly constructed camouflaged 
aircraft dispersal areas at some distance from their main airfields with connecting taxi-tracks. 
30 Higham, ibid. p. 60. 
31 Interview with Mr. 'Cluis' Morris, Chief Eng., Shuttleworth Trust, 5 Sept. 2000. The Trust are the only 
organisation in the world to fly a Spitfire from a grass airfield. This figure was also confirmed by Mr. Stephen 
Gray, IWM Duxford. Interview 6 Sept. 2000 .. 
32 Interview 16th August 2000. in reference to Dakaota aircraft with Mr. David Eales Chief Eng., Air Atlantique. 
Air Atlantique.are a Coventry based airline operating seven C-47 Dakotas. 
33 Private correspondence with Col. Scott Willey, UASAF (rtd.) NASM, who also contacted Robert Mikesh, 
former Curator NASM. Apparently this pmticular aspect of Japanese aircraft had never raised before. Also private 
correspondence with N01man Petersen, EAA Museum, Oshkosh ,Wise. 
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runway surface for a limited time. During the monsoon PSP became a necessity and 
was laid directly on top of the Bithess. 
Even with the lower tyre pressures commonly used by British aircraft, the Spitfire 
with its narrow track undercarriage required a reasonably level and hard surfaced PSP 
runway if damage to aircraft was to be avoided. According to an RAF engineering 
officer on a Spitfire squadron, PSP runways were a necessity for Spitfires due to the 
fighters narrow wheel track.34 Not only had these surfacing materials to be flown in, 
but also mechanical equipment such as small Bulldozers and Graders that were 
necessary for construction. Airfield construction was labour intensive and this was 
only mitigated by using such specialised equipment. 35 During the second Chindit 
expedition at Broadway for example, this form of equipment was flown in by Gliders 
in the first wave to enable a landing strip suitable for Dakotas to be prepared. During 
the siege of Imphal the fair weather airfields had to be kept open during the pre-
Monsoon rain and as PSP was too heavy and took to great a proportion of the 
available load capacity bithess was flown in as an emergency measure. It was laid 
' ... directly on the mud and it worked'. 36 The building of air strips was now recognised 
as being vital to the persecution of the campaign and serious consideration was given 
to how this was to be accomplished. 
The planning, selection and construction of transport aircraft strips [during the 
advance into Burma] demanded the closest co-operation between Army and 
the Air force. This policy was agreed at joint Army/Air Force conference in 
January [1945], 221 Group [RAF] approved the chosen sites in relation to 
available fighter cover and obtained photographic coverage. Following this 
the Combat Cargo task Force was [to be] contacted to agree a date from which 
the transport aircraft could start to fly-in.•37 
The supply of the aviation 'white' fuel was also a vital air requirement which took up 
part of the airlift capacity and therefore required a co-operative effort from the army. 
Because of the limited range of the vital air superiority fighter, the Spitfire, fuel had 
to be flown in to the forward airfields by C-47 Dakotas in 44 gall drums due to a lack 
of ground communications or POL pipelines. The fuel was often transferred to petrol 
bowsers but frequently had to be manually pumped into the aircraft's fuel tanks.38 But 
it didn't stop there, the Monsoon made for the highly dangerous problem for aircraft 
34 Interview with Mr. Goodman, 18 August 2000. 
35 Extensive use of PSP was confirmed by F/0 Goodman. PSP was also known to the Ame1icans as Marston Mat. 
Higham op.cit. p. 125. 
36 Higham, op.cit. p.232. 
37 PRO AIR 23/4438. 
38 Goodman interview, op.cit. 
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' of water contaminating aviation fuel when being transferred from one form of 
receptacle to another such as a Bowser, drum or aircraft fuel tank. This was overcome 
by filtering through chamois leather, and refuelling was very labour intensive for the 
ground crews.39 When Japanese airfields were captured the on-site aviation fuel was 
found to be of an unsuitable quality. To raise the fuel rating to 87 octane Japanese oil 
engineers heavily leaded the petrol and as such it was deemed to be unsuitable for 
allied aircraft engines which used 100 octane fuel. Japanese aviation spirit was 
therefore usually allocated for the use of the motor transport. 40 It follows from all of 
this that the demands from both the army and the air forces on the load allocations of 
the air transport were considerable and plagued with conflicting priorities. Without air 
transport the army lost the major part of its necessary logistic support, consequently 
the key was the construction of airfields and pipeline POL supply. These were 
problems could only be resolved with a complete understanding of the exigency at 
any given time and depended on total co-operation between the services. 
The building of forward air bases was a critical problem in Burma as the army moved 
forward and ' ... the progress of the soldiers was governed as much by the speed which 
new airfields could be hacked out... and transport aircraft could land supplies and 
evacuate wounded, as by anything else.'41 The short operational ranges of the British 
fighters was a persistent handicap especially with a continuous front of over seven 
hundred miles, the equivalent to the longest in any allied theatre, the Russian Front.42 
This partly changed when the first Beaufighter squadron appeared and later when the 
American fighters, the P-38s, P-47s and P-Sls reached the Theatre. All the 
constructional effort was to be later recognised in a letter of appreciation from 
General Evans to General Slim, 
The zeal displayed by your forward airfield engineers in constructing new 
fields in record-breaking time, the excellence of the completed fields, and the 
fine co-operation demonstrated in conforming as far as possible to our every 
request in the matter of specifications and details of construction and 
maintenance, were a source of constant gratification to me and my staff, and 
to our operating squadrons.43 
The necessary fuel supply was the life blood of the air forces and this also applied to 
those airfields providing the bases for the 'Hump' route and for this pipelines had to 
be laid to them. To an extent the need for pipelines was overcome in Assam, where 
39 Goodman interview, ibid. 
40 Interview with Mr. Goose, 8 September 2000 . 
41 Higham, op.cit. p. 239. 
42 Slim, Defeat into Victory, op. cit ., p. 541. 
43 Slim Papers, Box 6/3, CCC. Letter to Lt.Gen. Slim from Brig. Gen. Fred W. Evans, USAAF commanding the 
Combat Cargo Task Force, dated 1 June 1945. 
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there was a Bmmah Oil Company refinery at the port of Chittagong which produced 
87 octane fuel, and was capable of taking oil tankers bringing in 100 octane.44 Oil 
Tankers were also permanently docked there to act as fuel farms for aviation (White) 
fuel. To put the problem into context, the C-47 Dakota transport aircraft used by the 
RAF with an economic operational range of 250 miles required 800 gallons of 100 
octane aviation fuel, the equivalent of eighteen 44 gallon drums. 
Not everyone agreed with Evan's assessment, AM Baldwin in his Dispatch of June 
1944 emphatically states that at that time one area of RAF dissatisfaction with the 
Army was in the construction of airfields. His view was that, 
... army commanders often diverted labour and materials from the construction 
work without prior consultation with the air force and that the first that they 
often knew of the cessation of work was when it actually happened.45 
His point was that the only way that this situation would be resolved was when all 
airfield construction work was placed under RAF control. The vital importance of 
airfields to the land battle was not always appreciated by the army, although it would 
be reasonable to surmise the reverse could be true with road construction. The 
construction programme was further compounded by the demands to build sufficient 
airfields to supply China via the 'Hump' air route. 
Arakan Offensive and Operation Ha-Go 
Apart from the Arakan offensive, during 1944 there were decisive and successful co-
operative actions during the Chindit operation and the air supply of Imphal. These 
coupled with air superiority were to change the whole course of the war in Burma. Of 
the on-going air transport operation in 1943 and early 1944 in the Arakan, to air 
supply the 81st West African Division in the Kaladan Valley and the 'Admin Box' of 
the 7th Indian Division in the Mayu Peninsular, only that of the 81st Division had 
been planned. This situation was to be exacerbated during February 1944 when 
Wingate's second expedition behind Japanese lines had been arranged. Whilst the 
Arakan battle was being air supplied and fought out, Wingate's force had to be 'flown-
in'. This was to be on a much bigger scale than the previous operation in 1943 and 
was now at divisional strength which placed an added strain on the transport 
squadrons that were available. The whole air supply operation now required very 
careful planning. In addition, to ensure the protection of the vulnerable transport 
aircraft, fighter cover had to be provided. However within days of the 'fly-in' of the 
44 1-Iigham, op.cit. p. 232. This refinery produced 87 octane fuel which could be used for motor transport and 
light aircraft, 100 octane had to be transported from Abijan and the US. 
45 PRO AIR 23/1928. Ba1dwin Dispatch. 
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Chindits in March, General Mutaguchi had launched his attack on Imphal, Operation 
U-Go which had been timed to start three weeks after Ha-Go had been initiated. 46 
Once the only road supply route from Dimapur in the north had been cut, Imphal was 
under siege and also had to be supplied by air . Thus within some three months and in 
four operations, the air force and air supply had become the major component of the 
war in Burma. It cannot be stressed too highly that literally everything depended on it. 
For a critical three months all depended on the success or failure of air supply and on 
this the whole balance of the war in south-east Asia was to hang. 
The second 'Chindit', Long Range Penetration Operation Thursday 
'During the winter of 1943-44 there had been a shift in American policy, no longer 
were the supplies to China solely just to keep her in the war, but also to build airbases 
and stocks from which the newly operational B-29 Superfortresses would bomb Japan 
from the mainland. Myitkyina was an important element in this new strategy, it would 
enable an increase of flow of supplies on a revised 'Hump' route and China would also 
be supplied by a new 4 inch POL petrol pipeline from Ledo. The intention was for the 
American constructed road from Ledo via the Hukawng Valley to connect with and 
thus re-open the Burma Road. Operation Thursday' was part of a series of operations 
to extend the offensive in north Burma to support Stilwell's advance on Myitkyina. As 
Myitkyina and its airfield shortened the route over the Himalayas to China it was a 
vital part of the US plans. At the same time the offensive in the Arakan was a prelude 
to future air support operations to cover the Rangoon area. 47 
Operation Thursday was a much larger affair than the first Chindit incursion for it 
required two thirds of the 'Chindit' Division, known officially as Special Force to be 
flown in.48 The 'Chindits' , supplied by air, were to establish two semi-pem1anent 
bases from which to attack and cut the Japanese lines of communication, primarily 
the railway from Rangoon to Myitkyina. to support to Stilwell"s advance. It was an 
innovative and ambitious plan and one which relied completely on air supply 
supplemented by air support when requested. For this particular task a special air 
force unit, the 1st Air Commando USAAF under the command of Colonel Cochran 
had been established by General Amold for a ninety day support operation. The Air 
Commando also included four helicopters, the first to be used in any theatre of war. 
Air evacuation became easier and for example, ' ... TSgt. Hladovcak [a USAAF 
Enlisted pilot] moved the[three British] wounded soldiers to a clearing where they 
46 See Alien, Burma, op. cif., p.17l. The Japanese 15th Division was late in joining 15th Army and caused over a 
weeks delay. 
47 At this time 'Extended Capital' was only a possible option. 
48 The first operation was at Brigade strength. 
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could be evacuated one at a time by helicopter.'49 For the airborne operation Dakota 
'tug' aircraft and gliders were brought forward to airfields as close as possible to the 
front line. To maintain the secrecy and security it was essential that Japanese aircraft 
would not be able to observe the assembly of the aircraft on these airfields. By using 
radar to give early warning of the approach of hostile aircraft and Spitfires fighters to 
intercept, enemy air reconnaissance was successfully denied. 
One brigade of the force was to march in from the north during February and on the 
evening of the 5th March 1944 the first wave would be flown in by gliders of the 
American 1st Air Commando to a point some one hundred and fifty miles behind 
Japanese lines. 50 Each Dakota towed two loaded gliders but themselves were not able 
to carry any load. The first wave, in addition to troops, were also transporting 
bulldozers to prepare landing strips. This would enable the Dakotas to land and bring 
in the bulk of the men and equipment. 51 Two strongholds had been defined as the 
first landing places and code named 'Broadway' and 'Aberdeen', however at the 'last 
minute' Aberdeen was found to be obstructed and only 'Broadway' was used. Most of 
the gliders were damaged on landing due to ruts across the landing strip but, by the 
following evening the airstrip was able to take Dakotas and sixty two landed 900 
men, 100 mules and 20 tons of stores. 52 That same night the second glider force was 
flown to Chowringhee, seventy miles further south, again to also prepare a Dakota 
landing strip. By the 11th March 660 RAF and USAAF Dakota sorties had been made 
carrying 9,000 men, 1,350 animals and 250 tons of stores, each sortie being a round 
trip for the Dakota crews of some 500 miles. 53 As a measure of the air transport effort 
required to support the whole operation, between February and August 1944, 212 tons 
of supplies were landed and 7982 tons were dropped to Special Force. 54 Operating 
with the force were RAF teams comprising wireless operators, and Liaison Officers 
(LO) who were all pilots, who co-ordinated the supply drops and called in air 
49 USAF, AFEHRI File 1 OO.D25, p. 9. 
50 Kirby, vol. III, op.cit. n.l, p.l75-8 1. It was planned that forty gliders (sixty two actually took off on the first 
night) would land at each of the two landing strips. Thirty five reached their destination. The flight was made at 
night to reduce the chance of interception by enemy fighters . Kirby gives the normal load for the Waco Hadrian 
glider as twenty five fully equipped men or 4,500lbs of stores and may have confused this aircraft with the Horsa 
as Thetford disputes the number of men carried by the Hadrian probably correctly giving the figure as thirteen 
trooops. Thetford, op. cit., p.' 660. Alien, op. cit., p. 326, gives the figure seveteen with t11e pilot making eighteen. 
Two pilots were normally used. Gerard M. Devlin, Silent Wings: The Stmy of the Glider Pilots of World War If, 
London, Alien 1985. p. 63. Michael Hickey, Out of the Sky: A Histmy of Airborne Wmfare, London, Mills and 
Boon 1979. p. 101, gives the figure as fouteen men and a handcart. 
51 The Hollywood child film star of the thirties, Jackie Coogan , piloted the first glider to land in this operation. 
Ephraim Katz, The Macmillan International Film Encyclopedia, New Edition, London, Harper Coli ins 1994, 
Fourth printing 1996. pp. 284-5. Devlin, op. cif., p. 154. 
52 Kirby, ibid, p. 181. 
53 Narrative 4 p. 157 quoted by Probert op. cit. p.176. 
54 Compiled from tables in Kirby, vol . Ill, op.cit. pp. 513-4. 
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/ strikes. 55 Throughout the operation Special Force was directly supported by 
Cochran's 1st Air Commando and the RAF. The difficulties of finding the DZs in the 
jungle clad valleys and dangers of flying the air drop sorties during the Monsoon 
cannot be underrated and a number of transport aircraft were lost at this time due to 
weather. 
Perhaps little recognised by historians were the solitary operations of the American L-
5 pilots of the Air Commando who, in very small aircraft continuously flew out 
casualties. Later this job was undertaken by 194 squadron RAF also flying L-5s when 
the 1st Air Commando were withdrawn. The L-5 Sentinel was a light aircraft flown 
by the American Liaison squadrons of which there were three in the CBI Theater. 
Operated with one pilot, it would carry two stretchers cases. This air and army effort 
was of particular importance to the ethos of co-operation, and perhaps best summed 
up as, ' ... a long and happy relationship with our "mercy-pilots". 56 The 150 pilots of 
these aircraft were nearly all enlisted pilots (Sergeants), an unusual situation in the 
USAAF where all pilots were normally officers. 57 The ordinary foot soldier would 
often be in close proximity to both the aircraft and the pilot, and aware of the dangers 
he faced when there were,' ... taut moments as the planes came in to land on a strip 
they had never seen before ... ', to which would be added the often life saving and 
emotive evacuation of a casualty.58 They were seen as ' ... the linchpin of the whole 
operation and were a bigger factor in sustaining morale than anything else•.59 In the 
China-Burma-India Theater (CBI) ' ... the pilots of the three L-5liaison squadrons of 
the USAAF evacuated some 4220 casualties in addition to their other duties, not a 
mean undertaking by any standards but particularly so in this CBI area.'60 A typical 
example of their rescue operations occurred when the allied crossing of the lrrawaddy 
river took place in February 1945. Many of the assault craft were swept away and 
came under fire from the enemy. 'Light planes did, in fact, save many of the wounded 
from the catastrophe into which the boats had led them. Americans piloting L-5s 
picked them up off the sandbanks and brought them to safety, .. .' At the same time 
55 The RAF teams used the big American bred 14.5 hands artillery mules to carry their radio, batteries, and 
charging engines. Unlike local mules, these could not feed off the land and had to have fodder air dropped, and 
this occupied supply capacity. This is why moutain artillery batteries did not accompany Chindit columns, each 
gun required eight mules. See Pat Carmichael op.cit., pp. 3-4. These mules consume half a bale a day and a bale 
weighs approximately 30 lb. and are 4.5 to 5cu. ft. I am indebted to Dr. M. Comes for this infom1ation but see also 
Marabel Hadfield, The Manual of Horsemanship, 9th ed., Buckingham, Kenilworth 1950, reprint 1991. 
56 Richard Rhodes-Jarnes, Chindit, London, John Murray 1980. p.45. 
57 Private correpondence with Richard P. Hallion, Chief Historian ,USA F. Ken Wakefield, The Fighting 
Grasshoppers:US Liaison Aircraft Operations in Europe, 1942-1945, Leicester, Midland Counties 1990, pp. 21-2. 
Lee Arbon, They Also Flew: The Enlisted Pilot Legacy 1912-1942, Washington, Smithsonian Institute 1992, 
passim . 
58 Rhodes-James, ibid, p.81. 
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/ Allied aircraft, by using close air support kept the Japanese from using their machine 
guns and artillery on the rescue efforts. 61 This form of co-operation was even more 
personal than with the Dakota crews who were continually flying in air supply but, of 
necessity, needed bigger landing strips. 
The RAF often made efforts to get casualties out using innovative procedures not 
always appreciated by higher command. 62 In June 1944 for example, at the height of 
the Monsoon it proved difficult to evacuate casualties as the Chindits were 
withdrawing north from Aberdeen and the landing grounds were too waterlogged to 
land aircraft. A plan was formulated by Sqn.Ldr. Jennings, a Chindit column RAF 
officer, to fly Sunderland flying boats from the Bramaputra River in Assam to Lake 
lndawgwi in north Burma to evacuate casualties. Two Sunderlands, affectionately 
named by the Chindits as Gert and Daisy, undertook this task and 537 sick and 
wounded were air lifted out. 63 This operation alone illustrates the levels of co-
operation between the RAF and the army. But, further to this, DH. 82 Tiger Moths 
were used to evacuate casualties from Tiddim in 1944 by adapting this two seat bi-
plane training aircraft to carry a single stretcher case in the upper level of the fuselage 
behind the pilot.64 As an RAF 3 TAF Operational Instruction stated, 
The air evacuation of casualties from forward areas is a service of 
considerable military value, since it frees fighting formations for action, and 
leaves them unfettered by the need to care for casualties, moreover, it aids the 
recovery of casualties and reduces the time before they can return to duty. 65 
It went on to state that where airstrips were too short for transport aircraft, light 
aircraft (L-5s or similar) were to be used. 
During the second Chindit operation, a section of Spitfires were sent to operate from 
the 'Broadway' airstrip.66 These were soon under repeated air attacks as the early 
warning radar coverage was limited and they had to be withdrawn after a few days. 
This air operation was to cause an altercation between Cochran and Wingate, as 
Cochan thought that the operation had been badly planned and that Wingate was 
responsible. When confronted by Cochran, who accused him of going against their 
61 Alien, Burma: The Longest war 1941-1945, op.cit. p. 418. 
62 Apart from the RAF officer with the Chindits, none of the aircrew involved received any awards. 
63 Sir Arthur Salisbury MacNalty(editor) and W. Franklin Melior, Medical Services in War: The Pricipal 
Medical Lessons of the Second World War, Edited by HMSO 1%8, p. 570. There is some slight descrepancy in 
casualty figures but see also, Rhodes-James, ibid, p.159, and Probert, op cit. p.181. Jennings was awarded the MC. 
Gert and Daisy were two popular British comediennes of the day. 
64 Ian Lyall Grant, Burma: The Turning Point, Chichester, Zampi 1993. See two photographs between pp. 150-
151. This was not as innovative as it may seem, the RAF had first used this system in British Somaliland in 1920 
and later in the thirties on the NW Frontier of India, albeit with the bi-plnes then currently in use. See RAF 
Historical Society Journal Nos. 22 and 23, dated 2000 and 2001 respectively. pp 11-12 and pp 132-4. 
65 PRO AIR 23/2075 Operational Instructions 1944, Nos. 12-18. Instruction No. 13. 
66 This wa~ to provide air cover. 
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agreed spirit of co-operation and trust, Wingate agreed and apologised, to use 
Cochran's words, ' He looked me straight in the eye and said, "I did didn't I?" That 
just cut me off...He put on a good one'. 67 Cochran confessed that he had already 
planned for American P-5ls to operate from the air strip to give close air support. He 
firmly believed that this could have been effectively carried out by flying in the 
aircraft at dusk and then taking off the following dawn when they would carry out air 
strikes and immediately fly back to their base in Assam during the day. In this way 
they would not be open to ground attack, as the Spitfires actually 'stationed ' at 
Broadway were. Cochran likened the Japanese reaction to counter-air action, 'You're 
just waving a red flag at a bull'. 68 But on a fuel supply basis alone it would seem that 
Cochran was right. 69 His summing up of his relationship with Wingate after this was, 
' ... certainly a little bit of a different relationship after that, but a good one, still a solid 
one•.70 Of particular value during the operation had been the fact that the US aircraft 
were equipped with HJF radios and could talk to the ground troops directly which 
meant that targets or DZ adjustments could be made on the spot, a facility not 
available to the RAF with VHF radio sets. 71 This period showed the level which co-
operation had reached. An RAF officer on the ground at 'Broadway' identified the 
surrounding Japanese positions, he was flown out and then guided Cochran's p-51 
Mustangs of the USAAF in to destroy them. This demonstrates that not only was co-
operation working at inter-service level but also between the air forces.72 At the end 
of May the 1st Air Commando, at Pierse's instigation, were withdrawn having flown 
1,904 sorties in support of the 'Chindits'. This was not just an in-theatre military 
decision, there were political issues at stake. Cochran had been outspoken in his 
views of Peirse and Slim, views which had reached General Amold and to an extent 
confirmed some of his own views on operations in Burma. Nevertheless, Cochran 
makes it clear that he would have preferred to have stayed on, he and his aircrews not 
only got on well with the Chindits but were fully committed to them. 
During September the last of Special force had been withdrawn having been kept on 
through the Monsoon, something which they had been promised would not happen. 
They were then used to attack the Japanese who were in prepared defensive positions. 
They were neither fit enough nor equipped for this and this retention of the force was 
largely as a result of politics. The force Commander wished to keep it in being and 
67 AFHRATranscript of taped interview with Col. Cochran at Maxwell Air Force Base USAF, Alabama, 21st 
October 1975. p. 278. 
68 AFHRACochran interview,ibid, p. 276. 
69 The operational range of a Spitfire was such that fuel had to be flown in. 
70 AFHRA Cochran interview, ibid. p.278. 
71 Shelford Bidwell, The Chindit War, London, Hodder& Staughton 1991. p. 123. 
72 Alien, Burma:The Longest war 1941-1945, op.cit. p. 352. 
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withdraw but Stilwell, under whose command they had fallen, was determined to 
extract the maximum from them to attack Myitkyina in spite of recommendations to 
the contrary from his own staff. Undoubtedly the Chindit forces did have a problem 
when attempting to do battle in an orthodox manner for they were equipped as a 
mobile force and did not have heavy weaponry. This was to have been be 
compensated for by the use of close air support, 
... all along we were very conscious of our lack of heavy weapons, having 
nothing bigger than the Vickers machine gun and the 3-inch mortar. These 
were splendid weapons, but against the Japanese 75-mm and 105-mm they 
seemed a trifle inadequate. The need was partly filled by our magnificent air 
support, but only partially, and the troops were glad of any weapon which 
would strengthen our fire power. Our hitting power was conditioned by our 
mobility, and the two were constantly at loggerheads. 73 
The success of the Special Force operations remains a debatable subject but there can 
be no doubt of the success of the air supply and evacuation operations and the very 
high levels of co-operation which existed between the army and the airforce, 
especially the Air Commando and the RAF, on which Special Force mostly 
depended. 74 
The 1st Air Commando had been formed in India in early September 1943 and 
commanded by the Colonel Philip G. Cochran USAAF.It was virtually a self-
contained composite unit and consisted of thirty P-51 Mustang fighter-bombers, 
twelve Mitchell medium bombers, thirteen C-47 Dakotas, twelve C-46 Commandos, 
one hundred L-5 Sentinel light aircraft, six helicopters and two hundred and twenty-
five gliders.75 An unusual air force officer ' .. . the legendary Philip Cochran' had been 
a successful fighter pilot leader in North Africa. 76 His other claim to fame was that he 
was the role model for the American cartoonist Milton Caniffs strip cartoon, 'Terry 
and the Pirates' character Colonel Flip Corkin. This was syndicated throughout the 
US during the war and partly used to inform the American public of the war in the 
China, Burma and India (CBI).77 He had been selected by General H. H. 'Hap' Amold 
USAAF for the particular task of supporting General Wingate's operations and for 
this reason was not part of the USAAF lOth Air Force but operated as an independent 
command in direct contact with General Arnold. This did not cause him to be popular 
in the USAAF in India, but he stuck to his mandate and ignored the orders from 
73 Rhodes-James, op.cit. p. 44. 
74 RAF aircraft continued to fly support operations when the Air Commando was withdrawn. 
75 Kirby, vol. Ill, op.cit. p. 38, fn. 3. 
76 John L. Frisbee, Makers of the United States Air Force, Washington OC, Office of Air Force History, reprint 
by Air Force History and Museums Program 19%. p. 234. 
77 Joseph Dracott, A Cartoon War, London, Leo Cooper. 1989. pp. 52-3. 
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General Still well to also operate in support of the latter's offensive from the north. It 
was notable that Cochran had not been promoted to a Brigadier rank as the 
commander of a unit of the size of the Air Commando because there was a USAAF 
policy of rank being in-line with their counter-parts and an RAF force of this size 
would normally have been ·commanded by an Air Commodore. It appears that this 
was mainly due to the American theatre command, in fact reportedly even General 
Wingate had recommended Cochran be promoted. Cochran himself suggested that he 
was probably seen as an 'outlander'. 78 The 1st Air Commando were undoubtedly an 
unusual unit and was criticised in some quarters as being Wingate's private air force, 
but under the circumstances there was clearly a need for a special relationship 
between the air force and the men in often precarious situations, on the ground. That 
relationship demanded a very high degree of co-operation not only from the air 
commando but also for those RAF transport squadrons which were involved. 
Operation U-Go. 
However, another threat was looming at this juncture as the Japanese were about to 
launch a major offensive, to capture the Imphal Area with is vast supply dumps and 
the railway route from India to Assam as part of what has popularly, if erroneously 
been called, 'The March on India' or Operation U-Go. For 3 TAF it turned out to be a 
balancing act and the fly-in of Wingate's forces was completed just before the 
Japanese offensive took place. The situation quickly became precarious for IV Corps, 
the British force on the Imphal Plain, and it was soon realised that it would be 
necessary to obtain substantial reinforcements. The nearest battle-hardened troops to 
hand were the 5th Indian Division in the Arakan. The Japanese 'ploy' having been 
successfully defused in that area, these troops could be withdrawn without causing a 
serious situation in the Arakan, but speed was of the essence. The problem was 
transport, how to transfer the Division quickly enough to be effective on the Central 
Front at Imphal. With the considerable help of US aircraft diverted from the 'Hump' 
route by the Supreme Commander, Admiral Mountbatten, 3rd TAF were able to 
move by air, both the 5th and then 7th Indian Divisions from the Arakan to the 
Imphal Plain and to help to bring forward from India, XXXIII Corps and the British 
2nd Division. Once again the Japanese High Command had failed to take into account 
the effect of air transport on the land battle. 
The scale of the All-lndia Congress Party led insurrection, the Satyagraha, in 1942 
suggests that had the Japanese entered India with the Indian National Army (INA) as 
78 AFHRA Cochran Interview, op.cil. pp. 304-6 
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its spearhead, the security of north-east India could not have been guaranteed.79 The 
control of the uprising in India had needed fifty two infantry battalions. The majority 
of the fighting and L of C troops in Burma were Indian but unlike those in Malaya 
they had not been subjected to Japanese and Nationalist propaganda by the F 
Kikan .. 80 Nevertheless, fated with the possibility of independence where would their 
loyalties have been? When Americans, such as Cochran, were asked if the Indians 
believed that they were ' ... pulling the English chestnuts out of the fire ... ' answered, 'I 
think that's close( ... ) there was some separation of unanimity on this campaign.'81 For 
many Indians it was not a question of supporting Japanese aspirations, it was rather a 
question of divided loyalties, to support the Raj or Indian nationalism and the desire 
for Independence, which was the real problem.82 
In Air Marshal Baldwin's Dispatch covering the air transport operations, it is quite 
clear that Air Transport had become a major component of the air operations of 3 
T AF. To this end Troop Carrier Command (TCC) was created on 15th December 
1943 by order of the HQ of Eastern Air Command in compliance with a Directive 
from HQ SEA C. This did not come under the control of 3rd Tactical Air Force until 
the middle of 1944. 
The Command was charged with the task of providing air transportation for 
airborne and air transit forces in the support and training of the Army Group, 
S.E.A. and other land and air forces included in the operations in Burma. The 
Command was empowered with operational control over American Troop 
Carrier Squadrons and British Transport Squadrons to be assigned to it. 83 
79 See Alien, Burma, op. cit., pp. 169-70. Lt. Gen. Sujiyama Hajime of the JIGS thought that the Indians would go 
over to Bose. The Indian States of Manipur and Assam in north-east India contained all the road and rail links to 
the Arakan and the Central front. Satyagraha, 'truth force', epitomised by passive resistance, the reality was 
violence. Over 20,000 Indian soldiers were recruited from Japanese POW camps after the fall of Singapore. See 
James Morris, Farewell the Trumpets, London, Faber and Faber 1978, p.281. Moorhouse, op.cit., p. 184. Fuller, 
op. cif., pp. 199-200. A.J. Barker says that the INA was about 30,000 strong. See A.J.Barker, The March on Dehli, 
London, Faber and Faber 1%3. p.252. Mohan Singh, the original commander of the INA, states that the INA 
were 45,000 strong. These figures are not confirmed, and were challenged by Wavell who said the numbers did 
not exceed 20,000. Most were Sikhs. The INA also provided guards for Changi POW Goal and 1,000 AA gunners 
for Singapore. Mr. Ellsworth confirmed the presence of Sikh guards. Ellsworth interview. Mohan Singh, Soldiers 
Contribution to Independence: The Epic oft he Indian National Army, New Dehli, Army Education Stores 1974, 
3rd. ed. 1975. p. 112. Paul H. Kratoska, The Japanese Occupation of Malaya: A Social and Economic Hist01y, 
London, Hurst 1998. pp. 104-5 
80 F Kikan (Fujiwara Agency). Fujiwara suggests that he had recruited over 5,000 Indian soldiers to the Japanese 
cause by the time that Kuala Lumpur fell in January 1942. He further suggests that Chandra Bose influenced 
Kawabe and Mutaguchi's decision to invade India. Fujiwara Iwaichi, F. Kikan: Japanese Army Intelligence 
Operations in Southeast Asia in World War Two, Hong Kong, Heinemann Asia 1983. p. xv and p.xxiii. In this 
context Kikan is an Agency. This translation is confirmed by Dr. D. Mills. Senkichiro Katsuma, gen. ed., 
Kenkyusha's New Japanese-English Dictionmy, Tokyo, Kenkyusha 1954. p. 813. Conversation with Dr. D. Mills, 
Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, 19 February 2001. 
81 Cochran interview op.cit. p. 356. 
82 Joyce. C. Lebra, Jungle Alliance: Japan and the Indian National Army, Singapore, Asian Pacific Press 1971. 
passim. Although he has some inaccurate military details Lebra illustrates the relationship between the INA and 
the Japanese. 
83 PRO AIR 23/1928 Dispatch Covering Operations qffiengal Comand and Third Tactical Air Force. 
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Brig. Gen. William D. Old was appointed air commander of Troop Carrier Command 
(TCC) placed his HQ at Comilla, India (2nd Jan.'44) deliberately so that it was close 
by HQ 14th Army, 3 TAF and the supply bases. 
The following TCC effort was for the period of January- May 1944 and demonstrates 
the value of the airlift capacity of this Command.84 
1944 Sorties 
Jan. 2013 
Feb. 3014 
Mar 4675 
April 6875 
May 10067 
26,644 
Tonnage 
5660 
10047 
12642 
18476 
22485 
69283 
Troops 
22002 
30665 
59825 
112492 
Casualties 
evacuated 
181 
651 
4788 
8996 
8593 
23209 
The steady increase in the number of sorties reflects the growing capability of the 
transport squadrons, the improving weather as the Monsoon abated and effect of the 
additional squadrons which joined the Command, partly due to the need to switch the 
effort rapidly from supporting the West African Division in the Arakan to the Kohima 
and Imphal areas where, British forces had cut off from their supply .base by the 
Japanese 15th Army. This had every prospect of advancing into India unless the 
ground forces could be supplied and relieved. The new squadrons which joined in the 
air effort were the 315th USAAF (organised from elements of the 1st and 2nd 
Transport squadrons) and 27th squadron direct from the US. Both squadrons went to 
Sylhet (on the Kohima Plain) and were joined there by an Airdrome squadron No.98 
to provide ground support. All arrived at Sylhet in early January. 
As the Dispatch states, 
... three main [air transport] commitments would arise in the near future: The 
supply of a Division about to commence an offensive down the Kaladan 
Valley, The establishment of a large reserve of supplies at Tiddim, the 
initiation of greatly increased supply dropping activities in support of the CAI 
in northern Bunna. In addition the command would have to supply the 16th 
Bde of3rd Indian Div. who would be marching in to Central Burma to meet 
up with Wingate's troops who were to be flown in [by Nol. Air Commando, 
84 ibid. PRO AIR 23/1928 . 
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Cochran] .... Events were occurring, the 7th Ind Div. and other units were 
encircled in the Arakan in February. In two weeks 900 sorties were made in 
the face of intense ground fire. All transport had to fly at relatively low 
altitudes when dropping supplies. C-46s from the Hump were 'borrowed' 
from Feb. to help with the intense demands made upon the Command. In 
April the 5th Div. was moved up to Imphal in 758 sorties. 85 
But it was not only the Transport squadrons which were involved in the defence at 
Imphal. In April 1944 on IV Corps front, 
Vengeances [dive bombers] were also [with Hurribombers] very active 
completing over 2000 sorties and dropping 660 tons of bombs. The bombing 
of the latter [Vengeances] was extremely good and in addition to close support 
tasks, included attacks directed at the [supply] dumps and camps. 86 
General Mutaguchi the Commander of the Japanese 15th Army, described as an 
overly ambitious officer by his contemporaries, planned that by contesting XV Corps 
in the Arakan with Operation Ha-Go he would attract a considerable British force into 
the Arakan area. 87 Whilst the British were thus heavily engaged and before they could 
reinforce the Imphal area, his intention was to launch a major thrust into the Imphal 
Plain. Thus by catching the British off-balance he would win a decisive victory, 
capturing large amounts of materiel and open the route into northern India via 
Assam. 88 Confident that he would be able completely to resupply his army from the 
Imphal supply dumps, he planned for a campaign of only weeks. Motor transport was 
therefore kept to a minimum and extensive use made of cattle which could provide an 
additional food supply for his soldiers.89 
Without doubt the ground forces in Imphal and Kohima were being very hard pressed 
by the Japanese and Slim took the decision to reinforce the garrison with the 5th and 
7th Indian divisions from the Arakan. Realising that the only way that these troops 
could be brought in was by air and that there were not sufficient transport aircraft 
available to him, he appealed to the Supreme Commander Admiral Mountbatten. The 
only available additional transport aircraft in India were those of the USAAF which 
were flying supplies over the Himalayas from India into China. By using his powers 
as Supreme Commander he ordered that a number of these aircraft should temporarily 
85 PRO AIR 23/1928, Baldwin Dispatch Covering Operations of: Bengal Comand until 17th Dec. 1943 and Third 
Tactical Air Force from 18th Dec. 1943-lst June 1944. 
86 PRO AIR 23/2f172, HQ 3 T AF, Operational Statistics. 
87 See Louis Alien's chapter in Fallen Stars, ed. by Brian Bond, op.cit. 
88 In 1943 Mutaguchi had sent Major Fujiwara (formerly ofF Kikan) to reconnoitre the Chindwin.and beyond, 
visualising a possible offensive against lmphal. See Alien, Burma, op.cit., p. 157. 
89 Alien, Burma: The Longest War, op.cit. p. 193. 
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be used for transporting the two divisions from the Arakan to Imphal. It was an 
extremely sensitive issue and threatened with opposition from both the Chinese and 
the Americans. Undoubtedly, it was Mountbatten's determined intervention and 
willingness to take the responsibility for diverting transport aircraft from the 'Hump' 
route, in response to General Slim's plea, that was critical decision in this whole 
operation. This massive use of air power was the undoing of General Mutaguchi and 
was to start the long Japanese withdrawal through Burma. 
lmphal 
The Imphal Valley was of particular significance to any future British offensive for 
two reasons. Imphal itself was within one hundred and thirty road miles south of the 
important railhead at Dimapur with an all-weather road connection and, most crucial 
to the RAF, it had a lower rainfall than the surrounding areas. It was therefore 
possible to construct a number of forward airfields for the forthcoming offensive and 
by late 1943 there were two all-weather airfields and four fair-weather airfields there. 
In early 1944, the HQ of RAF 221 Group moved into the Valley with two Spitfire and 
five Hurricane squadrons. The three Vengeance squadrons of the Group remained 
outside the Valley on airfields in northern Assam. 
The Imphal garrison was 155,000 men, of whom 30,000 were British, as well as 
11,000 horses and mules. Once Imphal was cut-off from Dimapur, supply became a 
major problem. The logistic requirement for the garrison alone was for 250 tons per 
day and the total need was for a minimum of 450 tons per day. This meant 157 daily 
transport sorties. Early on it was obvious that, despite the best efforts of the transport 
squadrons, there was a shortfall in the daily tonnage able to be delivered by air. To 
ease this situation it was decided to reduce the garrison and thereby reduce the daily 
requirements. As a consequence, some 50,000 personnel who were not crucial to the 
defence, 'useless mouths' and 10,000 casualties and sick were flown out to lower the 
daily requirement to 412 tons. Such were the supply shortages that Wellington 
bombers joined the Dakotas of the air transport squadrons to fly in 250lb bombs for 
the use of the Hurribomber squadrons. On the return flights the Dakotas would fly out 
the casualties.90 The objective of the Japanese attack was to cut Imphal off from the 
railhead at Dimapur and isolate the garrison, thereby stopping any reinforcements 
from reaching Imphal. Simultaneous attacks were launched to cut the road at Kohima, 
north of Imphal and capture Tiddim to the south. When the Japanese launched their 
attack,' ... Dakota squadrons were still flying supplies and reinforcements into the ... 
[Special Force] strips, as well as stepping up their supply drops into the [lmphal] 
90 Franks, ibid. p. 85. 
122 
valley and parachute drops into the Kohima garrison.•91 Allied air intelligence was 
becoming more efficient all the time, when the Japanese 15th Army HQ was 
identified and the RAF mounted an air attack on it. 'General Slim later made it clear 
that he didn't want the Jap commanders "bumped off", as he knew how they worked 
and what they were up to and wanted to stay that way'.92 
When the Japanese offensive was launched, the British army were stretched to the 
limit in the Imphal area and this meant that they could not provide protection for the 
airfields. Consequently, some of the airstrips were exposed to shelling and possible 
infiltration by Japanese ground forces. They had very limited early warning and some 
of the squadrons had to be withdrawn from the Imphal Plain and operated from 
outside the valley, whilst others were flown out at night to return in the morning. Had 
units of the RAF Regiment been available the situation would have been less fraught 
for the squadrons. Throughout the siege, the Imphal area was entirely maintained by 
air supply, a situation which was only made possible by gaining air superiority. So the 
original priority to win air superiority had been correct, this was the same lesson 
which had first been learned over the battlefields of France in the first World War. 
During this period the JAAF did not remain quiescent but continually contested the 
air space with raids of twenty to thirty fighters usually escorting two or three 
bombers. They did not however, carry out any ground attacks or close support for 
their army on the ground. Baldwin reports that to reduce the Japanese air strength, 'the 
long range fighters of 224 Group and P-38 Lightning's of the USAAF attacked 
Japanese aircraft returning to their airfields in the Irrawaddy Valley and one squadron 
destroyed 96 Japanese aircraft within six weeks of starting operations•.93 During the 
whole seventy days of the siege the allied air losses were 164 aircraft, of which 40 
crews were safe. Only fourteen of the aircraft losses were due to enemy action. A 
breakdown shows that the losses were: 
77 Hurricanes, 36 Beaufighters, 25 Spitfires, 11 Vegeances, 8 P-Sls Mustangs 
and 7 P-38 Lightnings94. 
The high number of aircraft losses not due to enemy action illustrates the hazards of 
operating aircraft throughout the Monsoon, the weather and the contribution this 
made to the state of the airfields and aircraft. The Hurricane and the three Vengeance 
squadrons were the air units most heavily engaged in close support of the army and 
their higher losses reflect this. The Hurricanes were operating from airfields within 
the Imphal Valley, whereas the Vengeances were operating from airfields outside. In 
91 Franks, ibid, p. 85. 
92 Franks, The Air Bailie of Imphal. op,. cif . p.65. 
93 PRO AIR23/1928. AM Baldwin extracts. p.5 
94 PRO AIR 23/1928 
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spite of their losses the Spitfires had maintained air superiority over the air corridors 
and no transport aircraft had been lost to Japanese fighters. The shortage of artillery 
meant that there was continued reliance on close support aircraft. For example Bailey 
makes the point that, 'Imphal [was] recovered with ten 25pdrs, eleven 3.7 in. 
howitzers and four 2 pdrs.'95 These figures do not equate to the amount of close air 
support that was supplied by the air force whose aircraft were continuously in action 
during the daylight hours. 
Apart from some initial optimistic views from the Japanese Southern Command, any 
attempt to invade India was abandoned by the Japanese once they realised the full 
import of the difficulties of the land communications in the north of Burma. Lacking 
substantial air transport or for that matter the ability to recover air superiority, their 
position in this regard was hopeless. How far the 1943 plan to capture of Imphal 
offered a threat to India is arguable. There is evidence to support the view that the 
invasion of India, Operation U-Go, was never a serious option for the Japanese, it 
had been initiated solely by General Mutaguchi who saw himself as a grand 
strategist.96 Undoubtedly, they still offered a very real threat of air attacks on the 
industrial north-east of India, to Calcutta, to the extensive shipping routes in the Bay 
of Bengal and to the supply routes from India to Assam. 
The generally accepted turning point in the battle of Imphal was the reinforcement of 
the garrison by 5th and 7th Indian divisions from the Arakan. The very fact that 
Mutaguchi had planned to cut the garrison off from the railhead at Dimapur illustrates 
that he did not anticipate the ability of the allied air force to keep the garrison 
supplied by air and transport two army divisions into Imphal within a matter of days. 
Following the Japanese 15th Army defeat a Kohima and Imphal there still remained 
the question of driving the Japanese from south-east Asia. As Supreme Commander, 
Mountbatten in 1944 was determined to develop a strategy within his theatre of 
operations and he presented various options to the Chiefs of Staff at a meeting in 
London in August 1944. Churchill, anxious to ensure British prestige and presence in 
south-east Asia after the final defeat of Japan, favoured a plan to effect a landing in 
Sumatra, Operation Culverin but this was viewed by the COS as being impractical. It 
would require a great deal of backing from the UK which following the invasion of 
95 Bailey., J.B.A., Artille1y and Firepower, The Military Press, Oxford 1949. p.229, fn.l93. Also India only 
produced twelve 3.7 in. howitzers per month, possibly the most useful Allied artillery piece in north Burma. 
96 For an appreciation of this see Meirion and Susie Harries, Soldiers of the Sun, London , Heinemann 199l.and 
Stewart Adrian, The Underrated Enemy, London, William Kimber 1987. pp. 346-7. Alien's chapter in Bond's 
Fallen Stars also confirms this. Chandra Bose of the INA was also very keen on the Japanese attack at Imphal 
seeing it as a way into India. 
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' Europe was not available. For any plan Mountbatten was aware that he needed US 
support. If Culverin was not to be, then as he saw it there were four main options: a 
land offensive from north and central Burma to Mandalay, Operation Capital; a 
combined air and sea assault to capture Rangoon, Operation Dracula; a further 
offensive from north Arakan, Operation Romulus, or an assault to capture Akyab in 
early 1945, Operation Talon. 
During the battle for Imphal, Stilwell and his American-Chinese force in the north 
had been advancing south along the Hukawng Valley, also known locally as was the 
Kabaw Valley, as the 'Valley of Death', towards Myitkyina whilst at the same time 
Wingate's forces were cutting the Japanese lines of communication to Myitkyina from 
the south. 97 After Myitkyina and its airfield had been captured in May 1944, the 
airfield became operational and between May and October operated 14,000 sorties to 
China, an airlift of 40,000 tons . 98 Aware of the new air bases being constructed in 
China and in an attempt to forestall this plan, the Japanese had launched Operation 
Ichi-Go. The airlift was essential if Japanese aims in China were to be thwarted.99 
The various demands being made on the air transport in this theatre could clearly only 
be met by intense and willing co-operation between the army and the air force to 
accommodate and adjust to the changing requirements. 
In 1944, the counter-air strategy was also beginning to be to the advantage of the 
Allied air force. The longer operational ranges of the Beaufighters and Thunderbolts 
of the RAF, and the P-38 Lightnings and P-51 Mustangs of the USAAF, meant that 
the Japanese airfields could be attacked. Japanese aircraft now had to be stationed 
further than ever away from the 'front line' and were therefore, unless staged forward, 
less liable to attack the Allied airfields. According to Masa Tanaka this had been 
common practice for part of the Japanese air force from 1943, ' ... our bombers 
advanced in the evenings (to front bases), commenced their attack at dawn and 
returned to rear bases in the evenings.' 100 Although expensive in aviation fuel it was 
clearly an effective way of avoiding losses on the ground. 
As far as the campaign was concerned, the counter-air operation was now showing 
bigger dividends than strategic bombing. By this time the effective use of the strategic 
bomber force must have been in question, ' ... heavy bombers were never adept at the 
97 Unlike the Kabaw Valley, this referred to a local massacre. 
98 C. F. Romanus and R. Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems, Washington DC, 1956. p. 228 and quoted by 
Alien, op.cit. p.366. Note, these are sh01t tons or 2000 lb. 
99 Alien, Burma: The Longest War 1941 -1945, op.cit. p. 400-1. 
100 PRO AIR 23/8455. Japanese Monograph No. 64, p. 298, 
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task [destroying bridges]'.l01 Some Liberator squadrons were being switched to SD 
and used in SOE operations.I02 The JAAF was now beginning to suffer from 
insupportable levels of attrition similar to those of the RAF in 1941 and 1942. This 
was to result in almost continuous air superiority over the forward airfields and 
transport corridors, and transport aircraft were able to fly with less threat of fighter 
attack. An important facet was the, by now, extensive Radar coverage and early 
warning operated by the British on the Burma front, which gave notice of most 
Japanese air threats. 
The siege of Imphal had been broken by the combined efforts of the air force, the 
garrison and IV Corps, with XXXIII Corps from the north relieving Kohima and this 
had seriously reduced the fighting capability of the Japanese 15th Army. This created 
an opportunity for an offensive into central Burma and, therefore, the next moves 
against the Japanese had now to be seriously considered. Any advance into Burma 
and to the Chindwin and beyond would require air support over some of the most 
inhospitable country and some of the worst flying conditions in the world in which to 
maintain an intensive air supply and close air support operation. The destruction of a 
major portion of the Japanese 15th Army in the aftermath of the battle for Imphal 
however, had made it possible to consider an advance into Burma from the Central 
front. This option, Operation Capital, had previously had a low priority in the overall 
strategic plan for Burma. A signal from Mountbatten to his team of staff officers in 
Washington now changed this. General Amold the Chief of the USAAF gave this 
idea his full support and ' ... authorized the sending of 400 transport aircraft to 
SEAC.l03 As Allen notes,' ... it was this sudden gift of riches in the air which 
radically transformed the future of the war in Burma•.I04 
As a direct result of the military difficulties in Italy and the prospect that the war in 
Europe would not be concluded in 1944, the COS decided to postpone Operation 
Dracula, the amphibious assault on Rangoon until December 1945, the earliest 
possible date after the Monsoon. They were also unwilling to withdraw forces from 
Europe to reinforce the British army in Burma for either Operation Romulus or 
Talon. 105 If an attempt to regain Burma was to be made it had to be resourced from 
the ground forces available in-Theatre thus, there was no choice other than Extended 
10 I Eduard Mark, op. cit., p. 95. Because of the inaccuracy of high altitude bombing small targets are difficult to 
hit 
102 Fitted with a long-range tank, Lysanders III (SD) were also successfully used in Europe and Burma on SOE 
operations. Owen Thetford, op.cit., pp. 580-2. 
103 Allen, Burma : The Longest War 1941-1945, op.cit. p.399. 
104 Derek Tulloch, Maj. Gen., Wingate in Peace and War, London, Macdonald 1972. pp. 211 -3, and quoted in 
Alien, ibid. p. 399. 
105 Kirby, vol. 4, op.cit., pp. 108-11 . Operation Dracula had assumed troops from Europe being available. 
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Capital, amended to include an offensive in the Arakan to capture Akyab.106 This 
option was approved by the COS in November 1944.107 
Co-operation and the Kabaw Valley 
The arrival of the Monsoon'in 1944 did not give the Japanese the respite they had 
possibly expected and the 15th Army continued to retreat south into Burma as the 
14th Army pursued them. One of the main areas of advance was the Kabaw Valley, 
notorious for the serious hazard of Malaria, to which the Japanese were as susceptible 
as the British and Indian troops. In Burma in 1943 the British hospitalisation rate for 
Malaria was 62.8 %, or 45 times that for battle casualties. Even Indian troops had a 
fifty per cent rate.108 The African contingents in Slim's 14th Army were, it was 
believed, less prone to Malaria and consequently the task of advancing down the 
Valley was allotted to the 81st East African Division.109 
DDT had recently been introduced in south-east Asia as a means of containing the 
mosquito that carried the protozoan malarial parasite.110 This was extremely 
important if sickness rates were to be kept down, as Malaria usually incapacitated a 
soldier for quite some time. The Official medical history makes the point that, 'The 
magnitude of the contribution to victory made by DDT cannot be Computed;( ... )ln 
this Theatre there were two enemies and of the two the infective mosquito was not the 
less formidable'.1ll As a means of aiding the East Africans, Hurricane fighter-
bombers (Hurribombers) carried DDT filled smoke-laying canisters that laid DDT in 
front of the advancing Division to lower their Malarial casualty rate; the Japanese 
were not so fortunate. 112 It can be appreciated how serious a problem Malaria was to 
the British forces in Burma until the introduction of mepacrine when it is realised that 
sources of quinine, the normal medication, had been cut-off by the Japanese 
occupation of the Dutch East Indies. 113 Almost the entire world supply came from 
Java.l 14 However, when the German supply of quinine had been cut off during the 
106 This was now to be supported by a large air force. 
107 The offensive in the Arakan was essential if air support was to be provided for any thrust to Rangoon. 
108 See John Ellis, The Shatp End: The Fighting Man in World War ll, revd. ed. 1990, London, Pimlico 1993. 
p.181 -3 . . 
109 Kirby, vol. iv, p. cit. , app. 14, fn .. 1, p. 461. In practice this was found not to be so. 
110 This is the Annopheles mimims a night feeder. The mosquito-borne and possibly fatal Dengue fever was 
catTied by the Aedes, a day feeder. Bergerud, op.cit., p. 132. 
111 F.A.E. Crew FRS, The Army Medical Services: Campaigns; vol. V. Burma. London, HMSO 1966. p.643. 
112 For report on this particular operation see, Edward Bishop, Hurricane, Shrewsbury, Airlife 1986. p. 112. 
113 The Japanese Army medical treatment of Malaria seems to have been of a low standard. See Harries, Meirion 
& Susie, Soldiers of the Sun: The Rise and fall of the Imperial Japanese Army 1868-1945. London, Heinemann 
1991. p. 317. 
114 Quinine is an extract of the bark of the Cinchona tree of South Amarica but was intensely cultivated in the 
Dutch East Indies as a commercial product. See Fred J. Chittenden and Patrick M. Synge (eds.), Dictionaty of 
Gardening, vol. l. 2nd. ed. 1957, Oxford, Clarenden 19.56. 
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First World War, they had developed atabrine as a substitute for the use of their army 
fighting in the Balkans. It was atabrine that was used by American forces in the 
south-west Pacific.115 In 1939 the British had developed mepacrine as an alternative 
and this was used in Burma, the small supply of quinine being reserved for aircrew 
until 1944 when it was realised that mepacrine did not have any particular side 
effects. 116 
Nevertheless, the fighting on the ground remained severe In these areas, the army 
relied heavily on close air support to provide them with the kind of support they 
would have normally expected from artillery. For example 'On the Tiddim Road [the 
Imphal battle] in August 1944, the 5th Indian Division was able to call upon aircraft 
operating a "cab rank" system, allowing field artillery to concentrate on "bunker 
busting". It was just not possible to deploy artillery where it was required. 117 As the 
West African Division advanced it ' ... found itself outnumbered and outranged by the 
Japanese guns .... so the enemy was instead outflanked and his main positions attacked 
by a total of 453 aircraft sorties•.ll8 Nevertheless the cab rank system was a not a 
particularly favoured form of close support in Burma. By then deploying them in one 
particular area it was not seen as an economic use of the available aircraft and it was 
thought to be an expensive consumption of fuel in a situation were there were 
continuous supply difficulties. Even as late as 1945 forward Spitfire squadrons were 
being refuelled from 44 gallons drums and manual pumps. 119 It was believed to be a 
far more suitable for the army to be able to call up support from airfields close to the 
front line where the response time was frequently within fifteen minutes of receiving 
a request. 
The RAF officers working in the field with the Army reported their difficulties and 
the ways these were overcome. For example, General Stratemeyer USAAF forwarded 
to Air Comdr. Mellersh, the Air Commander of the Strategic Air Force, a report by an 
RAF officer on his experiences with 161Brigade in 1944 on the advance on Tiddim 
whilst on an attachment with the army as an air observer. The RAF officer reported 
that the DZs (Dropping Zones) were generally useless caused by bad positioning of 
the visual ground signals [Ts] they, the Ts, were also too small and that the army was 
using the wrong radio frequencies (this must be the problem of the previously referred 
115 See Eric M. Bergerud, Fire in the Sky: The Air War in the South Pacific, Bolder Col. and Oxford, Westview 
2000. p. 130. 
116 Rexford-Welch, Histmy of the Second World War, RAF Medical Services, Commands , vol. III, London, 
HMSO 1955. p. 650. 
117Bailey, op. cit. p.230. 
118 Bailey, ibid. p.230. 
119 Interview with F/0 Goodman, RAF, Engineer Officer No.81 Spitfire sqn. RIAF. 
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to HF and VHF problem).Thus the aircraft making the (air) drops could not hear them 
and generally failed to see much of the visual ground signal. He criticised the 
visibility to the aircraft of the Army's Very cattridges and suggested that aircraft type 
cartridges were used instead. He had started to use these with great effect. Having 
arranged appropriate DZs and signals the RAF officers' next job was to organise close 
air support. Only five minutes before a strike, smoke shells were laid down on the 
target. It was apparently normal for this to be within two hundred yards of the front 
line, but he complained bitterly that with the standard army pack radio set it was 
almost impossible to talk to the aircraft concerned. This contrasts with the 
experiences of similar officers in Italy and NW Europe. This particular officer also 
comments on the effects of 'Rhubarbs" (Fighter Sweeps) during advances saying that 
he saw many destroyed Japanese vehicles and that the 5th Division were full of praise 
for the effectiveness of the RAF air strikes during this period. He also reports that the 
Japanese at this time, according to the prisoners that were taken, ' ... were terrified of 
Air Strikes•.120 His further suggestions were that the RAF Liaison Officers (LOs) be 
with the tentacle unit, have radios that can contact aircraft and that the LOs check the 
Army map references which were sometimes in error.12l 
AOPs 
In South East Asia Command, VCPs (Visual Control Points) were operated and 
developed with conspicuous success. Indeed it was soon found that VCP's were 
required in areas where Jeeps were useless and mule transport was all that was 
available. As elsewhere, airborne VCPs were a further development of the air war 
and co-operation in Burma. Operating as the sole AOP squadron No. 656 sqn. RAF 
covered the whole of the Fourteenth Army Front from late 1943 until the Japanese 
surrender with some fifteen Auster aircraft. In 1944 the value of AOP was rapidly 
accepted in Burma for target marking by the RAF and the army. These small aircraft 
were flown by Army Artillery Officers and by their very occupation they understood 
both sides of the picture. The Fourteenth Army and Third Tactical Air Force Joint 
memorandum, Combined Attacks by Army and Air Forces makes particular mention 
of this in respect of marking targets for the strike aircraft where it was extremely 
difficult to get either artillery or mortars in appropriate positions. 122 
The Second draft of the Joint Memorandum by the HQ Fourteenth Army and HQ 
Third Tactical Air Force dated 1211011944, emphasised that artificial marking of 
120 In his use of the word 'many', this is clearly his perception and can relate to as few as twenty or hundreds and 
thus is impossible to quantify, as is his description of Japanese as ' ... terrified of air strikes' , all ground troops 
hated being attacked from the air but do not necessarily 'break'. See A.P.N. Lambert op. cit .. p.85, and passim. 
121 PRO AIR '23/2CJ76. Report ofF/0 Webb. RAF, LO. with 5th Ind. Div. 3118/44-26/10/44. 
122 PRO AIR '23/2976. A copy of this publication is captained in this file. 
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targets was essential for bombers rather than the previous system of giving a map 
reference to aircrews. General navigation was difficult enough but aircrews had even 
greater difficulties trying to identify a particular map reference. To avoid friendly fire 
incidents as much as possible, the memorandum suggested that target marking must 
be by coloured smoke, usually delivered by 25 pdr guns and 3.7 Howitzers. This of 
course depended on this type of artillery being available otherwise 3" Mortars had to 
be used, but there was a limit to their range, a maximum of some 2,400 yds. Red 
Smoke with white and Yellow were proposed in decreasing order of preference as 
coloured markers were found to be the most effective against the jungle background. 
This was another part of the learning process in the Far East. There was also the 
problem of transporting sufficient smoke shells and mortar bombs which had to be 
balanced against the need for high explosive (HE). Smoke was generally laid down 
for thirty minutes which required repeated bombardments, and the only effective way 
of keeping up this level of ammunition expenditure was by air supply. The types of 
targets for this type of air attack were defined as; 'Type 'A', a defensive position 
astride a road axis, Bother defensive positions covering important road or rail 
communications and C defensive positions of towns or communication centres' and 
this defined the type of aircraft and level of attack. 123 Defensive positions astride a 
road axis would usually involve attacks on bunkers whereas those covering important 
communications would usually be expected to have substantial AA cover and 
consequently increased the hazards for the attacking aircraft. Co-operation and 
understanding were essential in these circumstances. 
The supply of suitable artillery shells (including smoke) was a constant problem in 
Burma. This was especially heightened during the monsoon because the tortuous all-
weather roads along the frontier and as far as the Chindwin contained steep gradients 
in the mountainous terrain. Roads were few in number and usually limited to only a 
two-carriageway width and were under particularly heavy demands. Any other roads 
and tracks were quickly turned into quagmires by the passage of vehicles and became 
difficult to use for the purposes of supply to any significant amount, even for mules. 
Normally, until the advent of large scale supply by air, the ground war would tend to 
stagnate during the Monsoon. Air supply and co-operation changed all that for the 
British but not for the Japanese. Given a sufficiency of landing strips and breaks in 
the Monsoon, the mobility of the British army was now only limited by its ability to 
deal with the terrain. In February 1945 XXXIII Indian Corps crossed the Irrawaddy 
backed by 80 guns, but it was the supporting tanks which mainly silenced the enemy 
positions.124 
123 PRO AIR 23/2976 . 
124 Bailey, op.cit. p. 230, fn.187. 
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In April 1945 the Supreme Commander in SEAC set up the Air and Ground Supply 
Committee who carried out a logistical investigation, ' ... to examine all possible ways 
and means of argumenting air supply, and to investigate improvements in ground and 
inland water transport supply.•I25 In their conclusion the Committee stated that, 
It has been proved conclusively at this time that air supply had become a 
factor new to war and had revolutionised certain aspects of strategy and 
tactics. In Burma, it had been utilised to maintain the advance of the 14th 
Army, on a scale not experienced in any other Theatres. April, 1945, indeed, 
closed with a total of 76,000 tons of supplies and equipment being delivered 
to the ground forces by air. 126 
Another summary report in this document describes the importance of wit 
communications. It makes the point that, 
Owing to the great geographical area of Air Command, South-East Asia, and 
the vast distances between the various formations, the only communications 
facilities which gave any reasonably reliable and mainly unbroken services 
during the latter part of 1943, were the static WIT channels. Trunk telephone 
and telegraph systems were poor and unreliable while teleprinter systems were 
almost non-existent... 127 
To an extent this Committee was doing the work which more appropriately would and 
ought to have been done, and was in Europe, by an Operational Research Unit (ORU) 
and this unwittingly confirms the lack of these units, and the possible shortage of 
trained personnel in this theatre. 
Interdiction 
The so called 'game bags', of the RAF statistical reports list the claimed amount of 
road transport destroyed but, these are only armed reconnaissance pilot estimates. 
Moreover, one of their number noted on how rapidly the Japanese could get transport 
off the road and camouflage it, 'They were masters of camouflage ... the damn thing [a 
burning vehicle] had disappeared- in less than twenty minutes•.128 Another comment 
from a Hurricane pilot was , 'The Jap trucks seem to move mainly at night; the river 
craft were more or less impossible to sink ... animal convoys, with their handlers, just 
disappeared into the jungle .. .' 129 This and the fact that the Japanese were making 
extensive use of mules for the reasons already stated does tend, without the advantage 
of Operational Research (OR) team reports, to raise doubts as to the effectiveness of 
125 PRO 23/1985 p. 40 
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interdiction in this Theatre. However, Beaufighters seem to have been effective in 
attacking railway trains evidenced by the Japanese building of 'shelters' for railway 
engines to use during daylight hours.130 The value of strategic bombers in this theatre 
was also brought into question. In the Second draft of the Joint Memorandum by the 
HQ Fourteenth Army and HQ Third Tactical Air Force dated 12 October 1944, 
various points are made in relation to combined attacks as opposed to strategic 
bombing in support of the army but which the army was not using at the time. It 
stated that, 
.. .in jungle warfare, owing to the relatively small size and poor definition of 
enemy positions, the occasions which warrant the use of medium and 
strategic bombers in close support of the army are generally rare.131 
Churchill had pushed for the use of strategic bombers in this theatre, but little was 
understood in London of the distances involved, the kind of terrain or the possible 
targets. Without large industrial areas, apart from ports like Rangoon and Bangkok, 
there was little of strategic value, and Singapore was out of the range of all the 
aircraft carrying a bomb load and flying from the main bases of either Ceylon or 
Assam. 
Medical matters; army and air force co-operation 
It has been said that ' ... Burma [was] another disaster [for the medical corps] area' .132 
A critical aspect of the war in Burma army and air force co-operation was that of 
casualty and sickness evacuation. Such were the conditions that, ' ... many of the 
medical defences built up since the beginning of the century wilted under the assault 
of the ... jungle .. .in an environment where no war would have been conceivable in 
earlier generations•.133 For the ordinary soldier casualty evacuation whether due to 
battle or sickness, was seen as a pre-eminent need along with possibly air supply or 
close air support. In an area where the incidence of Malaria was exceptionally high 
and where casualties from sickness were much greater than battle casualties, the 
demands on evacuation were significant. It has also been said that, ' ... the worst threat 
faced by both sides was malaria•.l34 Due to the type of terrain in Burma, evacuation 
was extremely difficult in 1942 and 1943 and frequently involved the patient being 
carried for hours, and sometimes days, along jungle trails over water courses and up 
and down precipitous ridges to reach the forward medical aid posts. This was 
frequently disastrous for the patient and was extremely labour intensive, taking large 
130David J. lnnes, Beaufighters over Burma, No. 27 Squadron, RAF, 1942-45. Poole, Blandford 1985. 
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numbers of men from the battle lines, not only as casualties but also as bearers. How 
expensive in terms of manpower this was can be seen when it is realised that in most 
Allied infantry divisions only one quarter to one fifth of the total number of troops 
were actually doing the fighting and casualty figures should be seen in this context.135 
The problems of evacuation and medical treatment in the conditions in Burma were 
critical matters, not only in respect of survival rates but also for morale and there are a 
number of references to this aspect of the war in much of the published works. 
Similar medical conditions were experienced in the south-west Pacific by the air 
forces of the Australians and Americans who considered disease a major factor in 
prosecuting the war as their statistical records, which are frequently quoted, 
demonstrate. 136 
Symptomatic of the whole problem of source material in SEAC, because of the huge 
expansion of the military, the army had, ' ... stopped keeping RAF statistics correctly, 
and the understaffed RAF Medical Statistics Office could not keep up.'l37 Therefore, 
as Professor Higham points out, even the figures quoted in the official medical history 
are often tentative.138 Yet so important was this medical aspect of the war that the 
official history is worth quoting at some length. 'In 1939 for example, 39.82 per cent 
of the total recorded mortality in Burma was ascribed to "fevers". It is certain that 
more than half these "fevers" were in fact instances of malaria'.139 This particular 
chapter goes on to state that, 
Undoubtedly this was the disease [malaria] which the military authorities had 
reason to fear most.. .. the gravity of the danger that the troops of both sides 
would have to face should the Japanese decide to invade the country.l40 
Rapid evacuation as was possible for treatment in hospitals was obviously of major 
importance, any preventative measures in the field were bound to be less efficient 
than out of it. A large part of the effective fighting force, above the battle casualty 
rate, could be sick at any one time and it was vital that these be treated and returned to 
the fighting line as soon as was feasible. In early 1942 when the army was retreating 
to the Indian frontier, the sole RAF transport squadron had done its utmost to 
evacuate casualties and the sick who, apart from any humanitarian aspect, were bound 
to affect the efficiency of fighting formations. In ten days during April [1942] ten 
135 See John Ellis, The Sharp End: The Fighting Man in World War Two, David & Charles 1980, revd. ed., 
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Dakota C.47s transported some 1,000 soldiers and civilians, including casualties, to 
aitfields in Assam.'141 According to the official history, in 1942 'Any air evacuation 
which did occur was arranged on the spur of the moment, often by individual private 
treaty.' 142 Air evacuation was to continue to expand throughout the war but added to 
this was the air supply of medical stores. As the official history says, 
It was abundantly demonstrated that the system of supply of medical stores by 
air possessed many advantages. The supply was speedy and the need for 
intermediate depots of medical stores along the supply route was eliminated. 
There was far less breakage and damage of stores, especially of transfusion 
fluids. 143 
As we have seen, Air evacuation was also carried out with the use of light aircraft, not 
only from the front line but often from behind enemy lines, and some casualties were 
even evacuated by glider144. In his foreword to the official history the editor-in-chief 
states that, 'The contributions of the RAF and the USAAF were of astonishing 
magnitude. The evacuation of casualties was a Herculean task and improvisation rose 
to heights hitherto unimagined'.l45 A former Liberator bomber pilot, Sqn. Leader 
Smith of 357 Special Duties (SD) squadron RAF recollected that, when not engaged 
on Liberator sorties, he had frequently piloted one of the squadron's L-5 Sentinel 
aircraft from Cox's Bazaar in the Arakan to airstrips on the front or behind enemy 
lines. He would, fly in various army specialists and evacuate a casualty on the return 
journey, in one instance he recalled, 'even to fly out a Japanese prisoner'.i46 Such 
were the levels of co-operation that, 'this was not considered an unusual task but part 
of working with the army' . 147 This attitude is confirmed by Lewin who states that, 
'Baldwin and Air Marshal Vincent, of 221 Group' ... both told the author that they 
simply felt part of the Army. Vincent [for example] shared Slim's mess until Rangoon 
was reached' .148 Air supply and air evacuation having now been accepted, in 1944 
Forward Aitfield Engineer (FAE) units were established to build fair-weather airstrips 
as close to the front as possible. 
Air evacuation and rescue also ivolved some very innovative operations behind 
Japanese lines. Such operations often entailed the need to clear the jungle to land a 
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small liaison aircraft, such as an L-5. Cochran reports that both opium and salt were 
frequently used as payment for assisting in the rescue of Allied airmen and soldiers. 
Money was not only useless to most of the indigenous peoples involved but also 
dangerous should it be found in searches by the Japanese, for it would automatically 
imply that they had been helping the Allies. Both practical and expedient, barter was 
an unusual aspect of co-operation and possibly unique to this theatre. It was 
politically a 'hot potato' and consequently seems not to have been mentioned much 
elsewhere but Cochran particularly names 'Dear Eleanor' (Roosevelt) in this 
respect.149 Foot and Langley for example, make only one reference to ' ... escape kits 
filled with opium' and Cruickshank mentions it as being part of SOE survival kits.l50 
In early 1944 the 'Germany First' policy' remained very much in evidence, all the 
British plans for defeating the Japanese in Burma were clearly dependent upon 
American help until the war in Europe had been won. Churchill was still keen to 
pursue Culverin and to this end Mountbatten had sent a team of SEAC staff officers 
to London and Washington to gain support for the plan. But this was not acceptable, 
the invasion of Europe was in the offing and he was forced to accept that it was not 
practicable. Mountbatten's solution was to develop a strategy that was practicable and 
take advantage of the aftermath of the battle of Imphal. To this end plans were 
developed for Operation Capital, to bring the Japanese Army to battle between the 
Chindwin and the Irrawaddy where the tanks of the 14th Army would be most 
effective and a second operation to recapture Rangoon in March 1945, Operation 
Dracula. In August 1944 these were both approved but by October the failure at 
Arnhem caused this approval to be revised and Dracula was to be delayed. Therefore 
only Capital now remained and it was on this basis that the 14th Army forged ahead. 
The year of 1944 saw numerous Command changes and administrative 
reorganisation. In December 1944 the 3rd Tactical Air Force was dissolved and of its 
elements, 221 Group was now to work directly with 14th Army on the Central front 
and 224 group to support XV Corps in the Arakan, both under the control of Eastern 
Air Command (EAC). Troop Carrier Command (TCC), nominally under the control 
of 3rd Tactical Air Force, had already been dissolved in June 1944. In October this 
was replaced by a new joint organisation consisting of the Combined Air Transport 
Organisation (CATO) to control the ground organisation of air supply and the 
Combat Cargo Task Force (CCTF) to control all the transport squadrons, both RAF 
149 AFHRA Cochran interview transcript, op.cit., pp. 394-401. 
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and USAAF supporting the 14th Army and XXXIII Corps. The lOth USAAF Air 
Force was concerned with providing air supply for the northern front. By the end of 
1944 the air elements were now organised for the advance into Burma. 
The impetus and main strength of the Japanese 15th Army (Mutaguchi) was now 
spent before Imphal and the 28th Army (Sakurai) was now in a defensive stance in 
the Arakan. Slim was convinced that the Japanese traditionally used all their reserves 
if there was a chance of snatching victory, and so the way was now open for the 14th 
Army to initiate Operation Capital and thrust into Central Burma. 151 This was to 
advance across the Chindwin River and bring the Japanese 28th Army and the 
survivors of the 15th to battle in the bend of the Irrawaddy River at Shwebo. The plan 
was for XXXIII Corps to cross the Chindwin where IV Corps would approach from 
the north to catch the enemy in a pincer movement between the Chindwin and the 
Irrawaddy rivers. To this end the Fourteenth Army continued to push on through the 
Monsoon of 1944 without allowing the Japanese any respite and continually pursuing 
the remnants of Mutaguchi's 15th Army. However, XIV Army also had its problems 
and especially serious was Malaria. In XXXIII Corps out of a total of 88,500, it's 
weekly July -November strength, half were in pursuit of the Japanese and of the 
47,000 who went sick, over half had to be sent [flown] back to India for 
hospitalisation. More than 20,000 of these had contracted Malaria.152 
However, it soon became obvious to Slim that Japanese forces were falling back 
without putting up their normal determined resistance. From this he rationalised that 
they would make a determined stand at Mandalay either with the Irrawaddy at their 
backs or behind the Irrawaddy and thus force the British to make a river crossing and 
a frontal attack on any bridgehead. In Slim's view this would be 'suicidal' for his 
forces and he decided to mount a massive deception plan to take the enemy by 
surprise. Known as 'Extended Capital' it meant switching IV Corps from the northern 
pincer and by crossing the line of advance of XXXIII Corps, move south down both 
the Kabaw and Myittha valleys to produce a southern pincer movement across the 
Irrawaddy and then attack the Japanese at Meiktila, the main Japanese supply base 
and eighty five miles south of Mandalay. In doing so the Japanese 28th Army in the 
Arakan would be split from the 33rd Army in the north which was responsible for the 
lines of communication from the Arakan to Mandalay. He would bring to battle and 
defeat the Japanese in the plains south of Mandalay where tanks could be effectively 
used in the relatively open country of central Burma. The key to the southern 
movement was surprise especially in the Irrawaddy crossing and this was effected at 
151 Slim had carefully thought about the Japanese War of 1904-4. See Lewin, ibid., Slim, pp.149-150. 
152 Alien, Bumta: The Longest War 1941-1945,op.cit., p. 390. 
136 
Nyaungu, a point less well defended than elsewhere and an attack unexpected by the 
enemy. None of this would be possible without a massive increase in the Allied air 
transport capability, as the advance would mostly be not only across the grain of the 
country but also where roads were almost non-existent, a situation where adequate 
logistic support in the form of air supply was critical. Clearly by now, 'The airmen 
had been cast as leading actors in Burma rather than in a major supporting role.'153 
The original purpose of Mountbatten's Axiom Mission in London and Washington 
had been to play-down plans to advance into Central Burma, Operation Capital, the 
main American concern being in the north and re-opening the Burma Road. 154 
However, the destruction of the main fighting potential of the Japanese 15th Army at 
lmphal and the opportunity to exploit this Japanese military weakness changed his 
view. Mountbatten sent a signal to the Axiom team to suggest to the Combined Chiefs 
of Staff 'Extended Capital', the plan to capture Mandalay and Central Burma. General 
Arnold, the C-in-C of the USAAF, was convinced of the possibilities of the plan and 
allocated 400 transport aircraft to SEAC to facilitate the air operations required by 
Extended Capitai.155 Slim's staff had calculated that the air supply needs of the 14th 
Army would be 702 tons per day in December 1944 or 7,000 sorties per day, but this 
would increase to 1,200 tons per day by March 1945 as the main Japanese force were 
engaged on the plain. 156 As with so much of the campaigning in Burma the weather 
remained a key factor in the planning. 
By June 1944, the situation for the Japanese Army Air Force was becoming critical. 
Some of their units had been transferred to the Philippines and the south-west Pacific 
area, and they were very aware that their fighter aircraft were now being 
outperformed by those of the Allies.157 In response to the increase in Allied air power 
during 1944 the Japanese had constructed a number of new airfields in Burma and 
Thailand. These had more than one main runway making it difficult for Allied 
bombing to put them completely out of action. Also they seem to have been operating 
early warning radar in the vicinity of Rangoon as well as a considerable number of 
' ... anti-aircraft observation [air observer] squads' throughout Burma.158 An ORS 
report of December 1943 suggested that, 'The enemy warning system [in Burma] 
153 E.D. Smith, Battle for Burma, London, Batsford 1979, p. 155. 
154 The role of Mountbatten's Axiom Mission, in February 1944, first in London and then in Washington, is 
described in detail in Kirby, op. cit. vol. iii. 
155 Alien, Burma: The Longest War1941-1945, op.cit. p.399. 
156 Lewin, op.cit. p. 217. 
157 In October 1944 American forces landed on Leyte in the Philippines. 
158 OCMH Japanese Monograph No. 64. op.cit., Part IJ, Appended Map No. 8. 
137 
probably depends largely on visual observation of hostile aircraft, but sound location 
devices as well as RDF apparatus may be deployed .. .'l59 
Air reconnaissance was becoming extremely difficult for the Japanese as their 
reconnaissance aircraft were continually being intercepted by Spitfires and attempts to 
intercept Allied supply aircraft was becoming almost impossible. Colonel Nonaka, C-
in-C of Operations of the 3rd Japanese Air Force, which covered Burma reported that, 
Due to the fact that the enemy planes were overcoming our air units in the 
Burma area, the situation became such that Headquarters reconnaissance 
planes were of almost no value and our Model 1 fighters [Oscars]were no 
match for the enemy. Therefore the following request was submitted to the 
Central Government: Reorganisation of the headquarters reconnaissance to 
Model 100[Dinah] Type [Army] 3 planes and if possible Model4 [Frank] 
fighter planes; if not possible Model 1 [Army] Type Ill lacking all else on 
increasing in number of Model 11 [Tojo]Single [seat] fighters and supplies 
[logistic] for the restoration of fighting power.I60 
Clearly this was a cri de coeur from a senior Japanese Air Force Officer now facing a 
desperate situation and emphasises the circumstances in which the Japanese now 
found themselves. By this time the Japanese homeland was beginning to undergo 
increasingly heavy air attacks and consequently this was a request that was never to 
be fully responded to. In his Monograph, Colonel Nonaka glosses over this fact, 
following the Japanese tradition of being reluctant to discuss their military 
reverses. 16 1 
After the Monsoon of 1944, the thrust into Central Burma went ahead with both arms 
of Slim's pincer movement reaching first the Chindwin and then the Irrawaddy 
without the Japanese being aware of the fate that was about to unfold. Essential to the 
advance was the securing of the Japanese held airfields at Ye-U, Shwebo and 
Onbauk. 
The early capture of these airfields was necessary for air transport and for the 
basing of the short range [Spitfire] fighter squadrons. This was for two 
reasons; Air supply needed to keep pace with the advance and the 
maintenance of air superiority over the air supply routes. Typical of the needs 
!59 PRO AIR 23/2108, Repmt dated 17/12/43. 
160 OCMH Japanese Monograph No. 56. op. cif., Air Operations Record (2nd Period of the Southwestern Area) 
August 1946, First Demobilization Bureau. Washington OC, US Army Historical Center. p. 241. 
161 OCMH Japanese Monograph No. 56. op. cif., This Japanese trait is also well documentated, see Marder op. 
cif. pp. ix-xi who also quotes Reischauer on this. 
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encountered- 2nd Division out-ran its fuel supplies and Ye-U [was] needed 
to fly in Dakotas with petrol supplies for the formation. 162 
Ye-U had been captured on the 1st January and both Shwebo and Onbauk by the 8th. 
Secrecy was maintained because the RAF was able to deny air reconnaissance to the 
Japanese, another example of co-operation as the RAF ascribed a high priority to this 
denial effort, in spite of the need to protect the transport aircraft. Many difficulties 
were encountered in the crossings of the Chindwin and later the Irrawaddy rivers and 
the efforts by the air force to rescue casualties is elsewhere recorded. When compared 
to the Rhine the Irrawaddy is a very much wider and a fast flowing river and without 
a network of approach routes. However both of the Chindwin and Irrawaddy 
crossings were successfully accomplished. 163 
In Central Burma by 10 February 1945, the offensive towards Mandalay had started 
and by the 4 March Meiktila had been officially been captured but it continued to be 
bitterly contested for the rest of the month, it was not until the 31st that the position 
was secured. On the 20 March after fierce fighting Mandalay was occupied. Thus, by 
the end of March 1945 both Mandalay and Meiktila, the real focus of the advance, 
had been recaptured, but not without severe fighting in both areas as the Japanese 
fought hard to retain their hold. The fight to capture Fort Dufferin in Mandalay for 
example, has been well documented.164 The total British battle casualties at Mandalay 
were 10,500 which serves to illustrates how bitter the fight had been. 165 Meitkila was 
critical to the Japanese, not only was it their main supply base for both .the 15th and 
33rd armies in central Burma, but also, ' ... as a transport route for petrol supplies to 
Central Burma from the oilfields at Y enangyaung.' 166 Because of this, Meitkila, 
captured by Cowan's 17th Division, was then subjected to a siege and severe counter-
attacks by divisions from both the Japanese 15th and 33rd Armies and for several 
days the airfields to the north of the town were under almost continuous Japanese fire. 
This was especially dangerous as it was at this particular time that reinforcements of 
9th (Airborne) Brigade were flown in. As the whole Brigade was brought in by 
USAAF Dakotas they were subject not only to Japanese AA fire but artillery and 
machine-gun fire on the ground.167 Some 142 sorties were made over a period of 
three days during which, only two aircraft were lost.168 Such was the intensity of fire 
162 PRO AIR 23/4438 
163 Detailed descriptions of these crossing are in both Woodburn Kirby, The War Against Japan, vol. IV., op.cil., 
and Alien, Burma: The Longest War 1941-1945, op.cit. , and elsewhere. 
164 See Woodburn Kirby, The War Against Japan, vol. IV. op.cil. , pp. 297-301 and Alien, Bunna: The Longest 
War, op.cit. pp. 4204 and passim. 
165 Lewin, Slim, op.cil. p. 228. 
166 Alien, Burma: The Longest War1941-1945, op.cil. , p. 442. 
167 This compares with the Luftwaffe transport aircraft which, also under fire, flew in troops and supplies to 
Malame airfield in Crete, turning the tide of that battle in 1941. 
168 Alien, Bunna: The Longest War, op.cit. , pp.446-7. 
139 
from Japanese positions close to the airfield, that in the following days it was decided 
by the army that supplies were to be air dropped. During this whole month while 
Meiktila was under siege RAF L-5s of 'C' Flight of 194 squadron continued to fly in 
medical supplies and fly out casualties. On one occasion, so desperate was the need 
for blood plasma, that the medical officer of the RAF Regiment defending the air strip 
as the only officer left alive, personally led a bayonet charge to clear the strip so that 
an L-5 bringing in the plasma could land. 169 B Flight of 656 squadron RAF was also 
continuously in the air spotting for the artillery. 
With Meiktila and Mandalay in British hands and the Irrawaddy supply route via the 
Ledo Road now open up-river to the north, waterborne traffic was beginning to 
assume part of the logistic load. For the first time in the campaign to retake Burma, 
the problem of air supply became slightly less consequential, although it still 
remained critical if the momentum of the thrust to capture Rangoon before the 
Monsoon was to be maintained. With the possibility of retaking Rangoon before the 
onset of the Monsoon in May 1945 the race to the sea, 'Sea or Bust' in 14th Army 
parlance (SOB), was on . Slim was aware at this time that American air resources 
were to be transferred to China by the 1st June. Now that the Ledo Road connection 
to the Burma Road and Myitkyina with its airfield were secure, the Northern Combat 
Area Command (NCAC), was no longer of any significance to the Americans and this 
was a factor, which for the British, added to the need to reach Rangoon with its 
important port facilities and their potential to supply the XIV Army.170 Limited road 
and waterborne supplies were, by now, certainly reaching the army from north 
Burma, however in comparison to air transport, the routes had limited capacity and 
the journey time was lengthening. The greater distance meant that more vehicles were 
needed if the pace of delivery was to be maintained. 
However, with the main air supply bases located at Argatala, Imphal, Comilla and 
Chittagong and given the 250 mile operational range of the C-47 Dakotas, beyond 
Meiktila Slim's army would be beyond practical air support including air defence 
fighters. Therefore, it was now essential for XV Corps to secure the airfields at Akyab 
and Ramree Island in the Arakan.171 On the 21 January 1945 elements of XV Corps 
landed on Ramree Island and on the 15 February landings were effected on Ruywa in 
the Arakan. Both landings successfully achieved their objectives and the respective 
airfields were in operation by the end of February for Akyab and Ramree by the end 
169 Probert, op.cit. , p. 265-6. 
170 The aircraft were needed to fly out the Chinese divisions in the Northern Combat Area Command (NCAC) to 
support an offensive planned by Chiang Kai-shek. 
171 Probert, op. cit. , p. 249. Necessary because the opera~iona1 ninge of the Dakota was 250 miles. 
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of March 1945. On the Central Front the Army having soundly defeated the Japanese 
at Meiktila and thereby capturing the main Japanese supply Base in Central Burma, 
the race for Rangoon was now firmly on. 
The vital factor in the rapid advance south towards Rangoon was air transport for 
their was no other way in which the required volume of supplies could have been 
maintained, considering the speed of the advance. The key to this was to build 
airstrips rapidly where Dakotas were able to land and to take-off and where fighters 
could be located to protect the transports. Forward Airfield Engineer (FAE) units 
operating with the forward troops selected suitable sites these were being constructed 
less than fifty miles behind the forward-most troops.I72 The Japanese were certainly 
impressed at the speed with which the Allies constructed new airfields and landing 
strips, the Staff Officer of the 5th Hikoshidan, Major Susumu Ogata commented, 'The 
enemy's abilities in constructing and reconstructing airfields were so remarkable that 
by the end of May [1945] they were able to utilize the air bases in the Rangoon 
sector.' 173 There was now also an insurance in the form of an agreed amphibious and 
airborne attack on Rangoon to ensure its capture before the Monsoon broke in 1945. 
However, even that was hedged with the need to capture the airfields at Prome south 
of Mandalay which were required to provide additional air cover and air supply for 
the army advancing towards Rangoon. 174 
There was a further complication forced upon Mountbatten by the Combined Chiefs 
of Staff who perceived that there was a need for more transport squadrons flying 
supplies to China to meet the Japanese attack on the airfields of the 14th Air Force 
from which B-29s had begun to attack mainland Japan. After much debate 
Mountbatten, fully aware of how critical air supply was to Slim's Rangoon offensive, 
was persuaded to release two transport squadrons to the 'Hump' route. When 
operating south from Mandalay without the airfields at Akyab and Ramree Island, the 
14th Army would be beyond the operational ranges of the air supply and air support 
squadrons. With these airfields in Allied hands it was now going to be possible to 
provide air supply over the whole distance to Rangoon and beyond. During the period 
under examination, January to May 1945, there were an average of fourteen transport 
RAF and RCAF squadrons in the Combat Command Task Force (CCTF).I75 To beat 
the onset of the Monsoon, entailed redoubled efforts by the air force to ensure that the 
army did not face a shortage of supplies. With this in mind, 'Mountbatten was tireless 
172 Higham, op.cit., p.223-5. 
173 OCMH Japanese Monograph No. 64, op.cit., Part II, p.377. 
174 This was important as there were two all-weather airfields at Prome. 
175 Kirby, vol. 4,op. cit., App. 15, pp. 462-3. The number varied as other demands also had to be met. 
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in maintaining a minimum number of squadrons, and ruthless, with an inevitability 
whose justice the crews recognised, in driving men and machines beyond 
conventionallimits•.176 
Between January and the end of May 1945, 217,731 (long) tons of supplies were air 
lifted, not only to the XIV Army advancing south and XV Corps in the Arakan, but 
included in the total were the supplies need by the advanced RAF fighter and close 
support squadrons. 177 Over eighty two per cent of supplies for the XIV Army were 
air landed and this demonstrated the importance of the airfield construction units. On 
the other hand, in the Arakan where 7501 tons was delivered to XV Corps over ninety 
five per cent were air dropped.178 In this area, sites for the construction of airstrips 
were limited due to the terrain. What was also vitally important in the context of air 
supply were the Rear Airfield Maintenance Organisations (RAMO) in Eastern 
Bengal, Assam and later Akyab and Rarnree, who organised the stores required and 
the aircraft loading. With an average of 1,555 tons a day to deal with, the seven 
RAM Os needed to be large and extremely well organised if aircraft loading was not 
to be held up and the correct loads were to reach the right destinations. As the official 
history states, ' ... [14th Army's] advance was never checked by a breakdown in air 
supplies whatever the conditions.•179 
Rangoon was re-occupied without serious fighting by the 19th May 1945 and after the 
Monsoon broke it was open to shipping. With the Monsoon at its height and for the 
first time since March 1942, the XIV Army no longer had to rely solely on either the 
tenuous road and rail links to India or on air supply. Otherwise, during the Monsoon, 
air supply would have remained the main method of support in the face of drastically 
reduced flows on the overland routes. The army now had access to a major seaport 
and the strain on the air transport squadrons could be reduced. With Rangoon in 
British hands the two critical elements for furthering the war in this Theatre would be 
obtained, logistic support would be assured and a 'springboard' for the invasion of 
Singapore and Malaya could be realistically established. Although severe fighting still 
remained until it could be brought to a successful conclusion, with these successes the 
outcome of the Burma campaign was now assured. 
176 Lewin, ibid, p. 229, favourably compares this air force effort with that during the Battle of Britain. 
177 A long ton is 2,240 lbs, an Imperial measure. 
178 Kirby, vol.. 4, op.cit., A pp. 22, pp. 508-12. Packaging and pushing loads out of the aircraft meant that 
aircraft loads were less when air dropped. 
179 Kirby, vol. 4,op. cil., p. 412. Sh01t tons. 
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ChapterS 
CONCLUSION 
'He who neglec!Jthe lessons of history is condemned to repeat them.'' 
Towards the close of the First World War, the British army and the air force had 
begun to form a close relationship on the battlefields of France and Palestine. This 
was a promising beginning in 1917 and 1918, from which both services had learnt 
valuable lessons. The inter-war years had a marked deleterious effect upon army and 
air force co-operation which broke the nexus between them. How did this happen and 
why were these lessons forgotten? Although it was brought about by several factors it 
was mainly the cumulative result of economic pressures and institutional frameworks 
within which service organisations habitually operate. One of the outcomes was the 
debacles in Malaya and Burma in 1941 and 1942. During the course of the Second 
World War, co-operation between the army and air force became a vital element in 
warfare and far beyond any levels previously envisaged. Nowhere was this more so 
than in Burma, where without co-operation, the allies might well have lost. Burma 
became a signpost for future military strategy. 
In the post-war era of the 1920s, Britain suffered from severe national economic 
problems. These affected all the Services and led to the RAF's struggle to survive as a 
separate service within the stringent financial limitations imposed by the government. 
The result was to relegate co-operation, then called Army Co-operation, to a 
subsidiary role. Aircraft assigned to these duties were only able to operate in areas 
where there was unlikely to be any air opposition. The outcome was, that the co-
operation lessons of World War One became consigned to history and forgotten. 2 
New policies, such as strategic bombing, appeared to point the way to the future, 
certainly for those RAF officers aspiring to high rank. 3 
The RAF were not alone, between the wars the army considered co-operation as 
requiring aircraft under their control. The inter-service economic disputes had forced 
them to settle for what they could get, a tacit recognition of co-operation by the RAF 
in overseas areas. At the time, both Liddell Hart and 'Boney' Fuller advocated a 
combination of Tanks and aircraft on the battlefield but without much success.4 As 
I George Santayana. 
2 For example, the first time the RAF were used in this role was during the Third Afghan War in 1919. See Bruce 
Hoffman, British Air Power in Peripheral Conjlict,J919-1976. Santa Monica CA., RAND 1989. p. 4. 
3 Trenchard had been selective in granting permanent commissions to officers in the new RAF choosing those 
who were supportive of his views. See Andrew Boy le, op.cit., 'P"'-''~ 
4 Both were influential creative military thinkers in the inter-war years. See B. H. Liddell Hart, Memoirs, vol. i. 
London, Cassell 1965. passim, and Anthony John Trythall, 'Boney' Fuller: The Intellectual General, London, 
Cassell 1977. passim . 
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with the RAF, with little incentive to pursue co-operation in the face of survival, these 
ideas seemed superfluous. In Britain there was a tectonic movement away from the 
notion of land warfare on the continent. 
The outcome of the Blitzkrieg in the West in 1940 was both a shock and a salutary 
lesson to Britain.s In the face of the threat from Germany, the lessons of co-operation, 
as demonstrated by the Wehrmacht, led to a reappraisal. 6 In a meeting in November 
1941, the requirement for close air support was recognised for Europe and the Middle 
East by the CAS, but there was no mention of the Far East and any concerns about its 
defence receded into the background. 7 Thus the 'die had been cast' and 'stop-gap' 
measures were thought to be sufficient to face any Japanese danger. In Malaya, a lack 
of will and fiscal considerations hindered progress in co-operation initiatives and even 
the dedicated co-operation squadron never got beyond training motions. Thus when 
war came any co-operation that did take place was ad hoc and at a local level. There 
was neither the equipment nor the available necessary expertise in either the army or 
the air force to do anything else. 
All the pre-requisites for defeat were in place in south-east Asia in 1941 and the scene 
was set for disaster as the was stage set for war. The unpalatable truth was that senior 
officers were not from the alpha drawer of military talent, for in the thirties the most 
talented officers were needed Europe. Brooke-Popham, the C-in-C (Army and RAF 
only), was called back from retirement in 1940 and Percival, the GC Malaya, was not 
a Patton, Rommel or Montgomery-like charismatic leader of men. Lacking powerful 
and strident leadership voices, pleas for more modem aircraft were only tacitly 
recorded in London until late in the day. Then, fighter aircraft deemed unfit for front 
line service in Europe, were allocated to Singapore. To reinforce these aircraft the Air 
Ministry assigned an RAF Wing equipped with new Hurricanes, scheduled to arrive 
in the middle of 1941.8 Churchill had these aircraft reallocated to Russia, it was to be 
a misjudgement with considerable import, as Hurricanes did not arrive in Singapore 
until it was already too late to have any decisive effect and the issue of co-operation 
did not arise. 
5 For more on the effect of air superiority and air attack in these Theatres see; Steven Zaloga & Victor Madej, The 
Polish Campaign, 1939, NY, Hippocrene 1985, Jack Adams, The Doomed Expedition: The Campaign in Norway 
1940, London, Leo Cooper 1989, Alistair Home, To Lose a Ball le: France 1940, London, Paperrnac 1990, and 
Christopher Buckley, Greece and Crete 1941, London, HMSO 1977. 
6 A German invasion of Britain, Operation 'Sea Lion', was seriously considered a possibility in 1940. 
7PRO AIR 20/950. Report of a meeting on the 2nd November 1941 to consider Army Air Support Requirements. 
This was prior to the Japanese invasion of Malaya and Burma. 
8 According to Donahue a fighter squadron at that time consisted of twelve aircraft with at least as many in 
reserve. Donahue, op.cil., p. 22. Three squadrons to an RAF Wing implies seventy-two pilots and aircraft. 
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For all the participants, the war in south-east Asia was a new experience where the 
learning curve was steep. The Japanese were aware of this and attempted to prepare 
their soldiers, informing them what the conditions were likely to be and how to cope 
with them.9 They were also well trained, most of the senior officers and a large part of 
the army were seasoned soldiers having fought in China. In contrast, the British and 
Indian forces were partly trained, but only to fight in a conventional war relying on 
road-bound transport. In a similar fashion the air force was equally unprepared and 
were positioned to fight from impossible locations without early warning and 
consequently incurring heavy losses.Furthermore, it was at a disadvantage in both 
numbers and fighter aircraft with short operational ranges. 
There are generally two lines of debate relating to the collapse of British military 
power in south-east Asia in 1941 and 1942. One suggests that the responsibility rests 
on the shortcomings of Brook-Popham and General Percival, the other that failure 
was due to surprise, a lack of modem equipment and insufficient trained soldiers. 
Both lines of argument are simplistic and untenable, on their own and I would suggest 
that neither is a sufficient explanation. Both Brook-Popham and Percival were aware 
of the deficiencies in the command but their requests for assistance were thwarted by 
both the Governor of the Straits Settlement, Sir Miles Shenton Thomas and London. 10 
Their failure lay in their willingness to accept the status quo and continue with a 
flawed defence strategy, ignoring military reality and in failing to heed intelligence 
warnings.ll In the second instance, in the circumstances in which they found 
themselves, a planned withdrawal to the south of the Malay Peninsular and a 
concentrated defence strategy would have prolonged the battle and in that respect they 
are culpable. However, both Churchill and Thomas must bear some responsibility for 
the loss of Singapore, Thomas for his almost obstructional refusal to provide 
sufficient funds or labour for the construction of defence works and Churchill for the 
diversion of RAF Hurricanes to Russia. 12 A combination of all of the foregoing 
factors was responsible for the disaster. 
Under the circumstances, there were two possible courses of action for a plausible 
defence. First, siting the available radar in the north and staging aircraft forward when 
they were needed would have avoided over half of the operational strength of the 
9 See Tsuji. op. cif., p. 12. and app. l, pp. 295-349. Pamphlet entitked, 'Read this Alone- and the War can be 
Won'. 
10 See Alien, Singapore, op.cit., p. 51, on Churchill's attitude to reinforcements and on Sir Miles Shenton Thomas 
pp. 166-7. 
11 Certainly both Marder op. cit., and Tow le op.cit., affirm that intelligence was received, it appears not to have 
been appropriately distributed. Accurate intelligence was obtained by the FECB but dissemination was a problem. 
As its head, Capt. Harkness did not succeed in getting the message across. See Aldrich, op. cil., p. 62. 
12 PRO AIR 20/956. Supply of Aircraft to Russia. 
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RAF being 'knocked out' on the first day of war. Alternatively, giving up northern 
Malaya and concentrating in the south to defend Singapore would have reduced the 
British lines of communication and lengthened those of the enemy.13 With a smaller 
defence area the limited ranges of RAF aircraft would have been less important and 
with fewer airfields to protect, AA defences and radar early warning more effective.14 
The problems of range, radar and meagre AA cover were all emphasised in 
Stevenson's Burma Dispatch.15 The air defence of Rangoon and the American ground 
defence of Bataan and Corregidor suggests that Singapore might have held out for 
much longer. When Hurricanes arrived, they might have been more effective had they 
not been used in 'penny packets'. Their arrival with experienced pilots suggests that 
Japanese air superiority might have been seriously contended earlier had Churchill 
not sent the initial allocation to Russia. This was a vital misjudgement and questions 
his ability to override military assessments. 16 London's apparent ignorance of the 
distances involved in south-east Asia and its effect on aircraft operations is 
inexplicable. Japanese aircraft had greater operating ranges than similar aircraft used 
by the RAF and British counter-air actions were therefore limited.17 There were no 
contingency plans for failure in the strategy, resulting in a disordered retreat which, 
once started was difficult to stop. Brook Popham's 'talk' at the RAF Staff College in 
1942 suggested a recognisable lack of co-operation in Malaya stating that, ' ... [there 
was] a unity of defence problem( ... ) RAF Staff must understand army problems if we 
are to co-operate' 18 These were all factors in the ensuing defeats, which no amount of 
courage could effectively remedy. 
There is less controversy about the loss of Burma. There was little prospect of success 
for the relatively small defence force other than fighting a creditable withdrawal. 
Mistakes were made, but under the pressure of circumstances, they are excusable.19 In 
both Malaya and Burma the evidence suggests that, given the situation, there was 
little opportunity for co-operation as each service fought for survival. In this whole 
'mish-mash' there was little space, time or sympathy to consider the subject. A 
13 Sir John Burgoyne proposed something similar for defending Constatinople in 1854 and later in the Crimea 
See Hew Strachan, op.cit., pp. 6-7. 
14 Singapore and Rangoon were the exceptions to this having some radar coverage. 
15 PRO AIR 23/4680. A VM D.F. Stevenson. Dispatch on Air Operations in Burma and the Bay of Bengal. The 
same could be said for Malaya. 
16 It must be assumed that sending aircraft to Russia was for political reasons as suitable aviation fuel was not 
available in Russia at that time. 
17 The short operational range of the Messerschmitt Bf 109 was a disadvantage over southern England. They 
could not reach airfields used as sanctuaries by the RAF, for example Duxford. See Williamson Murray, 
Luftwaffe: Strategy for Defeat, London, George Alien and Unwin 1985. pp. 47-8. 
18 LHCMA Brook Popham Papers, Vl7/17. Talk on the 2/3/42. 
19 See Alien, op. cit. , pp. 1-44 on the Sittang Battle. 
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defence strategy reliant upon having a sufficiency of suitable aircraft simply went to 
peices under Japanese blows. 
With one RAF fighter squadron and a Blenheim flight in Burma to defend an area the 
size of Europe, the AVG squadron was a bonus. Stevenson comments ' ... the main 
brunt of the [air] fighting was borne by the P.40 Squadrons of the AVG.'20 The main 
task of the air force was to defend the Docks area of Rangoon but the need for air 
support was obvious throughout the withdrawal to India, as Slim realised. He was 
also aware of the tactical restrictions imposed by being tied to roads. Stevenson's 
report makes clear that the RAF were conscious of this and sensitive to their critics. 
The RAF transport squadron, flying aircraft mainly donated to them from the US, had 
demonstrated how useful air transport was by flying in supplies and evacuating 
casualties. 21 From such inauspicious beginnings the co-operation lessons of the First 
World War were re-learnt, improved, applied and expanded. Paramount amongst 
these was that air superiority was necessary before any meaningful forms of co-
operation could take place. Only then could dedicated air support and transport 
aircraft be effective. Undoubtedly, the loss of Malaya, Singapore and then Burma was 
an unparalleled defeat but one from which important lessons had been learnt and later 
put to devastating use. 
By the time that Slim arrived in Burma the pattern of retreat had been established, but 
he attempted to lessen his force's dependence on roads by 'ditching' most of the 
superfluous equipment to obtain some degree of mobility. In this way he 
accomplished a fighting withdrawal. This may be ascribed to his being an officer in a 
rifle regiment, the Gurkhas, whose very raison d'etre was mobility.22 He adapted 
quickly, but lacked the means or the time to compose his force accordingly. After 
being driven out of Burma in May the remainder of 1942 was used by the army and 
the air force to lick their wounds and to build up strength and operational capability. 
The efforts of the sole RAF transport squadron to fly-in supplies and evacuate 
casualties during the retreat in Burma laid the foundation of air transport in Burma. 
Driven by the demands of the huge battle area; the terrain, the climate and the scarcity 
of land communications, Slim saw the possibilities that air transport offered. 
Gradually a new element was introduced into the ground war, co-operation and air 
transport on an unprecedented scale; it became one of the major successes of army 
and air force co-operation. 
20 PRO AIR 23/4680. Stevenson Dispatch. p.30. Of the three AVG squadrons for China, one was in Burma. 
21 These were DC-2s and DC-3s. 
22 See Hew Strachan, From Waterloo to Balac/ava: Tactics, Technologyand the British Army 1815-1854. CUP 
1985, on Light Infantry and Ril1e Regiments, pp. 19-23. 
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Mobility; How do armed forces move? 
Prior to World War Two most armies were only partly mechanised but also moved by 
a mixture of foot, horse and railway.23 One of the few exceptions was the British 
Army which was fully mechanised, all artillery for example, was towed by trucks and 
each army division had an established scale of motor transport. 24 This resulted in 
lines of communication that were road or rail-bound. In Europe, where there was an 
abundance of roads and railways, this was not considered a problem. What was not 
accorded sufficient consideration, was that this made them vulnerable to both air 
attack and blockage, especially in areas where there were few roads and railways or 
where these were constrained by the terrain. In such areas, this limited tactical 
mobility and such was the situation in Malaya and Burma. 25 In Malaya the roads and 
railways were confined to north-south corridors along the coastal lowlands with few 
lateral connections. In Burma they were mostly constricted to the north-south river 
valleys with one major port, Rangoon and without overland access to India. When 
supply routes where cut by road blocks in their rear, the British units withdrew for 
fear of being isolated. These situations epitomised the actions in Malaya and Burma 
but in Burma, Slim was aware of the vulnerability of communications, it was one 
with which he was familiar.26 
Mobility was a key to the campaign in Burma and air supply transformed the way in 
which armies and air forces moved and fought.27 It was a revolutionary change. 28 
From artillery spotting in Europe, co-operation evolved to offer the tactical movement 
of whole army divisions by air which completely changed the battlefield in Burma. 29 
In south-east Asia, terrain, weather and the distances involved were the crucial 
considerations dictating the fortunes of the land battle. In Malaya, the central 
mountain range inhibited the ability of British ground troops to manoeuvre. Similar 
conditions applied in Burma where the major rivers and sparse lines of 
communication forced constraints and complicated manoeuvre. This was even more 
so as the battle crept further north in Burma, communications petered out and the 
terrain became more mountainous and the flora denser in an area where heavy rainfall 
occurred during the Monsoon. The final stages of the 1942 retreat were undertaken in 
23 In 1939.a very high propmtion of the Wehrmacht transport was horse drawn 
24 The US Army was also fully mechanised. 
25 Italy was another. See Eduard Mark, op. cif., on 'Operation Strangle', p. 95. 
26 He had previously experienced the dangers of vulnerable L of C's in Syria. 
27 See Michael Howard, Clausewitz, OUP 1983, reprint 1992. pp. 3-4. 
28 Naval mobility was also changed in the Pacific by supply at sea and aircraft carriers, resulting in the demise of 
the capital ship as the major fleet unit. 
29 At Montain in Brittany in 1944 the battle was dominated by rocket-firing RAF Typhoons. See Richard P. 
Hall ion, Strike from the Sky: The Histmy of Battlefield Air Attack, 1911-1945. Shrewsbury, Airlife 1989. 
pp. 214-18. 
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difficult Monsoon conditions; by crossing the Chindwin River and forming a defence 
line along the Indian frontier the British were able to 'buy time'. 
The Monsoon dominated visibility and mobility on the ground and in the air and 
'Weather windows' determined when intensive military operations could take place. 
By gaining meteorological expertise, the British were eventually often able to ignore 
this limitation to air power, an advantage not available to Japanese commanders. 3D 
In the first attempt at a divisional offensive in the Arakan in 1942, Wavell and his 
army commander had failed to adapt. They underestimated the terrain over which 
they were fighting and its effect on the single L of C, and compounded this by 
ignoring Japanese mobility. Frustrated by the unexpected weather and limitations of 
the only road, they attempted to push beyond the available logistical support capacity 
and fell victim to a classic Japanese road block. Slim, when finally called upon to 
advise on the situation was clearly appalled. The solution was to air supply and use 
close air support as much as possible. Fortunately this was sufficient to enable an 
extraction to be made, but the Division was back to its start line. Demonstrably, 
Wavell and his Army commander had not adapted to the changing circumstances of 
either their environment or their foe. The lesson here was that air support and air 
transport were a solution to Japanese tactics. The 1942 failure was to bring forth 
officers with the ability and vision to understand what was necessary and that 
teamwork was essential. 
The mobility of air transport became a major factor of the campaign, for without it 
there is reason to believe that the British would have suffered a defeat at Imphal and 
the Arakan at the hands of General Mutaguchi and the 15th Army in 1944. In the 
battle of the Admin Box air supply was vital as was the later flying-in of the 5th and 
the majority of the 7th Indian Divisions from the Arakan to Imphal, a fact which even 
the Japanese recognised.31 Imphal halted the main Japanese offensive and 'broke the 
back' of the Japanese 15th Army. At Meitkila air transport again changed the tide of 
battle where the Cowan's division was under siege and the main airfield was in danger 
of being overrun. An Airborne Brigade was flown-in over a period of three days and 
made it possible to both secure the airfield and go over to the offensive. After 
Meitkila the Japanese were no longer able to present a coherent defence and its 
capture cut the Japanese land forces in two, ' .. .it was the seizure of Meitkila which 
finally destroyed any chance [Lt. Gen.] Kimura had of rectifying the situation in 
30 Apart from only having few transport aircraft, the Japanese Air Force never really overcame the difficulties of 
flying tlu·oughout the period of the Burma Monsoon. 
31 OCMH Japanese Monograph No. 64, Part 2, p. 309. 
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Central Burma.'32 All these battles were, to paraphrase Wellington's words,' close-run 
things' but they were also where air transport proved its value.33 
Air transport and close air support were also vital to the Chindit operations. Aircraft 
supplied the troops and evacuated the sick and battle casualties, a luxury not available 
to them in the first expedition in 1943. Such operations did much to maintain morale. 
Most of this support came from the USAAF 1st Air Commando commanded by 
Colonel Cochran and provided further testimony to the affinity between the air force 
and the troops on the ground. Unfortunately, the Chindit force was wrongly used by 
General Stilwell and ordered to attack Japanese fixed defensive positions at 
Myitkyina. They were neither trained nor equipped for this role, their heaviest support 
weapons being the .303 medium machine gun and 3 in. mortars, the heaviest weapons 
and ammunition which could be effectively transported by mule.34 The 3.7 in. 
howitzer used by the Indian Army designed to be transportable on three mules was 
not used because adequate supplies of ammunition could not be supported in the field 
as a proportion of air supply. This misuse was compounded by Stilwell's commitment 
of the US raiding force Merrill's Marauders similarly air supplied who were also 
decimated at Myitkyina.35 The air force attempted to support the ground attacks but 
they were not co-ordinated or effective against the Japanese bunker systems. and 
tanks and heavy artillery were not available for 'bunker busting'. Stilwell 
misunderstood the role of air power and air ground co-operation and was not in any 
case, in sympathy with it. 
To assess the scale of effort made by air transport in Burma, a comparison with the 
Berlin Airlift of 1948-1949 seems appropriate as both 'Theatres' were completely 
dependent on being supplied by air. It should be appreciated that the Berlin Airlift 
was accomplished with a relatively developed supply system already in existence 
with sophisticated production and delivery networks available and capable of being 
developed. Over a period of 318 days 2,360,000 tonnes of supplies were flown into 
Berlin in 277,728 sorties by aircraft of the RAF and USAF; the target was to fly in 
5,500 tons daily.36 Most of the distances flown, mainly from West Germany, were 
somewhat less than those in Burma, although meteorological conditions were often 
32 Alien, Burma: The Longest Wai· 1941-1945, op.cit., p. 425. Lt. Gen. Kimura Heitaro was C-in-C of Burma 
Area Army comprising of the Japanese 15th, 28th and 33rd Armies. Boatner, op.cit., p. 275-6, Fuller, op.cit., p. 
133-4. 
33 The Duke of Wellington's answer to a question on the battle of Waterloo. 
34 The remnants of the Chindits, commanded by John Masters, were flown out to India on the 27th August 1944. 
35 All this has been well documented by Alien, op.cit., pp. 362-80. See also Barbara W. Tuchman, Sand Against 
the Wind, London, MacDonald Futura 1981. pp. 574-7 and John Masters, The Road Past Mandalay: A Personal 
Narrative, London, Michael Joseph, 6th imp. 1962. pp. 278-9, on the dislike for Stilwell at this time. 
36 An average of 8.5 tonnes per sortie, or nearly three times the capacity of a Dakota. David Millar, The Cold 
War: A Militmy History, London, John Murray 1998, p. 332. 
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nearly as bad.37 The RAF's A vro Y orks with a capacity of almost eight tons and the 
USAF's C-54s of nearly ten tons, formed part of the transport fleet.38 This was a 
considerable advantage when compared to the three tons of the C-47 Dakotas used in 
Burma. 
In 1945 the critical period in Burma was between January and May, after the XIVth 
Army had crossed the Chindwin River and were entirely dependent on air supply until 
it reached Rangoon.39 To meet this demand 210,000 tons of supplies were delivered 
at an average daily rate of 1,031 tons in January rising to 1,625 in May. In addition 
7,500 tons (54 tons per day) were being air dropped to XV Corps in the Arakan.40 
The total airlift tonnage was some 217,500 tons over a period of 141 days, an average 
of 1542 tons per day. The Combat Cargo Task Force (CCTF) responsible for this had 
twelve C-47 Dakota squadrons in January, but by May this had increased to seventeen 
squadrons. These transport aircraft with maximum loads of three tons were mostly 
operating at their maximum operational range into unsophisticated and newly 
constructed airstrips which were continually changing to keep pace with the advance. 
During the Berlin Airlift 225 C-54s were used by the USAF with a daily capacity of 
6,487 tons. In addition there were 131 assorted transport aircraft (including civilian) 
used by the RAF with a daily capacity of 1,481 tons making a total of 356 aircraft 
with a combined a theoretical daily capacity total of some 7968 tons.41 In reality the 
average daily delivery figure was more like 5500 tons. 42 If theoretical daily capacities 
are compared, assuming one sortie per aircraft per day, then 7968 tons average were 
available for Berlin and 1146 tons for Burma. For Berlin the actual deliveries on a 
daily basis average at some 69 per cent of theoretical capacity, whereas in Burma the 
actual deliveries were 15 per cent greater than the theoretical air transport capacity. In 
Burma the actual average daily deliveries were 1328 tons using C-47s and in Berlin 
5500 tons.43 
37 In Burma, mountains were frequently enveloped in mist and cloud and air currents could be extremely 
dangerous. In Europe, as winter approached fog was a hazard and cloud cover often meant that visibility was 
restricted on approach paths. 
38 Aim and John Tusa, The Berlin Airlift, London, Hodder & Stoughton 1988, Spellmount 1998. p. 238. Neither 
of these aircraft were available in Burma. 
39 That is apart from supplies dispatched by road and inland water transport (IWT) using the upper reaches of the 
Chindwin and Irrawaddy rivers. Some 16 per cent of the total of 261 600 tons, 5 500 tons by road and 38 600 tons 
by IWT, most to rear echelon formations. Kirby, vol. iv, op.cit. , p. 413. 
40 Kirby, vol. iv, op.cit., p. 409. Due to the delivery meiliod aircraft flying air drops carried a reduced load. 
41 Ann and John Tusa, op.cit., p. 309. Aircraft were making an average of three sorties per day, but the theoretical 
capacity figure was never attained. 
42 During the Berlin Airlift, six RAF Yorks were used and Dakotas equipped nine RAF squadrons as well as 225 
C-54s of the USAF. David Millar, ibid., p. 309. Owen Thetford, Aircraft oft he Royal Air Force since 1918, 
op.cit., pp. 69-70 and pp. 246-7. 
43 Burma figures obtained from Kirby, vol. iv, op. cit., pp. 409-10 and a pp .. 22 pp. 508-12. The averages were 
calculated between the lowest and highest number of !lircraft used dming this period. 
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This comparison demonstrates that the air transport effort in Burma during the 
advance on Rangoon was an extraordinary accomplishment and can only have been 
achieved with aircrews flying excessive numbers of sorties and hours. Comparison 
with Berlin is difficult as there were other factors influencing delivery such as, 
maintenance schedules and peace versus war risk options. 44 Nevertheless these 
tentative calculations point to an outstanding effort in Burma in the air transport 
operation and the intense levels of co-operation that were achieved. In summing up 
the importance of air transport generally, Slim identified the two major problems in 
Burma, ' ... Maintenance[supply] and Movement. Our one real advantage over the Jap 
[was] air supremacy. [This] gave us the answer to both these in air transportation.'45 
Given this scale of logistic support, the courage, tenacity, and ability to suffer 
privation of the Japanese Army could not possibly have brought victory on their own. 
'They [the Japanese] failed in the intelligent use of courage .... [and] ... to understand the 
true meaning of airpower ( ... )they failed because air logistics in the form of a 
continuous flow of airborne supplies was unknown to them.'46 Air transport became a 
'secret war' enabling men and supplies to be transported over immense distances and 
difficult terrain without the enemy being aware. 
Interdiction 
The accepted wisdom of the Desert War and the campaigns in Italy and Europe was 
that air interdiction was the critical component of army and air force co-operation. 
Indeed, this view continued to be held during the Korean and Vietnam wars and was 
only proved to be false in Asian conditions when results were analysed later.47 In 
spite of the apparent weight of evidence from elsewhere, air interdiction was not 
critical in Burma. It is doubtful if interdiction affected the progress of the war when 
used against the Japanese in Burma as they did not depend exclusively on the 
classical forms of road and rail transport for their logistic support. They were masters 
of camouflage and improvisation when it came to the movement and supply, 
requiring considerably less rear echelon support than western forces. Their innovative 
use of bicycles in Malaya for example, was later to be imitated by the North 
44 PRO AIR 23/ 1975 provides another interesting comparison. During 1944 Bomber Command dropped 470,00 
tons of bombs, during the same period 600, 000 tons of supplies were air dropped in Burma. 
45 Slim Papers, CCC, Box 3/1. 
46 Martin Caidin, The Ragged, Rugged Warriors, New York, Bantam 1979. p.xiv- xvi. 
47 When applied to Asia. See Eduard Mark, op.cit. p. 324 :md p. 407. 
152 
Vietnamese where the USAF never succeeded in closing the so called 'Ho Chi Min' 
supply traii.48 
The Japanese, in so far as they were able, resourced their army and air force by 
exploiting the local assets· within south-east Asia. Their ground forces tended to 'live 
of the land', and operated without the level of logistics 'tails' that were common in 
European armies. 49 This nullified the effect of air interdiction to a level not 
experienced in Europe. 50 However it had clearly had some effect because the 
Japanese, like the Allies, were at the end of a long supply chain. Without doubt the 
interdiction of railway lines and the bombing of bridges on the lines from Rangoon 
and Thailand for instance did have repercussions, but the results are impossible to 
quantify. 51 The Japanese themselves suggest that it caused a reduction in supplies and 
eventually only those transported by the Burma-Siam railway were reaching them. 
Such was the paucity of the land lines of communication in Burma that both sides 
were plagued by the logistics nightmare. Major Ogata states that in 1944, 
The transportation for the accumulation of munitions during the rainy season 
was carried out by the Thailand-Burma railway [only] which had been opened 
for the reason that the sea route to Rangoon was practically cut off by enemy 
submarine warfare, air attacks, and also by the deficit [deficient] number of 
our ships. 52 
Kinvig describes the railway as having been built as a 'strategic imperative'.53 The 
Japanese proved as impressive soldiers and airmen in defence as they had been in 
offence; stubborn and resilient, they would bitterly contest every inch of ground in the 
face of repeated air and ground assaults . Their air force continually disputed air 
superiority in spite of being increasingly outnumbered by aircraft superior in 
performance. 
As with interdiction, the Allied strategic bomber force had a only limited impact. In 
Malaya the efforts to stage a counter-air campaign against the Japanese airfields in 
48 Eduard Mark, ibid., passim. The French tried air interdiction in Indo China but failed to stop supplies reaching 
General Giap at Dien Bien Phu. See Robert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows, Morrow 1994, London,Little, Brown 
1994. p. 588 and p. 936, and Peter Macdonald, Giap: The Victor In Vietnam, London, Fourth Estate 1993. p. 132. 
49 OCMH Japanese Monograph No.S~ p. '22.0 . 
50 Eduard Mark, op. cit. p. 40 I and 406 especially n. l. He suggest that the failure of American interdiction 
during both the Korean and Vietnam wars was partly due to the concentration of studies on Europe in WW 11. It 
would suggest that, if a study had been made of the results of interdiction in Burma lessons appropriate to these 
wars may have been usefully absorbed. 
51 All records were deliberately destroyed by the Japanese before surrender Japanese and unlike ot11er Allied 
Theatres of war, there were insufficient OR Us to attempt to record ilie actual effect of air interdiction. 
52 OCMH Japanese Monograph No. 64, Part 11, p. 356 .. 
53 Clifford Kinvig, 'Allied POW's and the Burma-Thailand Railway' in Phi lip Tow le et al eds. Japanese 
Prisoners of War, London and New York, Hambledon, and London 2000. pp. 38-9 
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Indo-China had failed because of a lack of aircraft with sufficient range.54 In Burma 
there were few genuine strategic targets available apart from the docks at Rangoon 
and Bangkok. Heavy bombing of areas close to the front lines, 'Earthquake' missions, 
were hazardous for friendly units and brought small returns. The bombers (Liberators) 
retained in theatre were often co·nverted to Special Duties (SD) squadrons flying SOE 
and SIS operations, their long operational range making them the only aircraft able to 
undertake many of these missions. 55 On balance the evidence suggests that these 
aircraft absorbed an uneconomic proportion of the available materiel capacity and 
manpower for arguably limited returns. 56 
By 1943 the key elements of inter-service co-operation, air transport and close 
support, had begun to emerge and arguably without these, the whole campaign would 
not have been drawn to a successful conclusion. It is conceivable that a stalemate 
would have been the end result on the ground. But using these 'weapons' would not 
have been possible without the construction of airfields. The construction and 
maintenance of forward airfields close to the front line and the air protection of the 
transport aircraft involved units of the RAF, RE and the Army Service Corps working 
in harmony to meet the demands of the campaign. Spitfires for example, had to be 
forward to ensure air superiority to protect air corridors. 57 Ziemke has no doubt that 
air superiority was a decisive factor in war operations and says, 'The outstanding, 
most expensive, and last to be mastered lesson of the war in the air was that air 
superiority was the operational sine qua non'. 58 This is of course not possible without 
air bases from which to operate. 
The importance of airfields and airfield construction thus cannot be over emphasised. 
It controlled the speed of advance, the level of supply and therefore the size of the 
forces involved. This was a crucial difference between the British and Japanese 
commanders. Slim understood the use of air power. Mutaguchi did not, his mind was 
limited in a similar way to that of the British in Malaya at the outbreak of the war. In 
early 1944 Tazoe, his air force commander, undoubtedly understood and was well 
informed on the implications of airlift. He was clearly appalled by what he saw as the 
54 The damage to airfields caused by heavy bombing is in any case questionable as a counter-air tactic. 
55 RAFMH, Wood Papers, Gp. Capt. B.A.C, RAF, Box 2. Some Catalina flying-boat~ operated out of Ceylon on 
SOE missions but were subject to the sea conditions at the destinations. 
56 No official assessment of the effect of strategic bombing appears to have been made in this Theatre and the 
value of SD operations was a matter of opinion. 
57 Spitfires had very limited operational ranges. 
58 Earle F. Ziemke, 'Military Effectiveness in The Second World War' in Allan R. Millett and Williamson 
Murray, op.cit. p. 306. 
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consequences of Mutaguchi's false assumptions and even flew to see Kawabe, the 
area army commander and Mutaguchi's senior officer, but to no avail. 59 
The Japanese air force were also aware of the need for airfields and used them to 
rotate and move their squadrons to where the need was greatest, operating aircraft 
from forward airfields only when the need arose. In some ways Burma was a battle of 
airfields and thus co-operation. For both sides, airfields was a new facet of warfare 
that was determined by the terrain and the size of the battle area. 60 Both sides were at 
the tail end as far as priorities were concerned. The British suffered from the 
'Germany First' policy and the Japanese from their reverses in the south-west Pacific 
and consequently both were driven to innovate and adapt to the geographical 
circumstances in which they fought. Perhaps the term 'forgotten' might also be 
applied to the Japanese, certainly there would appear to be a note of despair in their 
requests to the homeland for aircraft and personnel replacements. 
During 1943, as the campaign continued, the Japanese air force in Burma was 
beginning to experience difficulties mostly due to it being a Japanese 'backwater'. 
Lieutenant General Obata, the commanding the 5th Hikoshidan found that his 
command was continually being reduced in its effectiveness, not only due to losses 
but also to unit transfers to other theatres and replacements from Japan arriving 
without any operational training.6l As the author of a Japanese Monograph states 
' ... operational training was dropped [in 1943], aircrew were sent straight to 
operational squadrons on arrival from Japan.•62 The Staff Officer to the 5th 
Hikoshidan, Masa Tanaka also reports that, 
... the 12th Air Brigade [Hikodan] was transferred to the Solomon[s] area, 
carrying with it a great amount of automatic canon shells [20mm?] and a large 
number of detachable fuel tanks( ... ) Most of the fuel supplied [for aircraft in 
Burma] was the type 77 gasoline [77 octane] which had to be mixed with high 
octane fuel oil because the types of our planes [and their engines] were 
improved[from those used in 1941 and 1942] .63 
59 See Alien, op.cit., pp. 326-8, for an informed discussion on this subject. Unusual for Alien, he does not quote 
his source. 
60 The front line was almost ~s long as the Eastern front in Russian. 
61 Lt. Gen. Obata (Hideyoshi) was in command of the air group which attacked the Philippines and in March 1943 
was promoted to Command the 3rd Air Army in Indo-China. He went on to command the 3rd Air Army 
[Kokugiin] handing over to Lt. Gen. Tazoe (Noboro). Not to be confused with General Obata (Nobuyoshi) who 
was Chief of Staff 15th Army under General Mutaguch.i. Richard Fuller, Shokan, op.cit, pp. 175-6 and p. 215. 
62 OCMH Japanese Monograph No. 64, Air Operations in the Burma Area, Part 1 ( 15 January 1942 to August 
1943) 
p. 302. 
63 OCMH Japanese Monograph No. 64, ibid, p. 280. See Chapter 4 as this is consistent with comments relating 
to Japanese aviation fuel made by Mr. Goodman in int~rview. 
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Alvin Coax suggests that during the course of 1943 the Japanese Army began to feel 
that the Navy was letting them down. Japanese Army Air Force units were being 
transferred from Southern Area Command, mostly Burma to the south-west Pacific 
area and the Philippines to reinforce the Japanese Navy Air Force. Areas, which were 
the responsibility of the Navy. 
The difficulties experienced by the JAAF must have been increased by the rates of 
sickness experienced by their aircrews. Endemic malaria and other virulent diseases 
affected Allied aircrews and must have affected the Japanese with their erratic 
supplies of quinine.64 There is, however, some evidence that Japanese army units had 
received local air-dropped medical supplies, 
After the middle of May [1945], both the 28th Army isolated in the sector 
north of Rangoon( ... ) and the 33rd Army, isolated in the Shun [Shan] sector, 
were suffering form the lack of military material and medical supplies. 
Therefore, the 5th Air Div. [Hikoshidan] endeavoured to supply them with 
medical supplies from the air.65 
Malaria did not mean that the Japanese Army had lost any of its tenacious spirit, ' ... the 
realization of defeat did not permeate the Japanese Army( ... ) it rather denigrated the 
navy's botching of the Coral sea and Midway battles.'66 
Throughout the war in south-east Asia co-operation was a continuous learning 
experience for the Allies and the apogee for co-operation was reached during 1944 
and 1945 when air supply and evacuation became one of the main elements for 
success . 
... the Allies added a new dimension involving the techniques of air supply 
which had never been used before in warfare( ... )The capability of moving 
troops by air [on this scale] revolutionized tactics, simplifying the problems 
that faced ground commanders, by allowing them to think big and act 
boldly. 67 
The army relied upon the air force to meet its logistic and tactical close support needs 
no matter where or when. A failure in supply, as had happened with the Prussian 
Etappen system in 1870, would have spelled distster in the advance on Rangoon. 68 In 
64 Eric Bergerud comments on the probable effect of malaria on Japanese aircrew performance in the south-west 
Pacific Theatre. Eric Bergerud, op.cit., p. 137. Navies did not suffer the same problem, being at sea meant that the 
incidence of malaria was low. 
65 OCMH Japanese Monograph No. 64, part 2, p. 378. 
66 Alvin D. Coox, The Unfought War, op.cit., p.50. 
67 E.D. Smith, Battle for Burma, op.cit. pp. 155-6. 
68 See Foreword by Stanley L. Falk. p. xvi . in George C. Thorpe, Pure Logistics: The Science of War 
Preparation, reprint Washington DC., NDU 1986, During the Franco-Priussian War Etappen were shuttle 
systems from rail heads to the front 
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spite of the competing demands on the air force and the army and in building and 
maintaining airfields and roads the army suceeded in keeping supply depots, the 
RAMOs, at the base and forward airfields stocked and readily organised for both 
services, sometimes at the cost of its own needs.69 
At this point it is interesting to make some logistics calculations and comparisons 
between transport aircraft and army trucks. For example, if a comparison is made 
between a transport aircraft, say a C-47 Dakota with a three ton load (6,720 lbs) and a 
three ton truck with no allowance for stops for a distance of 500 miles by road and 
250 air miles then: 
Distance Time of outward Tonnage No. of Speed 
(miles) journey (hours) (men) (mph) 
C-47 250 2 3 4 125 
truck 500 50 3 2 10 
For a truck to travel outward with a three ton load, fifty hours, one C-47 can make 
12.5 return flights, 37.5tons. Therefore aircraft are twelve and a half times more 
efficient than tmcks.70 This raises three points; i. How many trucks are needed to 
deliver the same amount as an aircraft in fifty hours to maintain the flow? ii. How 
much fuel is required by each? and iii. How many personnel (crews only) are needed? 
To answer the points in order: 
(i) delivering the same amount would require 25 trucks for every aircraft (including 
the return journey) 
(ii) Fuel consumption (trucks): Assuming 15mpg71, then 500 miles- 15 = 33.3 galls. 
Then33 galls. x 25 trucks= 833 galls. 
Fuel Consumption (C-47): say 1.8 mpg, then 250 miles - 1.8 = 138.8 galls. 
Then 138.8 galls x 12.5 sorties = 1736 galls. 
(iii) Assuming two drivers per truck= fifty drivers. A Dakota (4 crew)= 4 personnel 
would deliver the same tonnage. Although air supply was more expensive in fuel use, 
delivering the same tonnage, still only required one aircraft and crew of 4.72 From this 
it it is evident how effective air transport is . 
69 During 14th Army's advance to Rangoon in 1945 there was frequently a shortfall in the daily tonnage needed. 
Foreseeing this situation Slim arranged that tllis would be bome by tl1e rear echelon formations so as not to impede 
the advance. The need for Bithess and PSP could take up a disproportionate amount of available capacity. 
70 This assumes that 250 miles 'as the crow flys' = 500 miles by road and assumes average speed at !0 mph for a 
truck and 125 mph for an aircraft. These are optimistic assumptions. See Gerhard Neumann, Hermanthe German: 
Enemy Alien, US Army Master Sergeant No.J0500000, NY, Morrow 1984. pp. 69-70. Neumann says that with 
Chinese drivers the 540 nliles journey between Kunming (China) and Wanting, the Chinese end of the Burma 
Road, took eight days each way at an average speed of 5- !0 m ph. The road was similar to that in Burma. 
71 Based on personal experience in East Africa. The calculations theoretically assume continuous movement. 
72 The calculations ignore other factors such as, the amount of fuel required by trucks en route which also needed 
transpotting and the number of mechanics, cooks and others necessary to keep trucks continuously moving. 
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Casualty evacuation also had a positive effect on morale and is impossible to quantify 
although emphatically mentioned in the histories and in reminiscences. The official 
medical history states, 'The recorded evacuation of casualties by air during the 
fighting in south-east Asia in 1944 and 1945 was 178,367'.73 and the RAF medical 
history says, ' ... air evacuation brought a benefit in terms of conserving men and 
resources( ... ) ' .. an average of 600 men a day [were evacuated], whatever the 
weather' .74 
Ground to air contact by radio remained a continuing problem but this was overcome 
to a certain extent by the use of coloured smoke target indicators and Very signals. 
This was a problem limited to RAF aircraft, US aircraft operated on the same 
frequencies as the visual observation posts. The same problem occurred between RAF 
fighter escorts for transport aircraft and a visual communication system had to be 
devised. 75 Wireless communication equates with mobility and its importance was 
emphasised by the two operational research sections, army and air force, who 
concentrated on this problem. 76 The army report comments that there was a total of 
only nineteen army personnel in SEAC.77 It refers to communications as do the RAF 
reports which also report on AMES (radar) and the Japanese warning systems, both 
units concentrated on the most immediate concerns. 78 
Co-operation also included air reconnaissance. Malaya had suffered a self-inflicted 
failure of intelligence as when for example, Colonel Wards' lectures on the Japanese 
Army were derided by service personnel when delivered in Singapore in 1939.79The 
intelligence problem had been recognised by Brooke Popham but the assessments of 
Japanese air power by his staff were misleading. 80 In south-east Asia the battle 
73 Medical Services in War: The Principal Medical Lessons of the Second World War, Edited by Sir Arthur 
Salisbury MacNalty and W. Franklin Melior, op.cit., HMSO 1968, p. 738. 
74 Rexford-Welch, op.cit. p. 476. 
75 PRO AIR 23/2075. Operational instructions 1944. Nos. 12-18. 
76 PRO WO 291/1301, Air 23/2108. Wireless and communications were obviously important in an area where 
they were problematical due to terrain, climate and distances. How important radio communication is can be 
judged by the fact that the success of the German Panzer units has been ascribed to two-way radios equipping all 
their tanks. Martin Van Creveld, Technology and War: From 2000 BC to the Present, London, Brassey's 1991. p. 
180. 
77 PRO WO 291/1301. This would explain why Operational Research Sections (ORS) in other Theatres were 
analysing the effects of tactics or munitions, this was not possible in SEAC with only one RAF unit and one army 
section. 
78 PRO AIR 23/2108. Operational Research. Wireless and communications were obviously important in an area 
where they were problematical due to terrain, climate and distances. How important communications are can be 
judged by the fact that the success of the German Panzer Divisions has been ascribed to the fact that two-way 
radios were installed in all their tanks. Martin Van Creveld, Technology and War: From 2000 BC to the Present, 
London, Brassey's 1991. p. 180. 
79 Peter Elphick, op.cit., pp. 169-70. Col. G.T. Wards was an acknowledged expert on the Japanese Anny. After 
the war he was one of the contributing authors of the War Against Japan, vols. i-v, HMSO, the official history . 
See Wards Papers, IWM. 
80 Percival suggested that Brooke Popham relied too heavily on the advice of Gp. Capt. Darvall. Alien, Singapore, 
op.cil., pp. 52-3. Elphick, op. cif., p.p. 168-9, Aldrich, op. ci f. , pp. 62-3. There is doubt as to whether the air 
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intelligence situation did not dramatically improve except in the field of aerial 
photography. Williamson Murray points out that, 'One of the foremost British 
intelligence successes of the war lay in the capabilities developed in the field of 
photo-reconnaissance'.81 Wireless intelligence was dogged by the problems of 
atmospheric interference; and there were too few British linguists who knew Japanese 
to interpret any documents that were captured. There were few prisoners compared to 
other theatres and especially, almost no officers and none above the rank of Captain 
until hostilities ceased. Under these circumstances, the only significant intelligence 
source available was that of air reconnaissance. However, from December 1943 the 
RAF were increasingly able to deny this form of intelligence to the Japanese who 
then virtually had to fight the campaign blind. 82 
Due to the scarcity of artillery in Burma it was necessary for close air support to take 
its place. As with the Luftwaffe, 'airborne artillery' was a successful expression of co-
operation. With air transport, close air support was one of the success stories of co-
operation. The RAF had never developed a dedicated aircraft for this form of air 
warfare. Sholto Douglas for example, wrote in his memoirs that, 
I could not help feeling with the deepest regret that it would have been so 
much better if, some years earlier, we [the RAF] had developed a dive bomber 
along the lines of Emst Udet's [Junkers Ju 87] Stuka, instead of devoting so 
much of our resources to the design, development and the production of those 
wretched Battles.83 
Burma was unique in close air support operations for it was the only theatre where the 
RAF used dive-bombers, the American Vengeance. It was accurate in the close 
support mission and mostly effective against Japanese bunkers. 84 Tactics were 
decided by experiment during training where errors of only 40 yds were observed. 85 
'The bombing of the latter [Vengeances] was extremely good ... '86 The Vengeance was 
intelligence failure in respect of the Navy 'Zero' for example, can be necessarily laid at either the door of the FECB 
or Gp. Capt. Darvall. Peter Elphick, op.cit., pp. 167-9. Marder, vol. i, op.cit., p. 308 
81 Williamson Murray, 'British Militwy Effectiveness: The Second World War', in Militwy Effectiveness: The 
Second World War, 3 vols., ed. by Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray, London, Alien & Unwin 1988, m, 
p.ll6. 
82 A comparable situation occurred in north-west Europe where, for three days following the D-day landings, the 
Lujhvaffe were unable to fly 'over the battle areas. The German Army had no real idea of the size of the force they 
were opposing. 
83 Lord Douglas of Kirtleside, Years of Command, London, Coil ins 1963. There was a British dive-bomber, the 
Blackbum Skua, that was arguably the superior of the Junkers 87 Stuka . For example, it had a considerably longer 
range but, it was a Aeet Air Arm aircraft. and hardly likely to be looked upon with favour by the RAF. 
84 Hurribombers would not have been as effective against well 'dug-in' targets as they carried 2 x 250 lb. bombs. 
At Fort Dufferin (Mandalay) they were not that effective. The Vengeance carried 2 x 500 lb bombs, with a much 
greater explosive force. 
85 PRO AIR 23/5287, Dive Bombing Training 
86 PRO AIR 23/2072 HQ 3 T AF, Operational Statistics for April1944. 
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used effectively on both the Arakan and central front where it operated side by side 
with Hurribombers. 
They [close support aircraft of 221 Group RAF] concentrated in a sense, the 
power which drew the ground forces forward in the immediate battle area on 
top of the main Japanese Army, whose resistance became broken by air 
assault, and the control of [Japanese] formations and organisations, 
disorganised by air assault. 87 
Mustangs were also used in close support by the 1st Air commando supporting the 
second Chindit operations and later these roles were taken over by RAF 
Thunderbolts. The 'cab ranking' system as used in Europe whereby aircraft 
continually flew over the battle front and were called upon by the ground forces when 
required was seen as ' .. . a notoriously uneconomical use of aircraft. .. •88 Nevertheless, 
in a letter to Slim, General Giffard wrote, 'I am confident that whosoever has seen our 
Pilots attacking the front positions of the enemy and shelling [bombing?] their 
communications in the rear( ... ) will never be able to forget their valour and sense of 
dedication to our cause.'89 The close support needs of the army were readily accepted 
by the RAF and they would willingly have exchanged the Blenheim for more of the 
effective Vengeance.90 
The lessons of 1942 were applied in late 1943 and 1944 when both air transport and 
close air support were put to the test in the Arakan and Imphal. The gaining of experi-
ence especially in the area of air supply was then used in the advance on Mandalay 
and then Rangoon when it was needed to move very large amounts of materiel. 
Supporting the army required expertise and exceptional levels of co-operation to bal-
ance the needs of the two services without detriment to either one. Supplying the 
fighting units, building forward airfields and organising the forward air heads for dis-
tribution was complex but was successfully accomplished. Given the terrain and dis-
tances there was no possible way that road transport could have met these demands. 
Huge numbers of vehicles and drivers would have been necessary to maintain the 
flow of supplies with the limited capacity of the roads and would have bee an impos-
sible constraint. Being limited to ground transport, the Japanese could not possibly 
meet the materiel needs of their forces, even with being supplemented by local 
87 PRO AIR 23/1985, Air Operations South East Asia digest. p.62. 
88 PRO AIR 23/4438. Reconquest of Burma. p. 13. 
89 Slim Papers, CCC, Box 2/1. Letter from General Sir George Giffard dated 28th July 1944. The use of the 
expression 'our pilots' and 'our cause' is not necessarily significant, but it is interesting. 
90 PRO AIR 23/4361 Stevenson to AHQ India, llth September 1942. He states that in the Akyab operations that 
with Vengeances instead ofBienheims only half the effort would have been necessary. The Vengeance could 
accurately deliver a 500 lb bomb, the Blenheim was limited t.o 250 lb bombs with far less accuracy. 
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sources and soldiers on a lower level of sustenance than common in European 
armies. 91 
Clearly, army and air force co-operation was a complex matter, especially when it 
came to supply. However, between 1941 and 1945 a system of operation was 
constructed that was able to stand the test of a rapid advance leading to a resounding 
victory, in spite of a 'Germany First' policy which had left Burma in a logistics 
Desert. That the problems were overcome is the finest testimonial to their co-
operation. 
Epilogue 
'For only the wind will listen.' -1-
Adapting to change 
Military organisations are complex and conservative institutional frameworks, which 
are reluctant to adapt to changed environments and modify their methods unless there 
is forceful and dynamic leadership and a pressure of circumstances. They successfully 
operate as family units and live within their own worlds.92 This is the basis of the 
'Regimental system' and it is both a strength and a weakness. As a strength it produces 
a very determined closely knit fighting unit, as a weakness it does not readily adapt to 
change without specific training as the experience in Malaya demonstrates. There the 
British and Indian army generally did not adapt to the environment.93 The same 
applied to the air force, which persisted in its flawed strategy. In the days leading up 
to war it continued to retain part its bomber force on exposed airfields in the north, in 
spite of the dangers, in the belief that they could attack airfields in Indo-China.94 
Apathy is a danger to any organisation but especially to the military who may be 
called upon with little notice. The threat was such that this could have been avoided 
in Malaya, but prior to the outbreak of war in south-east Asia there was apathy. Most 
of the best senior personnel had been posted to the existing theatres of war and the 
91 On Japanese rations see Merion and Susie Harries, op.cit., p. 314-5. 
92 In the army it was not unusual for sons to follow fathers into the same regiments. 
93 The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders had undertaken jungle training before the Japanese invasion and proved 
to be equal to, if not superior to the Japanese. See Ian MacArthur Stewart, Histoy of the Argyll & Sutherland 
Highlanders: 2nd Ballalion (The Thin Red Line)Malayan Campaign 1941-42, London:NY, Nelson 1947. pp. 98-
105., and Douglas Sutherland, The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders (91st and 93rd Highlanders)ed. Lt Gen. 
Brian Horroks, London, Leo Cooper 1969. pp.1-8. 
94 Orily the Blenheim IV squadron had sufficient range, No. 34 sqn. at AI or Star. See Probert, op.cil., a pp. A. 
-\- T.S. Elliot, Collecled Poems, London, Faber 1936. 
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remainder were unaware of the immediacy of the dangers and happy to remain in 
ignorance. There was no attempt to remedy this apart from bringing a few 
experienced pilots to command the fighter squadrons in Malaya and Burma which 
then performed well. Given the shortages of experienced aircrew, apathy was 
demonstrated by the failure to disperse aircraft. In the army there seems to have been 
a distinct unawareness of the low state of readiness for war. This could have been 
overcome by rotating senior officers who had recently experienced active service and 
giving them the authority to institute training procedures in the way that was already 
becoming an established procedure in RAF. In the memoirs written by recent arrivals 
from war areas, it is frequently mentioned how peacetime attitudes existed in 1941. 
Rotation clearly worked in RAF Commands and there is no reason to believe that it 
would not have worked in south-east Asia in all the services. 95 
Minimising divisions 
The established positions adopted by the British armed forces in south-east Asia had 
undoubtedly mitigated against co-operation. The air force for instance did not consult 
with the army over the siting of the airfields. This was partly encouraged by not hav-
ing an overall commander until the arrival of Brook Popham, but by then it was too 
late. Without a clear and realistic defence plan with a single objective, close inter-
service relationships, did not exist and neither Service understood the problems of the 
other except to give them 'lip-service'. The lesson that Burma taught was that under 
these circumstances a forceful overall commander is necessary at an early stage to 
support officers attempting to co-operate with one another and to dismiss those who 
are being obstructive. This is a ruthless business, but so is war. Exchanges in this 
respect are helpful as the example of RAF officers working with the ground forces 
and Army personnel working with the transport squadrons in Burma illustrate. 
The experiences of Burma suggest that stress and exchanges both enable personal re-
lationships to be established and result in inter-service co-operation. Working to-
gether to solve problems produces teamwork and experience. It is surprising how 
often personal relationships worked in war situations and how often they are men-
tioned in the Memoirs.96 Exchanges give every reason to believe that inter-service 
relationships would then be just as effective as those established in Burma. Stress 
provides an engine and forces decision-making leaders to appear who can make the 
right choices, without decisions only chaos results. 
Mobility 
95 Both Fighter and Bomber Commands successfully rotated aircrew to operational training units. 
96 The same school syndrome seems to be equally effectiv~ . 
I, -
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Mobility was a key factor in the campaign in Burma as it presnted Slim with the gift 
of tactical freedom. However, it also comes with logistic penalties such as distance, 
which in turn incurs debts of time, fuel and volume of materiel.97 They are caused by 
the time spent 'in the pipeline', the greater the distance the more materiel that is 
needed to maintain the flow and the more chance of things going wrong.98 To 
overcome these problems the Allies developed high levels of co-operation and 
expertise. Slim, in summing up the campaign described the differences in logistical 
outlooks between the British and Japanese: 'They [the Japanese] launched their troops 
into the boldest offensives on the slenderest administrative margins( ... ) The British 
Army, ever since the terrible lesson of the Crimea had tended to stress supply at the 
expense of mobility•.99 However, he had quickly grasped the possibilities that, 
reducing the number of road vehicles and supplanting them with air transport would 
give him in the difficult terrain of Burma. This was a tactical advantage of both 
supply and mobility which the enemy was unlikely to be able to match. Ziemke is 
quite clear on the importance of this particular point when he states unequivocally, 
'Mobility was the common goal of all Second World War tactical doctrine, the war's 
outstanding contribution to military art and its most durable legacy. It was the 
principal combined-arms achievement... '.100 Nowhere was this more true of the 
fighting on land than in Burma. 
In war, the personality of the commanders is important and this was particularly 
demonstrated in south-east Asia. In Malaya the personalities of the British 
commanders had not allowed them to adapt to changing circumstances or to provide 
forceful leadership with catastrophic results. 101 In Burma forceful leadership and 
personality 'got things done' and instilled confidence. Clearly, the levels of co-
operation experienced in Burma would not have been possible without commanders 
who were willing to learn from their experience. Certain personalities stand out as 
being crucial to success and especially to inter-service co-operation. Undoubtedly 
General Slim was the major driving force in Burma and the strongest advocate of co-
operation. As the senior service figure, he was the first to see the importance of a co-
operation ethos between the army and the RAf.102 He was closely followed by Peirse, 
97 Some of Clausewitz's 'frictions' and 'Murphy's Law'. See Michael Howard, op. cit ., p. 25. 
98 See Michael Howard, ibid, p. 25: See also V an Creveld, Technology and War: From 2000 BC to the Present, 
London, Brassey's 1991. pp. 173-82, for an interesting discussion on mobility and logistics. Significantly he does 
not include the campaign in Burma. 
99 Slim, Defeat into Victory, op.cit. p.539. 
100 Earle F. Ziemke, 'Military Effectiveness in The Second World War' in Allan R. Millett and Williamson 
Murray, op.cit. p.311. 
101 Classic examples are Admiral Philips refusal to call for air cover for Force Z and Brook Popham's failure to 
order Operation Matador.. 
102 As a former Gurkha officer his pre-war experience of aircraft was limited but encounters with air power in 
Abyssinia and Syria introduced him to its significance. See Lewin, op. cit ., pp. 66-72. 
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the air commander who, determined to support the army, persistently attempted to 
obtain additional transport aircraft and Spitfires to deny Japanese air reconnaissance 
and protect air transport corridors. Three other personalities also stand out in the field 
of co-operation, Mountbatten, Wingate and Cochran. Mountbatten gave whole-
hearted support to his commanders in obtaining additional transport aircraft when 
needed and Wingate and Cochran perfected the methods of air delivery and co-
operation necessary to obtain high rates of success.l03 They were all individuals with 
their own ideas yet also team players. The evidence suggests that there was little 
discord and that teamwork owed much to the long supply chain and the need to work 
together to overcome difficulties. 104 As recipients at the lowest level of priority they 
shared a feeling of mutual deprivation and of being 'forgotten' with regard to both 
supplies and encouragement from London. 
In Burma personality also influenced the Japanese and General Mutaguchi is an 
~""'Pif2.. 
unfavourable ,..._As with the Allies the Japanese were also at the end of a long line of 
communication with the homeland but unlike them, their supply system relied heavily 
on 'living off the land' and this produced a frame of mind which tended to become 
'fixed'. Mutaguchi, who appears to have been driven by personal ambition, was the 
cause of dissension between himself and some of his subordinate commanders. His 
'fixed mind' blinded him to their supply problems which his strategy compounded. 
Clearly he seems to have lacked a practical appreciation of what was possible and 
what was not. He failed to adapt to the changed Allied circumstances of 1944, and he 
assumed that British supplies so available in Malaya would again be accessible in 
Burma. The result was disaster and the destruction of the 15th Army. 
The Burma campaign illustrated that what was successful against one kind of enemy 
may not necessarily be successful against another and interdiction is a case in point. 
But more that that, the evidence suggests that the ultimate lesson of Burma was that 
army and air force co-operation are a vital combination in solving many of the 
problems encountered in war and that to do so requires commanders of force and 
personality. It will not necessarily produce the victory that it did in Burma, but it will 
produce the most efficient fighting force possible making the best use of it's 
resources. 
103 Mountbatten became Supreme Commander SEAC in November 1943. 
104 As supply had to be organised many months in advance of the estimatect needs, there were always going to be 
shmtages which could not be immediately met without mutual collaboration. 
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NOTES ON SOURCES : 
Evidence for the historian can be a hazard but, one which must be allowed for. 
Comments on sources for south-east Asia 
In spite of the importance of co-operation in south-east Asia during the Second World 
War and since, especially in the field of air transport, there is little written work 
devoted to the subject in either official or other histories. The official history of 
Transport Command, Humphrey Wynn's, Forged in War: A History of RAF 
Tramport Command, written by a senior member of the staff of the Air Historical 
Branch of the MOD has only half of one chapter on Burma and the Foreword by 
ACM Sir Thomas Pickett, the AOC Transport Command does not even mention the 
Burma operations. 1 Close air support in Burma also gets short shrift but in contrast 
has been copiously dealt with for other areas. 
Mostly this seems to be because sources for the war in south-east Asia present 
difficulties. Significantly historians such as, Marder Old Friends, New Enemies and 
Gooderson in his Air Powrer at the Battlefront:Allied Close Air Support in Europe, 
1943-1954 have raised the problem of sources.Gooderson goes so far as to admit that 
his personal area of study was influenced by the lack of source material for south-east 
Asia.2 Kratoska,The Japanese Occupation of Malaya: A Social and Economic 
History, also comments that, ' ... academic literature on the occupation [Malaya] is 
sparse, reflecting a lack of source materials on the period.' He writes of the spells of 
destruction by the British in 1941, the Japanese in 1945 and by looters in both periods 
and that ' ... occupation records are even more dubious than the usual run of 
questionable materials used by historians of Southeast Asia.'3 Gilchrist confirms this 
and writes that, " ... unfortunately there are no documents recording what was actually 
said because most of the Singapore War Diaries and signal files were subsequently 
lost. "4 But this is not an unknown position, as Gilchrist was to comment on, 'What 
needs to be done in consequence of the non-survival of official records .. .'5 and later, 'I 
was surprised to find, after a lapse of fifteen years, how little information I could pick 
up about the events of 1941-42.' 6 
1 Humphrey Wynne, Forged in War, London, Stationery Office 1996. 
2 Gooderson, Ian., Air Power at the Batt/e.fi·ont: Allied Close Air Support in Europe 1944-45, London, Cass 1998. 
p.4. 
3 Kratoska, op.cit., pp. 6-9. 
4 Gilchrist, op. cit., p. 180. On this point see Gilchrist , Sir An drew, Malaya 1941., Robert Hale, London 1992. He 
is a formidable witness to the events he describes. and for his comments on evidence see for example, pp. 88-9 n.2, 
andp. %. 
5 Gilchrist, op.cit., p. 125. 
6 Gilchrist, ibid. p.180. 
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Desperate withdrawals and struggles for survival do not encourage the recording or 
keeping of detailed accounts of events as they ocur, only afterwards are attempts 
made to chronicle history. This applied equally to the RAF as to the Army. Cotton, 
Hurricanes over Burma quotes Wing Commander Stone RAF; "All records of the 
first Burma campaign were lost, ... "7. Daniel Ford Flying Tigers, states, ' ... the 
operational logbook of No. 67 (Buffaloes) squadron RAF was destroyed in the 
retreat'S Interestingly, he disagrees with part of General Slim's account of some of the 
RAF actions which indicates how distorted the recording of events can be during a 
retreat. 9 
Other difficulties remain. Professor Arthur J. Marder discussed these in the preface to 
Old Friends, New Enemies, which is worth quoting in full , 
Pax ton 
I would at this point comment on several problems that arose in the course of 
research and writing. There was, first of all, a matter of informants.( ... ) the 
Imperial Japanese Navy officers I interviewed were as a group somewhat 
reluctant to speak frankly,( ... ) A factor may be that ancient Chinese saying 
which is well known in Japanese Service circles: 'Defeated generals should 
not talk of battles (Haigun no sho hei Katarazu)'. Japanese scholars have 
called my attention to other considerations to explain the blandness and 
superficiality of statements( ... ) that history is traditionally written that way in 
Japan, and that this is due to groupism. It is the peculiarly Japanese problem 
of tatemae versus honne: tatemae, what is said and written for the. record, and 
which is not necessarily the truth or the whole truth, versus honne, the actual 
truth- what one intends or really means- which one expresses if one is 
courageous, though, normally, only to confidents or when in one's cups. 
Honne, I have reason to believe, does not always appear in the records or in 
autobiographies- or in interviews with historians .... the Western historian has 
a problem in evaluating Japanese material that he does not have in working 
with British materials. ID 
, makes a very interesting observation in reference to 
evidence which is of relevance to this particular theatre of war, 
7 Cotton, M. C., Sqdn. Ldr., RAF, HwTicanes over Burma, Grub Street, London 1995. p.301. This is a quote from 
the Memoirs bf W g. Comd. Stone, RAF, which are included in this volume. 
8 See Ford, Daniel, Flying Tigers, Srnithsonian Institution Press, Washigton 1991. p. 164. 
9 Slim's book, Defeat in/0 Victory refers to tl1e RAF actions at Mingdalon and subsequently at Magwe. Stone 
also comments critically on Aliens book [The Long Retreat] when refering to the same events at Magwe, 
presumably both Slim and Alien relied upon the same sources. 
10 Marder, op.cit., pp. ix-xi 
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The contemporary historian alternatively feasts and starves. On the one hand, 
modern records-keeping produces a flood of papers, much of it trivial...On the 
other hand, increasing use of the telephone and rapid transport have decreased 
the frequency with which public officials draft long, intimate reports to their 
seniors. Many a vital decision has been taken without minutes in the age of 
electronic communication. ll 
In this context he also speaks of the 'dead hand' of government secrecy.l2 This view is 
confirmed by Aldrich Intelligence and the War Against Japan, who confronted 
problems of source material, ' ... any historian must confront the possibility that the 
limited materials that are extant may constitute a deliberate deception inflicted by one 
department upon another, or an inter-departmental exercise in "black humour".' 13 
The amount of 'paper' being circulated in south-east Asia was invariably limited by 
the huge distances involved and the need to keep 'loads' to necessities ((paper weighs 
a lot). Opposed to this, a 'flood of papers' is reported by Higham referring to all RAF 
files , 'During World War Two the Air Ministry is estimated to have raised two million 
new files, not counting the pre-war ones'.l4 These present a monumental task if any 
'mining of files' has to be undertaken. For example, AIR 23 Overseas Commands, 
contains over eight thousand files. Yet south-east Asia was a wartime 'backwater' and 
many documents relevant to co-operation seem not to have been transferred Britain at 
the end of the war. 
Consequently, sources are limited, by being lost, possibly destroyed or buried in the 
plethora of other material. Higham's research caused him to comment, 'Though both 
Allied and enemy forces did their best to destroy these seemingly unimportant 
[logistics] records, the Air Ministry and the PRO appear to have done an even better 
job on the RAF materials .. .'l5 It seems he has a point, concerned officials in the War 
Office remarked that many reports made by 10 ORS (in SEAC), ' ... may never have 
reached England.'l6 Aldrich observes that, ' ... the burning of documents by means of 
bonfires in embassy gardens was so synonymous [in 1941] with imminent 
invasion .. .' 17 Stripp recalled, ' .. . decrypts and rough translations( ... ) were 
ll Paxton. Parades and Politics at Vichy: Princeton NJ, Princeton 1966. p. 433. 
12 Paxton has also raised the spectre facing many late twentieth century historians pointing to the difficulties 
raised by modern electronic communications such as the telephone, FAX and E-mail. 
l3 Richard J. Aldrich, Intelligence and the War Against Japan : Britain, America and the Politics of Secret 
Service, CUP 2000. p.385. 
14 Robin Higham, 'RAF Logistics Planning in the Inter-War Years: An Introduction' , Journall9, RAF Historical 
Society, 1999. 
15 Robin Higham, Journal 19, RAF Historical Society, op.cit. , p. 52, n. 1. 
16 WO 29111301, Operational Research in the British Army 1931-45, October 1947. para.%. 
17 Aldrich, op. cif. p. 386. 
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expendable[in SEAC] in the official view.' 18 Personal interviews have also confirmed 
that, at the end of the war, there was a of lack of purpose to make the effort to retain 
written material for forwarding to the UK.19 
This situation was even further compounded by necessity. Slim writes that during the 
retreat in 1942 his Corps HQ was very small and,' ... because we could not issue or 
keep much paper [records], it was I believe very efficient.( ... ) ... the whole of our 'G' 
branch, for instance, moved on two jeeps, one truck, and a couple of motor cycles-
and orders were more [often] than not verbal. We issued, I think, only four written 
directives.'20 and later, 'Men and units were jettisoning more and more [equipment 
and thus presumably typewriters] as they realised that mobility and survival were 
synonymous.' 21 
The official RAF files also seem to suffer from an imbalance and subjects. Wynn 
comments, 'There is a great dearth of information in historical records of the Second 
World War about logistics -.'22 One reason seems to be a shortage of personnel in 
SEAC to keep records. Higham suggests, ' ... planning failed to take into account the 
medical conditions and logistical necessities of campaigns abroad ... sickness in the Far 
East was such that, in effect, more than the entire RAF personnel and necessities area 
had to be replaced.'23 Record keeping problems were common, both sides similarly 
destroyed records or simply did not keep them when it was convenient to adopt this 
course. It was further exacerbated by destruction wrought by the climate and ruinous 
insects endemic to this part of the world. This argues the need for the historian to 
adopt less orthodox methodologies and a lateral approach to sources. 
Bearing all this in mind it is perhaps wise to take the following dictum of that eminent 
Cambridge historian Geoffrey R. Elton to heart, 
From the historian's point of view all evidence divides into two kinds: that 
produced specifically for his attention, and that produced for some other 
purpose. What survives from the past was put together either by someone who 
18 Quoted by Aldrich, ibid. p. 386. 
19 Some interveiwees suggested that the 1945 election papers arriving in the middle of the war, as far as they were 
concerned, produced an attitude of 'sod them', 'them' being the authorities in the UK. 
20 Slim, Defeat inlo VictOJy, Cassell, London 1956. p. 25. 
21 Slim, ibid. p.33. 
22 Humphrey Wynn, 'The Logistics of Support for the Second World War Land-Air Campaign', Journal No. 19, 
RAF Historical Society 1999. p. 57. 
23 Robin Higham, 'RAF Logistics Plarming in the Inter-War Years: An Introduction', Journal 19, RAF Historical 
Society, p.48, quoting from Rexford-Welch, op.cit. 
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wished it to survive, or by someone who had a purpose to serve in which the 
prospect of the historians interest played no part. 24 
Similar sentiments have been echoed by Cruikshank and others , 
... it is unusual in the middle of a war, especially if things are going badly, to 
pay much attention to the needs of a future historian. ( ... )There is no absolute 
certainty that a [official] paper, whether written by a single hand or by a 
committee, can be taken at its face value. 25 
This suggests that the originators of records (especially those that survive?) will 
generally have their own agendas and the research has been approached with this in 
mind. For example, it has been suggested by Peter Mead, Orde Wingate and the 
Historians that there was a deliberate distortion of events by official historians such 
as the controversy over Woodbum Kirby in his treatment of General Wingate and this 
influenced General Slim's campaign history.26 
The sources 
The RAF PRO files are considerable but few of the 8000 or so deal with co-operation 
in the south-east Asia and any evidence is fragmentary and there are no files 
belonging to Operational Research Sections, a key source for co-operation. Similarly 
the Army files are equally limited. The Official Dispatches are again of limited value, 
written by high ranking air force officers they deal with operations as a whole and it is 
difficult to extract information on co-operation. 
In the Public Records Office, "Overseas Commands AIR 23/various" are a main 
source but AIR 20 and "AIR 39/Army Air Support policy" and "Air 39/141 Support 
by Fighters and Bombers". These have only limited material on co-operation, along 
with the WO and CAB files and a CID Paper. Few files deal directly with co-
operation in south-east Asia and any evidence is fragmentary. There are a few files 
dealing with Operational Research, AIR23/2108 and AIR23/2123 and W0291 and 
should be a key source for co-operation but are relatively useless. In general the 
relevant RAF files seem not well organised at source. The Official Dispatches are 
again of limited value, written by high ranking air force officers they deal with 
operations as a whole and it is difficult to extract information on co-operation. In AIR 
23/1985 is a report produced by the Army's Military Intelligence Directorate, on the 
Manipur operations of 1944, The Siege of Imphal. The RAF air historian in Singapore 
24 Elton, G.R., The Practice of History, (ninth imp.}, Collins. Fontana, Glasgow 1979. p. 100-1 
25 Charles Cruikshank, SOE in the Far East, op.cit., OUP 1983, p. vi. 
26 See Brig. Peter MeadOrdeWingate and the Historians, Braunton, Merlin 1897, who comments, 'Kirby's 
treatment of Wingate was exceptionally hostile.' p.18 and later, ' ... no other commander (not even Mountbatten, 
Giffard or Slim) received any separate assessment'. p. 93. 
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describes it as ' ... probably one of the most dangerous documents written regarding the 
Siege of Imphal in 1944.' 27 His opinion is written from the RAF point of view but the 
reasoning is logical for, whilst applauding the document on its detailed description of 
ground operations, it completely ignores the RAF contributions which were 
unarguably vital in two respects, Air Supply and Close Support. The Intelligence 
Directorate's report certainly does not seem to reflect the views of the soldier on the 
ground. 
Personal papers kept at the RAF museum and RAF Historical Department have also 
provided some information. Of the personal papers the Slim Papers are disappointing 
as there are few papers referring to Burma. The Gilchrist Papers are of more interest, 
relating to events in Bangkok and Singapore in 1941. The Peirse Papers at the RAF 
Museum at Hendon contain little relevant to co-operation but the Woods Papers have 
information on early SOE operations. The Portal Papers at Christs College, Oxford 
reflect the European priorities in London with few references to RAF Far East. 
There are numbers of books published on the war in south-east Asia but many authors 
have particular leanings and independent studies are rare. Generally the works fall 
into four categories: Official Histories, campaign histories, memoirs and general 
studies. A considerable amount of the published material has been of only limited 
value in examining army and air force co-operation. 
The official publications are fruitful sources but numerous volumes must be searched 
to gain even a skeletal picture of army and air force co-operation. The following were 
some of the most useful: Kirby's The War Against Japan, in five volumes is a useful 
source especially for statistics and maps. Sq. Ldr. Rexford Welch's Royal Air Force 
Medical Services, (3 volumes)1954-58, unfortunnately refers to Auster aircraft of the 
USAAF called 'Blood Chariots', in fact these were L-5s.28 A small point but it 
supports the description 'tentative' used by Higham when referring to RAF medical 
statistics.29Nevertheless, with F.A.E. Crew, The Army Medical Services: Campaigns 
(5 volumes) 1953-69 are valuable sources. The Australian official air war history, The 
Royal Australian Air Force 1939-42 vol.i by Gillison and The War Against Japan 
1943-45 vol.ii by Odgers are informative, especially Gillison on Malaya. Kit C. 
Carter and Robert Mueller, The Army Air Forces in World War II: Combat 
Chronology 1941-1945 is valuable for checking the dates of actions. For diplomatic 
background see Woodward, Documents on British Foreign Policy and British 
27 PRO AIR 23/1985, p.45. 
28 Rexford-Welch, op. cif., Royal Air Force Medical Services, vol.3 HMSO 1958, p. 570. 
29 Higham, op.cit., p. 231. 
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Foreign Policy in the Second World War. The Official Dispatches are useful, but need 
a degree of circumspection as they are written for a particular viewpoint.. 
Campaign Histories understandably have a particular bias, although possibly one of 
the best and most important wotks on the campaign, Slim's Defeat into Victory is a 
very balanced account of events. What is impressive is that it has rarely been 
criticised by any of those who served in Burma. Dr. Louis Alien's arguably ranks with 
the best histories of the campaign, Burma: The Longest War, but is mostly concerned 
with the ground war and the subject of co-operation or the air war is not mentioned 
except en passant.30 As a linguist and academic with access to Japanese material he 
has produced a very readable text with accuracy. In Professor Bond's Fallen Stars , 
Allen also brings insight to the character of General Mutaguchi. Probert's Forgotten 
Air Force and Christopher Shores' two volume Bloody Shambles, (1941-2), with their 
teams have focused on a factual account of the air war on daily basis. Both are 
usefuPl 
Major General Ian Lyall Grant's book Burma: The Turning Point is of substance and 
photographs in the book demonstrates the lengths to which the RAF went to extricate 
casualties. In a more general sense D.D. Smith's Battle for Burma is relatively 
lightweight and unfortunately does not quote sources and is typical of much of the 
published literature describing the campaign. 
Useful biographical information is provided by Richard Fuller's invaluable Shokan: 
Hirohito's Samurai and Mark Boatner's The Biographical Dictionary of World War 
Il. 
Gilchrist's Malaya 1941, gives an insight into the circumstances prior to the invasion 
of Thailand and Malaya. The author was part of the British Embassy staff in Bangkok 
at the time and can and does provide an authoritative and revealing perspective of the 
behind the scenes view of events. Percival was heavily criticised over the loss of 
Malaya but his campaign history, Malaya 1941, forms a useful picture of what was 
happening from the perspective of the Army Commander. 
Many memoirs consist of those written by former POW's, as well as those written-up 
from diaries or Log Books. These latter avoid the shortcomings associated with 
distant memory. For example, Donahue's Last Flight from Singapore is a poignant 
contemporary record of events. For a background to the war, Gilchrist Malaya 1941, 
30 Allen was a wa1timed (SOAS) Japanese linguist officer in U1e 14th Army in Burma. 
31 W g. Comdr. Probert was tile Head of the RAF Hist01ical Section. 
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Ismay ,The Memoirs of Lord Ismay, Liddell Hart, Memoirs vol. i. Duff Cooper, Old 
Men Forget, were all useful. Helpful sources are Rhodes-James' Chindit and Maslen 
-Jones' Fire by Order, relating to his experience as an AOP pilot. O'Brien's book 
relates to his experiences as an RAF 'Chindit' officer. 
Studies on peripheral subjects are useful. Although peripheral to co-operation 
necessary works are John Ellis', The Sharp End and Brute Force where there is 
information for casualty and sickness rates. The same can be said for infmmation on 
the Japanese Army in Merion and Susan Harries Soldiers of the Sun, and Adrian 
Stewart's The Underrated Enemy. W. David Mclntyre's The Rise and Fall of the 
Singapore Naval Base is worthwhile for information on the controversy surrounding 
Singapore. John W. Dower War Without Mercy is useful and analyses the bitterness 
of the war in the Far East and the Pacific. Sadao Obata The Japanese War and Sue 
Jarvis Japanese Codes both provide information on the difficuties and training of 
linguists at SAOS. Information on the struture of both the Indian and Australian 
forces is to be found in A.B.Lodge The Fall of General Gordon Bennett and F.W. 
Perry The Commonwealth armies which helps to shine a light on the collapse in 
Malaya. 
Robin Higham's Bases for Air Strategy is vital for providing technical background 
and is an academic insight into a critical but invisible infrastructure. Eric Bergerud's 
Fire in the Sky is informative on pilot training and both Higham and Bergerud discuss 
the effects of sickness on aircrew. Useful background on enlisted pilots in the 
USAAF is provided by Arbon in They also Flew. Peter C. Smith's books on 'Dive 
Bombers are informative on this type of close support aircraft and Thetford, Aircraft 
of the Royal Air Force since 1918 and Francillion, Japanese Aircraft of the Pacific 
War are unrivalled sources for aircraft information. Japanese Air Forces in World 
War II is an invaluable source for information on Japanese air force organisation, the 
sole copy is in the British Library Reserve. 
For the development of RAF bombing doctrine H. Montgomery-Hyde's British Air 
Policy Between the Wars is useful for an insight into this important aspect of the 
Second World War as is Barry D. Powers, Strategy Without a Slide Rule and 
Professor Ronald Schaffer's Wings of Judgement: American Bombing in World War 
11. 
Montgomery Hyde's Neville Chamberlain and Andrew Boyle's Trenchard along with 
Anthony Trythall's 'Boney' Fuller, were all useful in describing icing the approach to 
war. Professor Sabin's description of the Gr~dient of Force 'The Counter-Air Contest', 
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in Dynamics of Air Power was useful in understanding the importance of operational 
ranges. Incidentally, neither Richard Hallion Strike from the Sky nor Kriess Piercing 
the Fog have much to say on Burma but Eduard Mark's Aerial Interdiction in Three 
Wars is useful in comparing the differences between Asia and other areas, as is 
Robert B. Asprey's War in the Shadows. 
Norman Franks, The Air Battle of Imphal frequently quotes from interviews with 
aircrews and these are good source materials in one vital aspect, accuracy.32 In this 
vein Flight Lieutenant Williams book, 194 Squadron has been useful, included is a 
photograph of the pages of his 'Log Book' on Operation 'Thursday' and David J. Innes 
Beaufighters Over Burma gives insight into interdiction. Benjamin F. Cooling Case 
Studies in the Development of Close Air Support is invaluable in describing the 
history of this air tactic. 
Along with tactics and strategy, logistics is the third element of warfare. Considering 
that Burma was a Theatre where logistics was of major importance it is interesting 
that in three authors works on Logistics such as; Martin Van Creveld, Technology and 
War; From 2000 BC. to the Present, London, Brassey's 1991 and Supplying War; 
Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton, CUP reprint 1987 and John Ellis, Brute Force, 
Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World War, London, Andre Deutsche 1990, 
Burma is hardly mentioned. George C. Thorpe, Lt. Col., USMC, Pure Logistics; The 
Science of War Preparation, Washington DC, National Defense University 1986 
originally published in 1917, remains one of the most academic and informative 
books on logistics. Thorpe makes an informed comment on the reporting of Logistics 
when he says, 'That logistics has received so little academic attention and is so little 
mentioned in the literature of war is readily explained.'.33 He then goes on to ascribe 
the cause to it being 'stage management' unseen and therefore coming in third place 
after tactics and strategy and 'not the scene of action'. Van Creveld disappointingly, is 
only useful for illuminating problems and makes no mention of Burma, whilst Ellis' 
Brute Force Burma is limited to five pages in an Appendix. However he refers to the 
extremes of climate (Monsoon) and terrain of Burma in an earlier book, The Sharp 
End, which contains some useful statistics on the war in this area. 
Certain other works were helpful in making airlift comparisons. Ann and John Tusa's 
The Berlin Airlift and David Miller's The Cold War: A Military History were 
particularly so. In so far as the consequences of a failure of airlift Richard Muller The 
German Air War in Russia is useful in respect of Stalingrad. In this same vein, Robert 
32 Much is taken from Pilot's Log Books. 
33 Thorpe, op.cit., p. 2. 
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B. Asprey's War in the Shadows and Peter Macdonald's Giap provide a comparison 
with Dien Bien Phu. 
Peter Elphick, Far Eastern File, The Intelligence War in the Far East 1930-1945, and 
Richard Aldrich's Intelligence and the War Against Japan provided an informed 
picture and useful background information, particularly on the problems of inter-
service intelligence. Both go some way to explaining attitudes of both the Japanese 
and the British. M.R.D. Foot's SOE 1940-46 was helpful for SD operations in Burma. 
Interviews have to be treated with caution but were helpful. Messrs. Ellsworth, Rixon, 
Goodman, Smith, Hill, Kohler, Skelley, Eales, Morris and Gray discussed their 
knowledge and experiences on subjects as wide ranging as the Burmah Oil Company, 
fuel supplies, tyre pressures, squadron engineering, bombing, close support operations 
and Mules. Dr. M. Comes supplied useful information on fodder for mules. Private 
correspondence with Col. Scott Wiley of NASM, Washington and Norman Petersen 
of Oshkosh Air Museum provided information on tyre effects on runways. 
The IWM Video "Burma Victory: The Forgotten War" is a useful if unusual source. 
A collection of contemporary film shot by the Army Film Unit in Burma it contains 
visual evidence of air transport operations. 
Japanese Sources 
Available Japanese source material for south-east Asia presents a difficulty for non-
Japanese speaking researchers. There is very little that has been translated into 
English, the largest source available in English being the Japanese Monographs. 
However, these are revealing for the perceptions of the Japanese. 
The US sponsored Monographs typify source problems for this period. The following 
introduction to the Guide to Japanese Monographs, a series of personal recordings by 
former Japanese Officers instigated by the US army after the war, points out that they 
should be used with caution. 
In October 1945, General Headquarters, Far East [US] Command, directed the 
Japanese Government to prepare a complete history of the war in the Pacific. 
This history developed as a series of operational monographs which were 
written by former officers of the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy. Since 
most of the official records had been destroyed, either through bombings of 
military headquarters or by deliberate action after the surrender, the 
preparation of an accurate operational history proved extremely difficult. As 
might be expected, the studies vary widely in value and coverage: some were 
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prepared entirely from memory, others were amplified by material contained 
in diaries, fragmentary orders, or directives; ... There was little US. 
supervision or guidance ... there was tremendous variance in the knowledge 
and abilities of the translators, few of whom were completely familiar with 
either US. or Japanese terminology. For these reasons the studies must be 
used with caution .. . 34 
There are more than one hundred and eighty-four Monographs, of these thirty- three 
are concerned with Malaya, Singapore, Burma and the Dutch East Indies and have 
been translated into English and are held at the Army Historical Center in Washington 
DC. 
None of the Official Japanese War Histories Senshi sosho appear to have been 
translated into English and the Monographs are a useful sources of information.35 
However, they have a 'loose' style and the Japanese do not talk to 'foreigners' or even 
amongst themselves, about defeats. A recent television interview confirmed this 
aspect when, on being interviewed, a Japanese ex-soldier stated that, 'veterans don't 
talk about the war. .. we don't talk about bad things because it would shame Japan'.36 
The only Japanese military 'histories' available on Malaya in English are Tsuji's 
memoirs Singapore: The Japanese Version .. , Written retrospectively, his narrative 
writing is typically Japanese and 'free'. A degree of interpretation is required but that 
does not detract from its value. Reischauer and quoted by Marder confirmed that, 
" .. .it is easier to be ambiguous and vague in Japanese than in most Indo-
European tongues. "37 
A senior staff officer, he was in a unique position at the centre of Army Command. 
This book provides an insight to the thinking of the Japanese Army and makes useful 
comments of the effect of the RAF. Fujiwara's F Kikan and Mohan Singh's A Soldiers 
Contribution to Independence are complimentary accounts of the founding of the INA 
but are of little value on the air war. 
In attempting to understand the situations existing at the time, many wide ranging 
works such as Leslie Robins' Policing the Raj, T.D. Roberts' Area Handbookfor 
Burma, Robert. 0 . Paxton's Vichy France, Joseph Daracott's A Cartoon War and N.J. 
Westwood's Railways of India, have been consulted. They have all been useful in 
34 Guide to the Japanese Monographs and Japanese Studies on Manchuria, 1945-1960. Prepared by the Office 
of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Washington, DC. p. 3. 
35 Available in Washington DC. 
36 Interview in Horror in the East, BBC 2, 9pm 5th December 2000. 
37Marder, ibid, pp. ix-xi. 
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explaining or clarifying the problems and solutions of the many facets of co-
operation. 
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